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" . . .  The less you eat, drink 
and read books; the less you go to 
the theatre, the dance hall, the 
public-house; the less you think, 
love, theorise, sing, paint, fence, 
etc., the more you save— the err eater 
becomes your treasure which neither 
moths nor dust will devour— your 
capital. The less you are, the 
more you have; the less you express 
your own life, the greater is your 
alienated life— the greater is the 
store of your estranged being . . . "
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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to analyze The Economic 
and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 by Karl Marx to determine 
whether a theory of alienation can be found in these writings. 
The major ideas are arranged in systematic order to identify 
the nature# causes and consequences of alienation". The final 
aim is to determine what relevance the Manuscripts. particu­
larly the ideas on alienation# have for modern sociology.
Although there have been several commentaries and dis­
cussions on the Manuscripts. to the writer’s knowledge no one 
has analyzed or reconstructed systematically the treatment of 
alienation by Marx in his 1844 papers. The basic data for 
the study are from the English translation by Martin Milligan 
of The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 which was 
published by the Foreign Languages Publishing House in 1961. 
Additional use is made of Milligan's translation published 
by International Publishers in 1964# edited and introduced 
by Dirk J. Struik.
The specific approach of the study generally resembles 
the procedure of content analysis. Each statement in the 
Manuscripts which was judged as important was put on an index 
card? this procedure was repeated to include important 
passages missed the first time. The cards were grouped into
categories based on. the content of the material. The general 
framework was the identification of causes, forms and conse­
quences of alienation. The cards were rearranged into a 
meaningful order disregarding the original place of the 
statements in the Manuscripts. The present study resulted 
from the analysis and interpretation of the theory formulated 
in this new ordering.
An examination of the general intellectual orientation 
of the Manuscripts reveals a sociological conception of 
society and the individual, an emphasis on economic and 
social categories of analysis, the Hegelian influence 
especially in the dialecticalirmethod, and the important 
effect of Feuerbachian materialism.
Alienation is defined in terms of alienated labour.
In the Manuscripts alienated labour refers to forced and 
external labour in which the worker finds no meaning, no 
happiness or contentment, no satisfaction of needs, no free­
dom or control, no mental growth or physical development.
It is activity which belongs to another, is not spontaneous 
and becomes simply a means to satisfy the needs of physical 
existence. In political economy it becomes solely wage- 
earning activity.
The three primary sources of alienation are identified 
to be private property, political economy, and the division 
of labour and exchange.
The manifestations of alienation, the forms in which
vii
it occurs in real life, are (1) alienation from the act of 
production; (2) alienation from the product of labour; (3) 
alienation from man's species being; and (4) alienation of 
man from man. These are sequentially related, each form 
being an empirical indicator of the presence of all prior 
forms.
There are three immediate or direct consequences of 
alienation: (1) private property; (2) wages; and (3) the
relation of the non-worker to the worker and to labour.
Other indirect or long-range consequences include the worker 
as a commodity, increased value of things, priority of 
economic over human matters, and an increase of economic 
asceticism and conservatism.
The resolution of alienation is dependent upon the 
abolition of private property and the development of mature 
communism. The final stage, which is higher than communism, 
is socialism, meaning positive humanism.
The findings of this analysis are stated in propo- 
sitional form to demonstrate the interdependent relationships 
among these phenomena and to suggest hypotheses. Marx's 
theory of alienation has great relevance for the contemporary 




Initial interest in The Economic and Philosophic 
Manuscripts of 1844,^  written in Paris by Karl Marx who was
i
then in his mid-twenties, grew out of a more general interest 
of the writer in the problem of alienation in modern 
society. This curiosity is shared by many who, for a 
variety of reasons, have recently begun to read and reread 
the work of Marx, particularly his early writings. The 
upsurge of interest in his early work has resulted mainly 
from the late publication of these Manuscripts which first 
occurred in English in 1956. These writings have not been 
known for long in the rest of the world since first publica­
tion of them appeared in Russian in 1927 and in German in 
1932 and 1955.3 It has been only in very recent years, 
however, that much attention has been given to them. The 
results have been dramatic.
There has been always a certain amount of scholarly 
perplexity over the ideas of Karl Marx. In addition to 
intellectual confusion, leaders in the movement of modern 
communism from Lenin on have carefully selected that of Marx 
which "fits" their programs and have, as is well known now,
distorted his work quite drastically. A further complica­
tion is that Marx's writings, especially his "mature" works, 
were done in conjunction with Frederick Engels; this raises 
the continual query as to which are Marx's ideas and which 
are Engels1. Engels in fact was responsible for publication 
of some works of Marx after the latter's death. One cannot 
assume that the comments, interpretations, and evaluations 
of Engels alone about work done many years before necessarily 
represented the convictions of Marx. Indeed, it is partly 
because of this long collaboration with Engels and the post­
humous publications that the 1844 Manuscripts have special 
importance. For these contain Marx's ideas in a unique 
intellectual period when he was moving away from philosophy, 
formulating notions on which he later elaborated and 
expressing ideas of his own, relatively free of the strong 
influence which Engels was tonexert shortly thereafter. 
Certainly by 1844 Marx was already affected by the ideas of 
many men of his period and had become acquainted with Engels' 
thinking in his writing in the Annals (Deutsch-Franzosische 
Jahrbucher). Nevertheless, it should be enphasized that the 
Manuscripts afford one of the clearest views of Marx alone 
and that they are important in understanding Marx and in 
distinguishing Marx from Engels.
The present interest in the Manuscripts stems from the 
treatment of alienation, which is the main subject of Marx's 
analysis in these documents.
3I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBIEM
The basic purpose of this study is to analyze The 
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 by Karl Marx to 
determine whether a theory of alienation can be found in 
these writings. In addition, an effort is made to arrange 
the major thoughts into systematic order in broad terms of 
the nature, causes, and consequences of alienation. The 
final aim is to determine what relevance the Manuscripts 
and particularly the ideas on alienation have for modern 
sociology and the contemporary study of alienation.
It should be emphasized that the study is limited to 
the quest for a theory of alienation in Marx's early 
writings. The scope of the study, therefore, does not 
include consideration of related and important issues such 
as the debate over the young versus the old Marx, the place 
of alienation in his later writings or the relation of the 
Manuscripts to the rest of Marx's writings. The analysis may 
produce some insight into these matters but they are outside 
the scope of this dissertation.
Although there have been several commentaries and dis­
cussions on the Manuscripts. to be reviewed in the third 
section of this chapter, to the writer's knowledge no one 
has analyzed or systematically reconstructed the ideas of 
Marx on alienation from his 1844 writings. It is the goal 
of this study to order these ideas for purposes of clarifica- 
tion without violating the Marxian meaning or intention.
4II. THE PROCEDURE OF THE STUDY
The translation of the Manuscripts by Milligan is 
generally recognized as the best available English transla­
tion. Additional use has been made of Milligan's translation 
published in paperback by International Publishers in 1964. 
The latter contains an introduction by Dirk Struik, who com­
pared the Milligan translation with the 1932 and 1955 German 
editions and made changes where appropriate. The present 
writer made selected checks of the Milligan translation by 
reading passages on key concepts in the German.
The specific approach in analyzing the manuscripts 
generally resembles the procedure of content analysis.
While it is inappropriate to apply the highly quantitative 
approach which has developed in the field of content analysis, 
the purpose is to relate similar ideas and to put them into 
systematic and meaningful order.
The material was handled, following a careful reading 
of the Manuscripts. by putting each statement which was 
judged to be important on index cards. This procedure was 
repeated to include any material which had been missed during 
the first step. The cards were grouped into categories based 
on the content of the material. The procedure utilized an 
inductive approach. The general framework behind the process 
was an interest in the identification of causes, forms and 
consequences of alienation. The cards were rearranged into 
a meaningful order disregarding their original place in these
informal writings.^ By continual analysis and rearrangement 
and rechecking of these cards, the analysis which follows 
resulted.
To provide the reader with the basic data and to 
facilitate the reader's check on this interpretation, direct 
quotations from the Milligan translation appear frequently 
either in the body, if deemed particularly important, or in 
the footnotes of this writing.
III. REVIEW OP SELECTED LITERATURE
With increased exposure of the Manuscripts and renewed 
interest in the work of Marx, numerous interpretations of 
Marx have appeared in this decade particularly. This review 
of the literature will be limited, for the sake of manage­
ability and pertinence, to the major analyses and interpreta­
tions of the 1844 Manuscripts only. The purpose here is to 
indicate the major interpretations of the Manuscripts by 
each author and to contrast in a general way the perspective 
which each has on Marx's ideas on alienation in these early 
writings.
Erich Fromm.— To a greater extent than any contemporary 
writer Fromm has attempted to apply the Marxian notions of 
alienation to contemporary society. His general approach is 
focused on the problems of modern man, however, rather than 
a detailed interpretation of Marx. Most interesting, for 
example, is Fromm's discussion in The Sane Socifetv in which
he tries to apply the concept of alienation to empirically 
observable phenomena. In his analysis of Marx he states 
that Marx's thought has Messianic-religious overtones par­
ticularly where he speaks of socialism as the beginning of 
history.6 Fromm states that Marx was naive in assuming that 
emancipation from capitalism would produce free and coopera- 
tive individuals automatically. Fromm's own solution, 
communitarian socialism, is more concerned with participa­
tion and power relations; Marx sought his in the relations 
of production and the very nature of work.
In Marx's Concept of Man, which contains T. B. 
Bottomore's translation of the Manuscripts, Fromm says that 
for.Marx the process of alienation is expressed in work and 
in the division of labour?8 A point on which this writer 
disagrees with Fromm relates to his statement that Marx did 
not foresee the extent to which alienation was to become the 
fate of the vast majority of people, especially those who 
manipulate symbols and men instead of machines.8 It will be 
demonstrated later, especially in Chapter VI, that Marx did 
foresee this development and writes about it specifically.
In reply to Bell's criticism that Marx was concerned 
with alienation only as it related to the economic system 
and not with individual or psychological alienation, Fromm 
states that alienation for Marx cannot be divorced from the 
concrete and real life process of the individual. ".
Bell does not see— or does not mention-— that Marx criticized
capitalism precisely because it destroys individual person­
ality. . . .1,10 The critical implications of the concept of 
alienation for Marx are mentioned by other interpreters.
Furthermore, Fromm takes the position that the concept 
of alienation remained the focal point of thinking for Marx 
and that the later writings cannot be understood apart from 
the early Manuscripts.
To sum up this point of the alleged difference 
between the young and mature Marx: it is true that
Marx (like Engels), in the course of a lifetime, 
changed some of his ideas and concepts. He became 
more adverse to the use of terms too close to 
Hegelian idealism? his language became less enthu­
siastic and eschatological? probably he was also 
more discouraged in the later years of his life than 
he was in 1844. But in spite of certain changes in 
concepts, in mood, in language, the core of the 
philosophy developed by the young Marx was never 
changed, and it is impossible to understand his con­
cept of socialism, and his criticism of capitalism 
as developed in his later years, except on the basis 
of the concept of man which he developed in his 
early writings.li
In Beyond the Chains of Illusion: My Encounter With
Marx and Freud. Fromm repeats his conclusion that the idea 
of alienation, if not the word, remains central to Marx's
later work. He points out that for Marx alienation begins
/ # 1 2  with the division of labour found in civilized societies.
It will be demonstrated later that the division of labour is
one of several sources of alienation, according to the 8844
Manuscripts. In contrasting Marx' s optimistic view of
history with the skeptical orientation of Freud, Fromm
emphasizes Marx's faith in the perfectibility of man and in
human progress:
. . . for Marx# history is a march toward man's 
self-realization; society, whatever the evils 
produced by any given society may be, is the con­
dition for man's self-creation and unfolding. The 
rgood society' for Marx becomes identical with the 
society of good men# that is# of fully developed# 
sane and productive individuals.I3
Erich Fromm presents in all his major works a clear, 
undistorted interpretation of Marx. He uses Marxian theory 
to analyze and criticize modern society and the problems of 
modern man. Finally# although he is less concerned with a 
systematic interpretation of Marx, he effectively utilizes 
Marxian thought to develop his own notions of socialism and 
its possibilities.
John Schaar.— In his book. Escape From Authority.
which is a critique of Erich Fromm, John Schaar claims that
in Fromm's attempt to broaden the meaning of alienation and
to give it more psychological depth, he loses the precision
and analytic utility of Marxian alienation.^  The present
writer agrees with Schaar on this poiht. Schaar believes
that alienation is central to Marx's whole critique of
capitalism and to his entire work.-^ Schaar's view of
Marxian alienation is that it is a constraint of liberty# a
form of slavery which prevents man from realizing himself.^-®
Schaar criticizes Marx for not making clear how socialism
would end alienation# particularly if alienation is rooted
17in the division of labour. He also feels that capitalism 
is probably the result# rather than the cause of alienation# 
since the latter has been of concern during all of Western
history. Finally, Schaar distinguishes between self-aliena­
tion and alienation from others in social-psychological 
terms and emphasizes the point that alienation may not neces­
sarily be destructive, but may strengthen the self and become 
a creative force. He criticizes Fromm for failing to see 
the advantages of alienation.
Robert Tucker.--Many analysts of the Manuscripts and 
other early works, including some listed here, have given 
little or no attention to alienation. Robert Tucker is an 
exception. In his Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, ^*8 
alienation receives rather extensive attention, particu­
larly in a chapter entitled, "Alienation and Money-Worship." 
The thesis <5f Tucker1 s work is that Marxism is a religious 
system, a religion of revolution, and that Marx has gone 
beyond philosophy to create a myth, in the old tradition out
1 Q
of which philosophy originally arose. Partly due to this 
peculiar interpretation of Marx, Tucker runs into difficulty 
in explaining Marxian alienation. The basis of alienation 
is egoism and the desire for wealth.20 One has difficulty, 
however, in identifying whose egoism and greed causes 
alienation, as Tucker interprets it. Tucker's explanation 
of the meaning of alienation for the worker appears rather 
accurate. The problem arises in the philosophic-psycho­
logical framework, rather than in the social-economic frame­
work, which Tucker utilizes. He is led to the conclusion 
that class conflict, the relations between the worker and
10
the capitalist, is simply an external mechanism for explain­
ing the internal motivations and emotions of men. Conflict 
within the self is the real matter? it is partly a result of 
Marx's own personal conflict and his strong urge for self- 
aggrandizement. The drive for acquisition and the passion 
of greed is the real evil against which men must revolt.
Finally, Tucker criticizes Marx for linking self- 
alienation and the alienation of man from man . He takes an 
anti-sociological approach. It will be seen that this 
contradicts the entire orientation of the Manuscripts.
Tucker concludes that Marx is a moralist and that "Marx's 
economics, growing out of the premise that man’s self­
alienation is a 'fact of political economy,' were economics 
of self-alienation.Tucker also feels that "human self­
alienation and the over-coming of it remained always the
supreme concern of Marx and the central theme of his 
22thought." In the opinion of Tucker, Marx was mistaken in 
concluding that self-alienation is the essence of capitalism 
and is linked to money-worship. Rather alienation is a 
psychological fact, which is related to egoism. Marx's real 
shortcoming for Tucker is his failure to locate alienation 
within the personality, to trace it to its real source in
the self.
Tucker's general conclusion is that Marx is a reli­
gious thinker who has constructed or created a secular myth.
11
Roger Garaudy,— A recent contribution to the under­
standing of Marx is Roger Garaudy's Karl Marx: The Evolu­
tion of His Thought.2^ After discussing the relation between 
Feuerbach, Hegel and Marx in a section on "The Alienation of 
Labor," Garaudy points out that for Marx the viewpoint of 
bourgeois political economy was one of alienation because it 
sees only what is apparent and cannot understand the problem 
oW alienated labour from the worker's position.2  ^ Labour is 
not distinguished from any other commodity and is purchased 
as any raw material. Because of its limited perspective, 
" . . .  Bourgeois political economy is condemned to positiv­
ism, to the establishment of definitive laws alone as the 
unchanging relations between phenomena." ° On the other hand, 
"The Marxist theory of alienation is not only an exposure of 
the illusions of positivism, but also a method for the criti­
que of positivism."2  ^ The revolution in philosophy which 
Marx brought about was a "change in class viewpoint. Marxism 
is, in the first place, the philosophy of labour because it is 
the philosophy of workers, for whom nature is not a creation 
or alienation from the mind but the very substance of labour."28
Garaudy discusses three "essential aspects of labour's 
alienation" of which Marx writes in the Manuscripts: (1) the
alienation from the product of labour which involves the sale 
of labour power for the fulfillment of someone else's goals. 
Garaudy says that "here alienation is dispossession.1,29 
Next the alienation from the act of labour is mentioned. 
Because the methods of one's work are determined by the boss
12
and the worker is an appendage to the machines, "here alien­
ation is depersonalization."3° The third aspect is aliena­
tion from species-life. Here the results of the creations 
of all past humanity are in the hands of a few. "Capital is 
the alienated power of humanity raising itself above men 
like an alien and inhuman power. Alienation here is dehuman­
ization.
Alienation appears at all levels of society: on the
economic level it is the fetishism of commodities, on the 
political level it is the mystification of the state where 
freedom is a myth, on the spiritual level it is a world of 
divided men.^
Alienation is the opposite of creation. That is 
why the alienation of labour;, if it is not the sole 
alienation, is root of all others. It is this 
that corrupts, t _ its v- ry source, all creative 
work, that is, the essenuo of m a n . 33
To overcome alienation one must do more than grasp it 
in the philosophical sense. Garaudy correctly interprets 
Marx as assigning the mission of overcoming alienation to 
the proletariat. As Garaudy puts it, the very being for the 
worker depends on "breaking the iron laws of having.
It is in this profound sense that the working 
class is the only revolutionary class to the very 
end. Indivisibly its class struggle challenges the 
entire social order and signifies the destiny of 
man— of all m e n . 35
John Horton.— In an article on "The Dehumanization of
j
Anomie and Alienation: A Problem in the Ideology of Soci-
36ology," John Horton explains the frameworks behind each of 
these concepts and their subsequent meanings for contemporary
13
sociology. He contends that anomie and alienation are radi­
cal concepts containing different ideologies and stemming 
from different interests, values and assumptions.3  ^ Marxian 
alienation is concerned with the legitimacy rather than the 
problem of social control, ". . . it is a problem of power 
defined as domination."38
. . . For Marx, alienation from society is .a 
priori alienation from self. Anomie concentrates 
on barriers to the orderly functioning of society; 
alienation on barriers to the productive growth of 
individuals, and by extension, barriers to the 
adaptive change of the social system. . . .39
While neither Durkheim nor Marx gave precise operational 
definitions to their concepts, the latter cannot be under­
stood apart from their radical, critical and historical 
context.
In further comparison Horton contrasts alienation as 
an immanent interpretation of man and society, anomie as a 
transcendent one. Marxian alienation cannot be understood 
except in terms of this "human and active side of the man- 
society relationship . . . man is his activity, his objects, 
man is society."^8 Marx is concerned with man's freedom and 
autonomy, not with order and harmony.
Marx wanted to humanize society, to organize the 
actual world so that man could experience himself as 
man (free and autonomous in his human or productive 
activity). Durkheim proposed to humanize Hobbesian 
.man through the extension of social control. . .  .41
Nevertheless, both men were critical of society, of self-
interest and egoism, of competition and inequality and the
pursuit of economic goals as ends in themselves. In these
14
terras they have been misinterpreted and misunderstood by 
many contemporary sociologists who claim to continue in 
their traditions.
Dirk J. Struik.— The American edition of Martin 
Milligan's translation of the Manuscripts, published by 
International Publishers, is edited and introduced by Dirk 
J. Struik.42 Struik discusses the influences on Marx, 
particularly Feuerbach and Hegel.43 Having critically 
selected important elements from both and having reviewed 
the work of English and French economists, Marx "breaks with 
classical political economy and takes fully the point of 
view of the working class."44 In attacking civil society 
and its effects on man, Marx actually begins his future 
analysis of capitalist society.43 Political economy has 
taken for granted the very elements which Marx criticizes, 
as demonstrated in his treatment of labour as the source of 
all wealth. In addition, Marx develops a conception of 
communism different from others of his day. Basic to the 
Manuscripts is the analysis of alienation.
. . . The problem of alienation that Hegel 
divined to reside in man's relation to the labour 
process, and Feuerbach saw in man's relation to the 
deity, finds its solution in the abolition of pri­
vate property. Communism emerges as the final 
answer to one of the most fundamental problems 
raised by classical German philosophy.46
Struik relates the "main characteristic traits of 
alienation" of Marx: (1) alienation of labour from its
product; (2) alienation of labour from the act of production,
15
self-alienation; (3) alienation of man from nature, hence 
from his species, mankind.^7 This delineation is rather 
confusing although it represents one of the few attempts to 
elaborate on alienation as presented in the Manuscripts.
In evaluating reactions to the Manuscripts Struik 
points out the relevance of these writings to present 
society, "we are shocked to see how aptly it fits. . . .*>48 
Struik is critical of those who tend to separate alienation 
from the historical process of class struggle, as in the 
case of F r o m m . I n  addition, he strongly disagrees with 
those who interpret Marx as philosophical (existentialists), 
mythical (Tucker) or metaphysical (Bigo). Finally, Struik 
concludes that there is nothing in the later writings of 
Marx and Engels to indicate that their concern about aliena-
C A
tion ever terminated.
Lewis Feuer.— In an article entitled "What is Aliena­
tion? The Career of a concept1 5 -^ Lewis Feuer considers the 
Marxian meaning of alienation, the appeal of the concept 
among American intellectuals and the usefulness of the con­
cept for understanding society. Feuer's thesis is that the 
concept of alienation was a romantic notion with a strong 
sexual connotation and was largely a "protest of romantic 
individualism against the new capitalist civilization."5  ^
Feuer quotes Feuerbach and Marx to make the point that the 
real meaning of alienation meant being estranged from one's 
physical and sexual life.
16
The alienation of man from himself signified 
that his natural human emotions had been distorted. 
Alienation signified a. mode of life in which man was 
being compelled by social circumstances to act self- 
destructively, to cooperate in his own self-mutilation, 
his castration, that is, the destruction of his own 
manhood. . . .S3
The basis for Feuer1s analysis is his premise that Marx and 
Engels "regarded love, not work, as the source of man's 
sense of reality."54 He feels that they were far more con­
cerned with man's return to nature and to himself than with 
the class struggle, particularly during the 1840's. There­
fore, it was only after they dropped the notion of aliena­
tion, according to Feuer, that class, struggle became the 
focus.55 This peculiar interpretation then leads Feuer to 
conclude that the socialism of Marx and Engels has itsi  ^
roots in violence, hatred and aggression rather than l o v e . 5 6  
Furthermore, Feuer explains the reluctance of Marx and 
Engels to publish the early manuscripts by the embarrassment 
they felt because of the sexual and romantic language of
e  •7
their early years.
This psychoanalytic interpretation of a small portion 
of Marx's writing reflects a lack of understanding of Marx's 
view of man and of the relation of man to his world. Marx's 
discussion of the relation of man to woman, for example, is 
a profound philosophical-anthropological statement which 
demonstrates Marx's equation of humanism with naturalism. 
Feuerrs interpretation indicates a narrow and somewhat 
pathological approach which considers -neither the context in 
which these passages appear nor the general assumptions about
17
man on which they are based.
Feuer goes on to distinguish six “modes" of alienation 
in modem society which are “independent of each other.1,58 
Marx probably would not agree that these exhaust the possi­
bilities or that these types of alienation can be independent 
of one another.
In his consideration of the usefulness of alienation 
as a contemporary concept, Feuer raises some interesting 
points, particularly in his criticism of Melvin Seeman's 
definition of the concept. Most importantly, one cannot, as 
Seeman intends, remove the critical, polemical element from 
the idea of alienation.
. . . But the will to criticize and polemize is 
precisely the essential intent behind the idea of 
alienation, and a multitude of alienated persons 
would be dissatisfied equally with conditions of 
power-possession, meaningfulness, norm-orientedness, 
involvement, and self-acknowledgment.59
Feuer adds that "Alienation has a way of eluding a fixed set
of dimensions because it is as multipotential as the varie-
60etiesoceE human experience. Feuer's criticisms of Seeman
are worthwhile.
To explain the appeal of the concept of alienation to
American intellectuals Feuer suggests that it is a response
to the prosperity and comfort which a generation of leftist
intellectuals has experienced. Alienation in this case
serves as a kind of self-reproach to the recognition that it
was status and power which they have enjoyed and wanted all 
61along. It is a last response to their own self-betrayal.
18
This point may be worth pursuing from a sociology of knowl­
edge perspective.
Peuer concludes that the concept of alienation has 
little value. " . . .  what it says can be better said with­
out it. . .
T . B. Bottomore.— Bottomore1s comments on the Manu­
scripts are confined to his "Introduction" to Karl Marx: 
Early Writings65 which he published in 1964. Bottomore's 
translation was not used for the analysis to follow in these 
chapters, however, since his tendency is toward liberal 
interpretation which reflects Bottomore as much as Marx. 
Bottomore makes the point that Marx's ideas on alienation 
began in a philosophical context; he mentions Marcuse and 
Lukacs who feel that Marx always remained, to some degree, a 
Hegelian.®4 The objection which Bottomore has to Tucker's 
treatment of Marx is his depiction of Marx as a "thorough­
going Hegelian" and his emphasis on Marx as a religious 
thinker, which was discussed here earlier.65 Bottomore feels 
that Marx stressed the human qualities and failings of men 
in the Manuscripts. Furthermore, he prefers to emphasize 
the scientific orientation of Marx.
. . .His whole life and work reveal not only a 
moral passion, but more strikingly a passion for 
empirical inquiry and factual knowledge. It is this 
scientific bent, and conversely his distaste for 
speculative philosophy, which marks most clearly his 
divergence from Hegel's followers in Germany. In his 
early writings we see Marx proceeding from a critical 
examination of Hegelian philosophy to a direct study 
of the economic and political problems of modern 
society as they are ^represented in the works of the 
economists. . . .66
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Bottomore prefers to view the early writings as a 
stage in the development of ideas. Even though Marx is 
engaged in a criticism of philosophical thought in his early 
writings and can be expected therefore to reflect that 
orientation, he is even there concerned with "the empirical 
study of modern economic and political problems."67
Daniel Bell.— Daniel Bell is one of the leading expo­
nents of the notion that a distinction should be made between 
the young Marx and the old Marx. He explains this position 
in an essay entitled "Two Roads From Marx"68 in which the 
thesis is that the yogng Marx wrote about the problem of 
alienation but that in later years his concern became 
exploitation. Bell claims that Marx was never really inter­
ested in economics but studied political economy because it 
contained " . . .  the material expression of that alienation: 
the process of exploitation.1,69 This, of course, somewhat 
contradicts Bell's assertion that mature Marx had rejected
70
his interest in alienation. However, one can agree with 
Bell that Marx focused upon the sociological and economic 
dimensions of alienation rather than the psychological 
overtones.71 The Manuscripts indicate that this is true also 
of the young Marx.
Daniel Bell recognizes the importance of Marx in 
bringing to philosophy a concern with real human activity 
and in placing the problem of alienation in the work situ­
ation. This meant that man could in fact do something about 
alienation.
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. . .As ontology, as an ultimate, man could only 
accept alienation. As a social fact, rooted in a 
specific system of historical relations, alienation 
could be overcome by changing the social system. . . . ^
Bell also feels that in moving his focus from man in general
to social classes, "individuals, and their motives, count
no
for nought." It will be seen that Marx's perspective in 
the Manuscripts is sociological and economic; it appears 
unjustifiable to demand of him a psychological analysis as 
well.
In his essay on "The Debate on Alienation" Bell states 
that 11. . . it is only further myth-making to read this con­
cept (alienation) back as the central theme of Marx. 
Furthermore, he feels that attempts to renew interest in 
Marxian alienation are the result of the disorientation of 
radical intellectuals in Europe who have become disillusioned 
with contemporary communism. In general, it appears that 
Bell rejects alienation because of its implicit critical and 
revolutionary overtones. He is a man who does not wish to 
critically analyze and evaluate capitalism.
Fritz Pappenheim.— One of the earliest analyses of 
Marxian alienation within the present period of renewed 
interest is Fritz Pappenheim's The Alienation of Modem Man; 
An Interpretation Based on Marx and TOnnies which was pub­
lished in 1959.7® Pappenheim is concerned mainly with 
inquiring into the nature and sources of alienation. He
C
concludes that neither politics nor technology are causes of 
modern alienation, and that one must look to the social
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structure (the socio-economic framework). Here he compares
Ferdinand Tonnies and Karl Marx. He sees an affinity between
Tonnies1s concept of Gesellschaft and Marx's theory of
capitalist economy. Capitalist society is one without the
ties of Gemeinschaft ? this is the plight of the dehumanized
human being, of the alienated man.^® For Marx the existence
of contemporary man is largely shaped by the rise and
dominant influence of commodity exchange. With this have
come the separation and predominance of exchange value over 
7 7use value. ' We consequently emphasize market relationships 
and think of ourselves as potential buyers and sellers.
Therefore, Pappenheim says that both TOnnies and Marx 
recognized the separation between man and man as the basic 
characteristic of modern society. Marx finds that two 
relationships in particular are dominated by the trend toward 
separation; (1) the relation between buyer and seller and 
(2) the relation between employer and workman.78
Herbert Marcuse.— -A section on Marx and alienated 
labour appears in Marcuse's well-known book. Reason and Revolu­
tion; Hegel and The Rise of Social Theory. M a r c u s e  men­
tions Marx's criticism of the division of labour which operates 
entirely "according to the laws of capitalist commodity 
production" with no "consideration for the talents of indi­
viduals and the interest of the whole."88 The materialistic 
proposition at the base of Marx's theory is stated as historical 
fact and a critique.81 Furthermore, in order to completely
fulfill himself, man must be free to develop his intellectual 
and physical faculties so that he can live in a world he has 
made. This self-realization requires the abolition of the
can
prevailing mode of labour. Marcuse briefly summarizes the
process whereby labour becomes alienated and mentions the 
often overlooked fact that "alienation affects all strata of 
society," according to Marx.8  ^ Moreover, the early writings 
as well as Capital contain statements on the process of 
reification "through which capitalist society makes all per­
sonal relations between men take the form of objective 
relations between things."8^
Marcuse's interest in Hegel brings him to the dia­
lectic as found in Marx. The principle of negativity in the 
dialectic means that "every fact is more than a mere fact? 
it is a negation and restriction of real possibilities."8^
. . . Wage labour is a fact, but at the same time 
it is a restraint on free work that might satisfy 
human needs. Private property is a fact, but at the 
same time it is a negation of man's collective 
appropriation of nature. . . .
. . . The negativity of capitalist society lies 
in its alienation of labour; the negation of this 
negativity will come with the abolition of 
alienated labour. . . .86
Marcuse also mentions the crucial point that the abolition of
private property is simply ammeans for the abolition of
alienated labour. If man does not use the means of production
t
for the fulfillment of each individual, socialized production 
will be only another form of subjugation.87 The fundamental 
interest for Marx is in having a society of free indi­




Other Sources on Marxian Alienation. “— The review of 
the literature presented above contains the major sources on 
Marxian alienation, especially as found in the Manuscripts. 
There are other sources available which are useful in under­
standing Marx but which were excluded from this review 
because they have relatively little to say either about 
alienation or about the Manuscripts. They should be men­
tioned, nevertheless, because they are important sources in 
the study of Marx.
Cornu90 and Hook,9*1 for example, are valuable sources 
in understanding the development of Marxian thought in terms 
of the influences upon him. Acton9^ and Adams,93 especially 
the latter, are particularly helpful in the study of Marx's 
early writings. Recent collections which deal at least in 
part with Marxian alienation are those edited by Fromm,9^ 
Horowitz,95 and Aptheker.96
IV. THE SCHEME OF ANALYSIS
This analysis of Marx's theory of alienation in the 
1844 Manuscripts is organized in the following way according 
to chapters. Chapter II is an examination of the general 
intellectual orientation of Marx as found in the Manuscripts. 
It includes Marx's ideas on society and the individual, his 
categories of analysis, the dialectical method, materialism 
and the approach to alienation.
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Chapter III deals with the nature of alienation. It 
is an attempt to define alienation in as precise terms as 
the Manuscripts allow.
The sources of alienation are treated in Chapter IV. 
The three primary sources examined!acd private property, 
political economy, and the division of labour and exchange.
Chapter V is concerned with the manifestations of 
alienation, that is, with the forms in which alienated labour 
manifests itself in real life. The four manifestations are 
(1) alienation from the act of production; (2) alienation 
from the product of labour; (3) alienation from man's species 
being; and (4) alienation of man from man.
The consequences of alienation are discussed in 
Chapter VI. These include three major immediate conse­
quences—  (1) private property; (2) wages; (3) the property- 
relation of the non-worker to the worker and to labour— and 
several indirect or long-range consequences. The latter 
involve (1) the worker as a commodity; (2) increased value 
of things; (3) priority of economic over human concerns; and 
(4) an increase of asceticism and conservatism.
In Chapter VII the resolution of alienation is 
examined to the extent allowed by the Manuscripts. Of 
particular interest in this chapter is Marx's analysis of 
communism which is to follow capitalism.
Chapter VIII, the concluding chapter of this analysis, 
contains in propositional form where possible a summary of 
the findings of the study. The second part of the chapter
deals with Marx and the sociological study of alienation in 
terms of the major questions frequently raised.
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FOOTNOTES
3-The edition of the Manuscripts which is used in this 
study is Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts 
of 1844, trans. by Martin Milligan (Moscow: Foreign Lan­
guages Publishing House, 1961). All references hereafter to 
this edition will be indicated as the Manuscripts. Any other 
editions used will be given a complete citation. The Manu­
scripts are informal, unpublished sheets on which Marx was 
working out his ideas in 1844 in Paris. These papers, now 
in the British Museum, are old, damaged, unpolished and 
incomplete. In the English translation by Martin Milligan, 
an editor's footnote on the first page explains the rather 
inconsistent form, peculiar arrangement and missing pages 
from at least the first two manuscripts. "Economic and 
Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 by Karl Marx has come down 
to us in the form of three manuscripts, each of which has 
its own pagination (in Roman figures). Just the last four 
pages have survived of the second manuscript (pp. XL-XLIII). 
Each of the 27 pages of the first manuscript is broken up 
into three columns with two vertical lines, and each of the 
columns on each page is supplied with a heading written in 
beforehand: Wages of labour. Profit of Capital. Rent of
Land. After p. XVII, inclusive, it is only the column 
headed Rent of Land which is filled in, and after p. XXII to 
the end of the first manuscript Marx wrote across the three 
columns, disregarding the headings. The text of these six 
pages (pp. XXII-XXVII) is given in the present book under 
the editor1s title, Estranged Labour. The third manuscript 
contains 43 large pages divided into two columns and 
paginated by Marx himself. At the end- of the third (pp. 
XXXIX-XL) is the Introduction, which is given in the present 
volume at the beginning, preceding the text of the first 
manuscript." Page 14. Milligan also mentions that the title 
and headings of these papers were given by the Institute of 
Marxism-Leninism. The Introduction and Critique of Hegelian 
Dialectic were arranged in order according to a remark by 
Marx in the Introduction. The first German edition was: 
"Okonomish-philosophische Manuskripte" (1844), in Marx- 
Enqels Gesamtausgabe. vol. Ill (Berlin: Marx-^Engels
Institute, 1932).
2A review of some of the major studies on alienation 
in recent literature revealed no consistency in the opera­
tionalization of the concept, no theoretical foundation for 
most of.the research, and consequently little, if any, 
relationship among the studies. Most of the research appears 
to contribute little to an understanding of this complex and 
pervasive phenomenon. On the other hand, a glimpse of the 
historical development of the concept of alienation reveals 
its use in many fields, including sociology, psychology, 
philosophy, history, and literature.
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For some of the background on why the Manuscripts 
were not published by Marx or Engels, see Robert Tucker, 
Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx (New York: Cambridge Uni­
versity Press, 1964), pp. 172-74.
^The fifth section of the third manuscript, which is 
Marx's critique of the Hegelian dialectic, is used less than 
the rest of the papers. This section is concerned mainly 
with Marx's view of and critique of Hegel's notion of philos­
ophy and alienation. As such it demonstrates more about 
Hegel's ideas of alienation. Marx strongly rejects Hegel's 
abstractness and use of vague terminology. The section does 
contain the beginnings of what was later the Theses on 
Feuerbach. It is of limited value in the reconstruction of 
Marx's theory of alienation.
3Erich Fromm, The Sane Society (New Yorks Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1955), pp. 124-209. Fromm 
applies the concept of alienation to the worker, manager, 




®Erich Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man (New Yorks 




^Erich Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusions My 
Encounter With Marx and Freud (New Yorks Simon and 
Schuster, 1962), p. 48.
13Ibid.. p. 37.
■^John schaar. Escape From Authority (New Yorks Basic 
Books, Inc., 1961), p. 193.
15Ibid., pp. 183-84, 187. " . . .  alienation was not
an incidental feature of capitalism but capitalism itself, 
capitalism in its social-psychological aspect. From this it 
follows that alienation advances as capitalism advances and 
disappears when capitalism disappears." Ibid., p. 87.
Schaar feels that Marx's primary work was concerned with 
"the realization of his moral vision of man restored, man 
liberated from the alienations of capitalist society and in 
command of his own destiny." His scientific work was an aid
28
to this goal; his revolutionary ideas and program, an appeal 




-*-9See particularly the Introduction and Chapter XV. 
" . . .  the reality that Marx apprehended and portrayed was 
inner reality. The forces of which he was aware were sub­
jective forces, forces of the alienated human self, 
conceived, however, and also perceived, as forces abroad in 
society. . . . For this is the decisive characteristic of 
mythic thought, that something by nature interior is appre­
hended as exterior, that a drama of the inner life of man is 
experienced and depicted as taking place in the outer 
world." Ibid.. p. 219.
20Ibid., pp. 137-38. "Marx's alienated man is a man 
who produces 'under the domination of egoistic need.1 This 
is the heed 'outside' the labour process to which the process 
is subordinated. The compulsion that transforms free crea­





2^Roger Garaudy, Karl Marx: The Evolution of His
Thought {New Yorks International Publishers,- 1967).
25ibid., p. 54.
26Ibid.. p. 56.
27Ibid. "Thanks to the class viewpoint Marx adopted, 
by means of which he posited himself outside the capitalist 
system, he escapes illusions as to alienation. His method 
consists in seeking, beyond the supposed "data" of experience, 
the human relations hidden beneath the 'appearance' of things. 
He applies the same method to the critique of Hegelian 
idealism. The alienation of the philosopher has the same 
class roots as the alienation of the economist."
28Ibid.. pp. 57-58. "The worker is not susceptible 
to symbols alone, but also to things. His point of view is 
that of practice and not of alienation. . . .Moreover, this 
does not at all exclude the fact that the individual worker
29
may himself be a victim of the dominant class ideology under 
which he lives, and subject to the illusions arising from 
alienation. Consciously or not, he is always a victim of 
alienation; self-consciousness liberates him not from 
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69Ibid., p. 361. 11. . .As alienated labor, there
was a two-fold loss: men lost control over the conditions
of work, and lost the product of their labor. This dual 
conception is present somewhat in the later Marx: the loss
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of control of work was seen as dehumanization. occasioned by 
the division of labor and intensified by technology; the loss 
of product, as exploitation, because a portion of man's 
labor (surplus value) was appropriated by the employer. But 
other than as literary references in Capital . . . this 
first aspect of the problem was glossed over by Marx."
Ibid., p. 367.
^^Ibid., p. 365. ". . . The historical Marx had, in
effect, repudiated the idea of alienation. The term, because 
of its Hegelian overtones, was, for him, too abstract. And, 
because it carried psychological echoes of ideas such as 
■man's condition,* it was too 'idealistic.' . . ." Ibid.
71Ibid., p. 362. " . . .  And so, alienation. initially
conceived by Marx to be a process whereby an individual lost 
his capacity to express himself in work, now became seen as 
exploitation. or the appropriation of a laborer's surplus 
product by the capitalist. Thus, a philosophical expression, 
which embodied, actually, a socio-psychological condition, 
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private-property system was abolished, man would immediately 
be free." Ibid., pp. 360-61. On the first point, alienation 
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point, there is nothing in the Manuscripts to indicate that 
men would immediately or automatically be free with the 
abolition of private property.
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CHAPTER II
THE MARXIAN APPROACH
An examination of the general intellectual orientation 
of these early manuscripts will provide a framework for 
understanding Marx's theory of alienation. This will be done 
by inspecting the following dimensions of his intellectual 
approach: (1) ideas on the nature of society and the place
o.f the individual therein; (2) categories of analysis; (3) 
the dialectial method; (4) historical materialism; and (5) 
development of a new approach to the problem of alienation.
I. SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL
The Manuscripts reveal three major facets with regard 
to the nature of society and of mans (1) a distinct 
sociological conception of society; (2) an emphasis on the 
individual as a social being; and (3) basic humanistic 
assumptions and concerns.
Marx's general conception of society emphasizes the 
reciprocity between the individual and society and locates 
the essence of society in the social relations of men.^
These two notions are reflected in the three facets of his 
social theory mentioned above.
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. . . Thus the social character is the general 
character of the whole movement [of private prop- 
erty]s just as society itself produces man as man, 
so is society produced hy him. Activity and con­
sumption, 2 both in their content and in their mode 
of existence, are social; social activity and 
social consumption; the human essence of nature 
first exists only for social man; for only here 
does nature exist for him as a bond with man— as 
his existence for the other and the other1s 
existence for him— as the life-element of the human 
world; only here does nature exist as the foundation 
of his own human existence. Only here has what is 
to him his natural existence become his human 
existence, and nature become man for him. Thus 
society is the consummated oneness in substance of 
man and nature— the true resurrection of nature—  
the naturalism of man and the humanism of nature 
both brought to fulfilment.3
t
Marx perceives society as a process which appears in
the ■ £
the form of direct, observable social interaction and in the 
private physical and mental activity of the individual.
Social activity and social consumption exist by 
no means only in the form of some directly communal 
activity and directly communal consumption, although 
communal activity and communal consumption— i.e., 
activity and consumption which are manifested and 
directly confirmed in real association with other 
men— will occur wherever such a direct expression 
of sociality stems from the true character of the 
activity's content and is adequate to the nature of 
consumption.
But again when I am active scientifically, etc., 
— when X am engaged in activity which I can seldom 
perform in direct community with others— then I am 
social, because I am active as a man. Not only is 
the material of my activity given to me as a social 
product (as is even the language in which the thinker 
is active)s my own existence is. social activity, and 
therefore that which X make of myself, I make of 
myself for society and with the consciousness of my­
self as a social b e i n g . 4
The thought and experiences of individuals are actually
reflections or representations of the entire social fabric
and of the relations among men.
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My general consciousness is only the theoretical 
shape of that of which the living shape is the real 
community, the social fabric, although at the present 
day general consciousness is an abstraction from real 
life and as such antagonistically confronts it. Con­
sequently, too, the activity of my general conscious­
ness, as an activity, is my theoretical existence as a 
social being.5
Likewise, the individual expresses himself and his humanity 
in the arena of social relations.
In the same way, the senses and enjoyments of 
other men have become my own appropriation. Besides 
these direct organs, therefore, social organs develop 
in the form of society; thus, for instance, activity 
in direct association with others, etc., has become 
an organ for expressing my own life, and a mode of 
appropriating human life.®
The empirical and sociological view of society is demon­
strated by Marx's caution against an abstract or idealistic 
conception. "What is to be avoided above all is the re­
establishing of 'Society' as an abstraction vis-^-vis the 
individual. . . . "7
The continual emphasis on the reciprocity between the 
individual and society suggests the second major assumption, 
that the individual is a social being. The above quote con­
tinues :
. . . The individual is the social being. His 
life, even if it may not appear in the direct form 
of a communal life carried out together with others 
— is therefore an expression and confirmation of 
social life. Man's individual and species life are 
not different, however much— and this is inevitable—  
the mode of existence of the individual is a more 
particular. or more general mode of the life of the 
species, or the life of the species is a more par­
ticular or more general individual life.8
As a social being, the individual is part of an on-going
society, and a continuing species; this is reflected in man's
37
consciousness— in his thought and language.
In his consciousness of species man confirms his 
real social life and simply repeats his real existence 
in thought, just as conversely the being of the 
species confirms itself in species-consciousness and 
is for itself in its generality as a thinking being.9
It is because of this consciousness that man is not only a
particular, objective being but also a subjective, general
representative of society— a creature in the present and an
i nextension of the past. Therefore existence and conscious­
ness are intimately bound together in the nature of being 
human. "Thinking and being are thus no doubt distinct, but 
at the same time they are in unity with each other."11
The complete conception of what it means to be human 
also involves, along with consciousness, the development of 
the senses. Marx speaks repeatedly of the sensual nature of 
man, by which he means that man only fully expresses himself, 
exercises his human qualities, through the mature use of all 
his senses. Man's relationship to the world, as a human 
being, becomes affirmed through the objectification of him­
self, of his senses. Objectification refers to the creation 
of.something— an idea, an object, and so on— in reality which 
expresses oneself. All senses, in addition to thought, may 
become sources of this objectification.
On the one hand, therefore, it is only when the 
objective world becomes everywhere for man in society 
the world of man's essential powers . . . that all 
objects become for him the obiectification of himself, 
become objects which confirm and realise his indi­
viduality, become his objects: that is, man himself
becomes the object. ... . Thus man is affirmed in the 
objective world not only in the act of thinking, but 
with all his senses. . . .  For not only the five
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senses but also the so-called mental senses— the 
practical senses (will, love, etc.)— in a word, 
human senses— the humanness of the senses— comes 
to be by virtue of its object, by virtue of 
humanised nature. The forming of the five senses 
is a labour of the entire history of the world 
down to the present.12
The essential sensuous nature of man is mentioned a 
little later to be man's tie with reality and with other 
men. It is the unfolding of man as a natural being, of his 
thought and senses and their expression, which is history.
. . .To be sensuous. that is, to be an object 
of sense, to be a sensuous object, and thus to have 
sensuous objects outside oneself— objects of one's 
sensuousness. To be sensuous is to suffer (under­
go or experience).13
In summary, Marx brings together the notions of the 
reciprocity of the individual and society, the individual as 
a social being, the importance of man's consciousness as 
expressed in thought and language and the expression of man's 
humanness through all his senses. Through creation or 
objectification man affirms his own humanness and expresses 
his tie with other human beings. The general orientation of 
these ideas is undoubtedly sociological with a symbolic 
interactionist flavor. Certainly the individual and psycho­
logical dimensions of man areggiven more emphasis here than 
perhaps in later works. The entire picture is placed in 
historical processual context. One can see the influence of 
Hegel in the discussion but it seems clear that Marx is 
interested in the experience of man in society, in sociol­
ogical rather than philosophical problems.
The basic humanistic concerns will become evident in
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the chapters which follow. Generally, they include: the
need of man to express himself and to affirm his humanness 
in his productions,14 the necessity for, and meaning of, 
fulfilling relations with other men, and the need for a 
social environment which encourages the free development of 
man.
II. CATEGORIES OF ANALYSIS
The categories of analysis used by Marx signify a 
major change in European thought and the inception of an 
entirely new intellectual orientation. Although there may 
be some question as to whether the orientation begun by Marx 
has been sustained, there is no doubt that the analysis of 
history and of society radically changed with Marx. The 
change is reflected especially in the categories of analysis, 
which for Marx are social and economic. Marcuse refers to 
this change:
The transition from Hegel to Marx is, in all 
respects, a transition to an essentially different 
oaider of truth, not to be interpreted in terms of 
philosophy. We shall see that all the philosophical 
concepts of Marxian theory are social and economic 
categories, whereas Hegel's social and economic 
categories are all philosophical concepts. . . .1^
Furthermore, the use of social and economic categories by
Marx is as characteristic of his early manuscripts as of his
later works. This writer is in full agreement with Marcuse
when he states that "Even Marx' s early writings are not
1 C
philosophical." Finally, the changes precipitated by 
Marx's works are so dramatic that even the Manuscripts
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cannot be viewed simply as an extension of the philosophical 
tradition of this time.
. . . Every single concept in the Marxian theory 
has a materially different foundation, just as the 
new theory has a new conceptual structure and frame­
work that cannot be derived from preceding theories.17
The nature of the categories of analysis utilized by 
Marx can be demonstrated by an examination of the concepts 
or taxonomical structure within them. The categories of con­
cepts are economic, political, social and social-psychologi­
cal.
Economic Category
The major concepts in this category are: political
economy, private property, division of labour, capital, 
labour, objectification and appropriation. An analysis of 
their usage in the Manuscripts reveals the following defini­
tions for these terms.18
Political economy refers to both an economic system 
and an economic ideology. As an economic system, political 
economy refers to the developing industrial capitalist 
society based on private interest, a system which is a 
product of private property and of modern industry. As an 
economic ideology, political economy refers to a body of 
theory which Marx calls the science of wealth, denial and 
asceticism. In this sense it becomes the ideological support 
and justification of capitalism.19
Private property includes the objects and means of 
production which are owned and controlled by someone other
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than the workers, who are the producers. Marx had no quarrel
with property per se nor with personal property; he condemned
private property because it used the men and materials of
society for private interest, which inevitably conflicts with
onthe general public interest and needs. w
The division of labour is characterized by a dividing 
up of work and the instruments of labour so that the fewest 
possible operations are apportioned to any one individual. 
This is linked to, and encouraged to develop by, the propen­
sity to exchange (which is related to profits). The division 
of labour results in the impoverishment of individual vx
activity. Related to the disastrous effect of the division 
of labour is the use of machine technology in such a way 
that man's work becomes extremely simplified, cut up, and 
destructive of human skills and creativity.^
Labour, which is a key concept in the Manuscripts 
second in importance only to alienation, may be defined as 
free, conscious, productive life-activity in which is 
reflected and reproduced the life of the species. It is 
voluntary activity, controlled by and belonging to the 
worker, to man himself. The idea is that labour in this form 
allows man to confront freely his product and to "contemplate
o phimself in a world he has created.
Closely related to labour is capital, which is stored- 
up or accumulated labour; that is, private property (private 
' interest) in the products of others' labour. Capital implies 
ownership and a governing power over those who by their
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labour produce the products. Marx says that the worker him­
self is capital inasmuch as the purpose of capital within 
production is productive labour.23
Another concept which was redefined from its philo­
sophical to an economic context is objectification. 
Objectification is defined as labour's realisation, as 
labour congealed in the object or product. It is the pro­
duction of the worker, of man. Objectification is the means 
for man to reaffirm himself as a species being, under 
desirable circumstances, therefore, the object of labour is 
the objectification of man's species life.24 if man
becomes alienated from the product of his labour, from 
labour objectified, he also becomes alienated in his relation 
to other m e n . 2 ^ This is because free activity— labour— and 
its results— objectification— compose the very essence of 
human life and human intercourse.
The final economic concept of note is appropriation. 
This concept is closely related to objectification and refers 
to the taking over and working-up of nature into objects 
(objectification) in an activity which is controlled by 
another. The production of an object, therefore, means a 
loss of that object to an alien power. Appropriation appears
as estrangement.26
Political Category
It is difficult and perhaps imprudent to separate the 
political and economic categories of Marx since his
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conceptualizations in the Manuscripts contained elements of 
both dimensions. The distinction is made only for analytical 
purposes. The purely political concepts are few in these 
writings.
The political concepts in the Manuscripts refer 
mainly to (1) the implication of revolution and (2) the 
economic-political structure of society as it moves dia- 
lectically toward socialism. With regard to the first, it 
is clear that the entire problem of alienation, and the 
economic conditions which create it, which is the general 
concern in these writings, can be resolved only through 
political means.
From the relationship of estranged labour to 
private property it further follows that the emanci­
pation of society from private property, etc., from 
servitude, is expressed in the political form of the 
emancipation of the workers; not that their emancipa­
tion alone was at stake but because the emancipation 
of the workers contains universal human emancipation—  
and it contains this, because the whole of human 
servitude is involved in the relation of the worker 
to production, and every relation of servitude is but 
a modification and consequence of this r e l a t i o n . 27
Although Marx does not address himself to revolution as
directly as in later writings of the decade, the implication
of the necessity for radical change runs throughout.
In the third manuscript Marx writes at length about 
the resolution of alienation in terms of various forms of 
communism leading to socialism. This process of resolution 
is discussed in detail in a later chapter but the political 
dimensions should be pointed out here. Communism is “the
o p
positive expression of annulled private p r o p e r t y . T h e
element of equality is important in communism.
Equality is nothing but a translation of the 
German 1 Ich=Ich' into the French, i.e., political 
form. Equality as the groundwork of communism is 
its political justification, and it is the same as 
when the German justifies it by conceiving man as 
universal self-consciousness. Naturally, the 
transcendence of the estrangement always proceeds 
from that form of the estrangement which is the 
dominant power; in Germany, self-consciousness: 
in France, equality, because politics; in England, 
real, material, practical need. . . .29
The movement of society from political economy to socialism 
involves the political emancipation of the workers and the 
establishment of equality. However, even the annulment of 
private property— crude communism— and the establishment of 
economic equality are insufficient for a desirable society. 
To go further, even communism in its second form, which may 
be democratic or despotic and where the state has been 
abolished, is not yet the completely satisfactory political- 
economic structure.The new structures are incomplete 
without humanism, without an orientation directed specifi­
cally toward the needs and desires of men.^l
It becomes evident upon examination that these manu­
scripts were, indeed economic and philosophic and that 
greater elaboration and sophistication about political struc­
tures, political ideologies and political change appeared 
only in later writings, such as The German Ideology. A 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. The Com­
munist Manifesto, and so on. It must be emphasized that by 
philosophic is meant concern with humanistic ethical values 
in society, not a concentration on the nature of abstract
c o n c e p ts  iior, an-
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concepts nor an inquiry into the achievement of the "good 
life" of the mind.
The political dimension, though somewhat undeveloped 
in the Manuscripts, is important therefore in two respects: 
(1) the emphasis on the constancy of change and (2) the 
implication of the ultimate necessity for revolution rather 
than an accommodation to the status quo, a major point of 
contention with Hegel.
Social Category
The relation between the economic and humanistic con­
cerns of these writings becomes clearer in the social cate­
gory of analysis. This category includes concepts which are 
sociological and s_ocial-phychological in content.
First one finds a sociological conceptualization of 
society which has been elaborated earlier in this chapter.
Coincident with an emphasis on the relationship 
between the individual and society are the deliberations of 
Marx on the nature of man. The nature of man is discussed 
in essentially a social-psychological context. Man is a 
species being, a conscious being whose activity is free and 
whose life is an object of thought for him. It is man's 
conscious life-activity which distinguishes him from other 
animals and frhich makes his activity free activity. He can 
control it, think about it, project himself into it. And 
through this activity {which involves working with nature) 
man expresses his conscious life and reaffirms himself as a
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species being.3  ^ The relation between the concepts of 
objectification and species being is important.
It is just in the working-up of the objective 
world, therefore, that man first really proves him­
self to be a species being. This production is his 
active species life. Through and because of this 
production, nature appears as his work and his 
reality. The object of labour is, therefore, the 
objectification of man*s species life; for he 
duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness, 
intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and 
therefore he contemplates himself in a world that 
he has created. . . .33
The symbolic life of man is referred to several times; 
its emphasis reflects the strong influence of Feuerbach in 
this regard. Consciousness is a reference to man's ability 
to contemplate and communicate ideas and events. Mention is 
made of thought and language as well as of more overt con­
scious activity.34 Feuerbach's discussion in the Essence of 
Christianity of the inner and outer life of man was 
essentially a discussion of man's great advantage in his 
ability to use symbols and to have as a result a rich inner 
life, a consciousness and awareness, which no other creature 
has.35
Perhaps because of his symbolic facility and the needs 
which a developed consciousness create, man's productive life 
is not only a means of survival but an expression of human­
ness. Man therefore has a need for meaningful life-activity 
which is free and expressive of himself. Because man depends 
on nature for his life-activity, man has a basic need for an 
.uninhibited relationship with nature, of which he is part.
Under capitalism man cannot live as a true species
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being? he becomes a proletarian. Approletarian is a man who, 
being without capital or rent, lives by labour which is a 
one-sided abstract labour.^® He is viewed only as a worker, 
not as a man. And the estranged labour created by this 
system destroys man's species life. His species life becomes 
a means rather than an end.^7
Included in the social category is Marx's discussion, 
particularly in the third manuscript, of the social condi­
tions which will facilitate man's development. The only 
social order which provides for the fulfillment of man's 
talents and desires and for an experience of a complete, 
creative life as defined by each individual is socialism.
In this order man is iai complete harmony with nature, with 
others and with himself.
Finally, the most important concepts in the social 
category of analysis are those of alienation and estrange­
ment. These terms are sociological and social-psychological 
in content. They are the social and psychological results 
of changes in the economic and political structures of 
society. Marx speaks of economic estrangement because the 
sources of this social phenomenon are economic, as opposed 
to religious (Feuerbach) or philosophical (Hegel). Full 
elaboration on these two concepts is contained in the 
following chapters.
A general examination of the Manuscripts indicates 
that the important categories of analysis are social and 
economic. The political dimension is less important,
especially as compared to later writings. Philosophic con­
cerns are centered in humanism and in the quest for a crea­
tive and ethical social order.
The analytical tradition begun by Marx is sociological 
because it views society in process, it utilizes social and 
economic categories, and it criticizes the existing order 
and envisages inevitable change.38
III. THE DIALECTICAL METHOD
The approach which Marx uses to develop a theory of 
alienation, as well as his later analyses of society and 
history, is the dialectical method of Hegel. Implicit in 
the dialectic is the power of negative thinking, as Marcuse 
puts it. It implies a critical view of reality and a con­
sideration of alternatives. It also encourages an examina­
tion of the contradictions in reality which ultimately
OQ
provide for movement and change. Marx and Hegel were 
concerned with the negative character of reality, which for 
Marx referred to the contradictions of class society which 
serve as forces of change.48 Unlike Hegel, who dealt with 
the dialectic as an ontological process— the movement toward 
Reason— Marx utilized the dialectic as an historical method.41
The historical character of the Marxian dialectic 
embraces the prevailing negativity as well as its 
negation. The given state of affairs is negative 
and can be rendered positive only by liberating the 
possibilities immanent in it. This last, the nega­
tion of the negation, is accomplished by establishing 
a new order of things. The negativity and its 
negation are two different phases of the same historical 
process, straddled by man’s historical action. . . .42.
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Another characteristic of the Marxian dialectic is its focus 
on a particular stage of history, that is, prehistory, the 
history of class society.43 The dialectic in this period is 
dominated by the economic forces in society. In addition 
there is an element of necessity such that capitalism follows 
a particular development or pattern and, in so doing, creates 
the conditions for its own destruction. The ultimate change 
or destruction, however, will not occur by necessity; it 
requires the action of conscious individuals.44 Although 
man's consciousness is always determined by social conditions, 
when man controls the relations of production, instead of 
being controlled by them, he is no longer simply at the mercy 
of events in society. He begins to assert himself, to make 
his own history.43
The dialectic might be called the relation of 
opposites. It involves the opposition of two events or his­
torical phases which ultimately produce something new. Hook 
explains the process:
The least significant aspect of the dialectical 
method is its division into triadic phases. . . .  It 
is not so much the number of phases a situation has 
which makes it dialectical but a specific relation of 
opposition between those phases which generates a 
succession of other phases. The necessary condition, 
then, of a dialectical situation is at least two 
phases, distinct but not separate. The sufficient 
condition of a dialectical situation is given when 
those two phases present a relation of opposition 
and interaction such that the result (1) exhibits 
something qualitatively new; (2) preserves some of 
the structural elements of the interacting phases, 
and (3) eliminates others.4®
This is the mode of thought, the method,' by which Marx
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analyses and criticizes the movement of history and condi­
tions in the social order.47 1
IV. HISTORICAL MATERIALISM
An integral part of the Marxian approach in these 
early writings is historical materialism. This intellectual 
orientation involves the basic assumption that man's 
consciousness results from his social existence,48 that 
man's mental productions of any sort are products of the 
material conditions of his life. In this sense Marx was 
turning Hegel "right-side up"; Hegel held to the idealist's 
assumption that consciousness determines history and social 
conditions. Perhaps it is most of all his materialism which 
gives the writings of Marx their sociological shape.
As important as the basic assumption of materialism, 
however, is its tie with the dialectical method. Materialism 
is a negative notion; it is meant as a critical formulation 
of capitalism where man's life and consciousness become 
totally dominated by the means and laws of capitalistic pro­
duction. Therefore, according to Marcuse, the grip of 
materialism can be eliminated with the dialectical movement 
from capitalism to socialism.
The materialistic proposition that is the starting 
point of Marx's theory thus states, first, a historical 
fact, exposing the materialistic character of the 
prevailing social order in which an uncontrolled 
economy legislates over all human relations. At the 
same time, Marx's proposition is a critical one, 
implying that the prevailing relation between con­
sciousness and social existence is a false one that 
must be overcome before the true relation can come to
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light. The truth of the materialist thesis is 
thus to be fulfilled in its negation.49
It seems clear then that materialism contains two 
dimensions: (1) an explanation of the relationship between
man and social conditions, and (2) a critical description of 
a particular phase of history.
. . . The relations of production that restrict 
and distort man's potentialities inevitably determine 
his consciousness, precisely because society is not a 
free and conscious subject. As long as man is incapable 
of dominating these relations and using them to gratify 
the needs and desires of the whole, they will assume the 
form of an objective, independent entity. Consciousness, 
caught in and overpowered by these relations, neces­
sarily becomes ideological.
Of course, the consciousness of men will continue 
to be determined by the material processes that 
reproduce their society, even when men have come to 
regulate their social relations in such a way that 
these contribute best to the free development of all.
But when these material processes have been made 
rational and have become the conscious work of men, 
the blind dependence of consciousness on social con­
ditions will cease to exist. Reason, when determined 
by rational social conditions, id deterahindd by itself. 
Socialist freedom embraces both sides of the relation 
. between consciousness and social existence. The 
principle of historical materialism leads to its self­
negation.50
The general approach of Marx can be characterized, 
therefore, by two basic purposes: (1) the study of man and
his relationship to the social conditions of his existence 
and (2) the critical analysis of society and a consideration 
of alternatives and the elements of change toward such
alternatives.
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V. THE PROBLEM OF ALIENATION
Because the problem of alienation is the central 
theme of the Manuscripts and the subject of this study, brief 
mention should be made of two approaches to the explanation 
of alienation which most heavily influenced Marx. Although 
Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx share a common interest in the 
nature of alienation, their approaches are quite separate.
As an idealist Hegel saw history as the movement of 
consciousness toward reason and of spirit toward its self- 
realization. This highly abstract approach regarded man as
C  T
"spirit in the act of becoming conscious of itself."3 
Alienation refers to not-knowing; knowing is the means of 
overcoming alienation." Since history is the realization of 
God, man is simply an expression or an extemalization of 
this process. Man is God still alienated from itself. For 
Hegel, then, alienation is manifested in man, in the 
objective. Alienation occurs in the intellectual process, 
where the product stands in an alienated relationship to the 
producer.
Feuerbach, whose greatest importance lies in his 
materialism, located alienation in man. It is still a 
spiritual or mental phenomenon but its development and 
resolution have been reversed. God is man alienated from 
himself.
. . . Instead of saying with Hegel that man is God 
in his self-alienation, one must turn the proposition 
on ,its head and say: God is man in his self-alienation.
The Hegelian idea of God's or the Absolute's self­
alienation reflects the actuality of man£s.52
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Feuerbach's major significance here was that he "naturalized" 
Hegel. The essence of Christianity or religion in a general 
sense was man's estrangement from himself.^ Man, in pro­
jecting himself into the image of God, had become estranged 
from his own humanity and had therefore lost confidence and 
meaning in himself. For Hegel, on the other hand, the 
essence of man had been God's self-estrangement. In these 
conceptualizations of alienation the sources and manifesta­
tions are reversed. Using Hegel's dialectic and Feuerbach's 
materialism, Marx created a third approach to the question 
of alienation— a creative synthesis which develops a 
sociological perspective for the study of this phenomenon.^
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FOOTNOTES
-^ The most: direct: and elaborate discussions of the 
individual and society are found in the section on private 
property and communism in the third manuscript.
^"Mind" is. a more accurate meaning here than the word 
"consumption." The translations of Bottomore and Struik are 
in agreement here and it clearly makes the best sense in 
context. See T. B. Bottomore (trans. and ed.), Karl Marx; 
Early Writings (New Yorks McGraw-Hill Book Company# 1964), 
p. 157? and Karl Marx# Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts 
of 1844, trans. Martin Milligan and ed. Dirk J. Struik (New 
Yorks International Publishers, 1964), p. 137.
^Karl Marx# Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 
1844. trans. Martin Milligan (Moscows Foreign Languages 
Publishing House# 1961), pp. 103-104. Parentheses mine. 
Subsequent references to this Milligan translation will be 







^Ibid. "Man# much as he may therefore be a particular 
individual (and it is precisely his particularity which makes 
him an individual, and a real individual social being)# is 
just as much the totality— the ideal totality— the subjective 
existence of thought and experienced society present for 
itself; just as he exists also in the real world as the 
awareness and the real enjoyment of social existence# and as 
a totality of human life-activity." Ibid., p. 105.
11Ibid.
•^ Ibid.. pp. 107-108. " . . .  Thus, the objectification
of the human essence both in its theoretical and practical 
aspects is required to make man1 s sense human, as well as to 
create the human sense corresponding to the entire wealth of 
human and natural substance.” Ibid., p. 109. Man's affirma­
tion of himself, his highest expressions of his senses, can 
only occur when man's basic needs are met (hunger, survival, 
etc.) and when he is not concerned with extraneous goals 
(profit, mercantile value, etc.). See ibid., pp. 180-109.
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13Ibid., p. 157. This writer's parentheses. Marx 
continues: "Man as an objective, sensuous being is therefore
a suffering being— -and because he feels what he suffers, a 
passionate being. Passion is the essential force of man 
energetically bent on its object."
"But man is not merely a natural being: he is a human 
natural beingI That is to say, he is a being for himself. 
Therefore he is a species being, and has to confirm and 
manifest himself as such both in his being and in his know­
ing  Andtasieveryfching natural has to have its beginning,
man,too has his act of coming-to-be— history— which, however, 
is for him a known history, and hence as an act of coming-to- 
be it is a conscious self-transcending act of coming-to-be. 
History is the true natural history of man (on which more 
later)." Ibid., p. 158.
14i'if xiictn's feelings. passions, etc., are not merely 
anthropological phenomena in the (narrower) sense, but truly 
ontological affirmations of essential being (of nature), and 
if they are only really affirmed because their object exists 
for them as an object of sense, then it is clear:
" (1) That they have by no means merely one mode of 
affirmation, but rather that the distinctive character of 
their existence, of their life, is constituted by the dis­
tinctive mode of their affirmation. In what manner the 
object exists for them, is the characteristic mode of their 
gratification.
" (2) Wherever the sensuous affirmation is the direct 
annulment of the object in its independent form (as in 
eating, drinking, working up of the object, etc.), this is 
the affirmation of the object.
" (3) In so far as man, and hence also his feeling, 
etc., are human, the affirmation of the object by another is 
likewise his own enjoyment.
"(4) Only through developed industry— i.e., through 
the medium of private property— does the ontological essence 
of human passion come to be both in its totality and in its 
humanity? the science of man is therefore itself a product 
of man's establishment of himself by practical activity.
"(5) The meaning of private property— liberated from 
its estrangement— is the existence of essential objects for 
man, both as objects of enjoyment and as objects of activity." 
Ibid.. pp. 136-37.
■^Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and





The following definitions are formulations by this 
writer of the taxonomy and definitions of concepts used by 
Marx in the Manuscripts. Page references are to particularly 
important passages upon which these definitions are based.
^®Karl Marx, Manuscripts. pp. 26, 119-21.
20Ibid. pp. 106, 137•
21Ibid. pp. 25, 117-18, 129-30, 135.
22Ibid. pp. 75—76.
23Ibid. pp. 36-37, 122-23.
24Ibid. p. 76.
25Ibid. p. 79.












38Marcuse states: "As a first approach to the problem,
we may say that in Hegel's system all categories terminate 
in the existing order, while in Marx's they refer to the 
negation of this order. They aim at a new form of society 
even when describing its-current form. Essentially they 
address themselves to a truth to be had only through the 
abolition of civil society. Marx's theory is a 'critique' 
in the sense that all concepts are an indictment of the 
totality of the existing order." Marcuse, op. cit., p. 258.
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3^Ibid.. pp. vii to xiv.
40Ibid.. p. 312.
4 *^" . . . For Hegel, the totality was the totality of 
reason, a closed ontological system, finally identical with 
the rational system of history. Hegel’s dialectical process 
was thus a universal ontological one in which history was 
patterned on the metaphysical process of being. Marx, on 
the other hand, detached dialectic from this ontological 
base. In his work, the negativity of reality becomes a 
historical condition which cannot be hypostatized as a meta­
physical state of affairs. In other words, it becomes a 
social condition, associated with a particular historical 
form of society. The totality that the Marxian dialectic 
gets to is the totality of class society, and the negativity 
that underlies its contradictions and shapes its every con­
tent is the negativity of class relations. . . . "  Ibid., 
p. 314.
42Ibid., p. 315.
43". . . The Entstehunasgeschichte of mankind, which 
Marx calls his pre-history, is the history of class society. 
Man's actual history will begin when this society has been 
abolished. The Hegelian dialectic gives the abstract logical 
form of the pre-historical development, the Marxian dialectic 
its real concrete movement. Marx's dialectic, therefore, is 
still bound up with the pre-historical phase." Ibid., pp. 
315-16.
44Ibid., pp. 317-18. " . . .  There can be no blind
necessity in tendencies that terminate in a free and self- 
conscious society. . . . The revolution depends indeed upon 
a totality of objective conditions: it requires a certain
attained level of material and intellectual culture, a self- 
conscious and organized working1 class on an international 
scale, acute class struggle. These become revolutionary con­
ditions, however, only if seized upon and directed by a 
conscious activity that has in mind the socialist goal. Not 
the slightest natural necessity or automatic inevitability 
guarantees the transition from capitalism to socialism." 
Ibid., p. 318.
45Ibid.. p. 319.
46Sidney Hook, From Hegel to Marx: Studies in the
Intellectual Development of Karl Marx (Ann Arbor: Uhiversity
of Michigan Press, 1950)., p. 61. For a comparison of the 
differences and similarities in the work and thought of Hegel 
and Marx, see Chapter One,."Hegel and Marx," pp. 15-76.
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4^"Marx focused his theory on the labor process and 
by so doing held to and consummated the principle of the 
Hegelian dialectic that the structure of the content 
(reality) determines the structure of the theory. He made 
the foundations of civil society the foundations of the 
theory of civil society. This society operates on the princi­
ple of universal labor, with the labor process decisive for 
the totality of human existence; labor determines the value 
of all things. Since the society is perpetuated by the 
continued universal exchange of the products of labor, the 
totality of human relations is governed by the immanent laws 
of the economy. The development of the individual and the 
range of his freedom depend on the extent to which his labor 
satisfies a social need. All men are free, but the mechanisms 
of the labor process govern the freedom of them all. The 
study of the labor process is, in the last analysis, abso­
lutely necessary in order to discover the conditions for 
realizing reason and freedom in the real sense. . . ."




51Robert C. Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx 
(London, England: Cambridge University Press, 1961), p. 49.
52Ibid., p. 85.
53Ibid., see discussion on pages 82-84.
^4Ibid., Chapter VI, "Marx and Feuerbach," pages 95- 
105. As Tucker discusses in this chapter, Marx transposes 
the abstract self-consciousness of Hegel to the self- 
consciousness of man. Likewise he moves from self-alienation 
to human alienation. Although Marx clearly recognizes the 
importance of Feuerbach's work, he goes beyond it by extending 
his concerns to humanism and the self-realization of man.
See particularly Tucker, op. cit., pp. 98-99. These concerns 
comprise the theme of the Manuscripts and the basis for a 
theory of alienation.
CHAPTER XII
THE NATURE OF ALIENATION
The key to an understanding of the Manuscripts con­
cerns the Marxian meaning of alienation. This is quite 
difficult to decipher. The difficulty stems from the fact 
that Marx did not develop the idea of alienation as a pre­
cise, measureable, single-word concept. Instead, particu­
larly in those passages where Marx specifically addresses 
himself to the nature of alienation, he does so always in 
terms of “estranged labour.”
The labour of man refers to the free, conscious, 
productive life-activity in which man reflects his human 
qualities and exerts his intelligence, his ability to 
symbolize and to create.^- Man is a species being (Feuerbach's 
term) because he has these characteristics. That is to say, 
man is a conscious being whose activity is free and whose 
life is an object of contemplation for him. In short, to 
engage in labour is to be human. Alienation occurs in the 
process of man's acting, labouring; that is, something 
happens, something deep and fundamental goes wrong in the 
life activities of man.
Two important dimensions of the Marxian conceptuali­
zation of alienation should be noted. First, it is apparent
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throughout the Manuscripts that Marx's concern with human 
life activity and labour has as its focal point the employ­
ment or work activities of man. Man must work; he must do 
something to provide for his own and his family's survival 
and that of society. Furthermore, man's work is an expres­
sion of himself, his talents and skills. Reflecting his 
materialism, Marx writes that "economic estrangement is that 
of real life? its transcendence therefore embraces both 
aspects," that is, both the inner life of man and his social
q
mode of existence. Secondly, he emphasizes the loss of 
freedom in man's work activity. Man has lost freedom and 
control; his work activity is no longer voluntary in an 
immediate sense.
It is from the concept of estranged labour, then, 
that one derives the Marxian conception of alienation. The 
meaning of alienation becomes unraveled in the explication 
of the manifestations of the condition or situation of being 
alienated. Prior to this, however, Marx rather descriptively 
defines estranged or alienated labour. He poses the question, 
"What, then, constitutes the alienation of labour?"^
1. He explains that labour is external to the worker?
5
it does not belong to him.
2. In his alienated labour, the worker does not 
freely develop his physical and mental energy.®
3. Nor does he feel content or happy in his work.7
4. There is the implication that no meaning or self- 
fulfillment exists in the worker's travail.®
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5. Therefore, Marx continues, the worker's labour is 
forced labour? it is not voluntary, but coerced.9
6. The nature of work becomes, in the situation of
alienated labour, ’'merely a means to satisfy needs external
i nto it," rather than "the satisfaction of a need." This is 
demonstrated, Marx explains, by the fact that such work is 
avoided when no compulsion for it exists.•***L
7. The external character of alienated labour is 
indicative of the worker1s activity which is no longer his
TO
own spontaneous activity, but belongs to someone else.
8. The result of these developments in his work 
activity is that man does not feel free in his human 
activities, which lose their meanings, become unrelated and 
animal-like in quality. Basic animal functions become the
"sole and ultimate ends."
9. In a larger sense, estranged labour reverses the 
importance of mem as a species being, a conscious being whose 
life is his object, so that his life-activity becomes simply 
a means to his existence.'*'4
In summary, alienated labour in Marxian theory may be 
defined as forced and external labour in which the worker 
finds no meaning, no happiness or contentment, no satis­
faction of needs, no freedom or control, no mental growth or 
physical development. As activity which belongs to another, 
it is not spontaneous and becomes simply a means to satisfy 
the needs of physical existence.1^ In political economy it 
becomes solely wage-earning activity.
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The context in which Marx analyzes estranged labour 
and accompanying changes in man's work is the emerging and 
flourishing capitalism and industrialism of nineteenth- 
century Europe. Marx was concerned not only with the exploit­
ative conditions of a (largely) pre-union industrial era, but 
also with the implications, for the future embodied in 
capitalism and its industry. That Marx was able to identify 
many such implications and to predict numerous social and 
economic consequences of capitalism, for our time as well as 




This writer's definition based upon Karl Marx, 
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, trans. Martin 
Milligan (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961),
pp. 75-76.
Based on ibid., p. 75.
3Ibid., p . 103.
4Ibid.. p. 72.
5"First, the fact that labour is external to the 
worker, i.e., it does not belong to his essential being; that 
in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies 
himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop 
freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body 
and ruins his mind. The worker therefore only feels himself 
outside his work, and in his work feels outside himself. He 
is at home when he is not working, and when he is working he 
is not at home. His labour is therefore not voluntary, but 
coerced; it is forced labour. It is therefore not the 
satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs 
external to it. Its alien character emerges clearly in the 
fact that as soon as no physical or other compulsion exists, 
labour is shunned like the plague. External labour, labour 
in which man alienates himself, is a labour of self-sacrifice, 
of mortification. Lastly, the external character of labour 
form the worker appears in the fact that it is not his own, 
but someone else's, that it does not belong to him, that in 
it he belongs, not to himself, but to another. Just as in 
religion the spontaneous activity of the human imagination, 
of the human brain and the human heart, operates independently 
of the individual--that is, operates on him as an alien, 
divine or diabolical activity— in the same way the worker's 
activity is not his spontaneous activity. It belongs to 









^"As a result, therefore, man (the worker) no longer 
feels himself to be freely active in any but his animal 
functions— eating, drinking, procreating, or at most in his 
dwelling and in dressing-up, etc.; and in his human functions 
he no longer feels himself to be anything but an animal.
Certainly eating, drinking, procreating, etc., are 
also genuinely human functions. But in the abstraction which 
separates them from the sphere of all other human activity 
and turns them into sole and ultimate ends, they are 
animal." Ibid., p. 73.
l^Ibid.f p. 75. Man's activity is no longer acting 
as a species being, that is, as a human being in the real 
sense, because he has lost control of the object of his pro­
duction as well as freedom in his life-activity, in the act 
of producing.
". . .In tearing away from man the object of his 
production, therefore, estranged labour tears from him his 
species life, his real species objectivity, and transforms 
his advantage over animals into the disadvantage that his 
inorganic body, nature, is taken from him." Ibid., p. 76.




THE SOURCES OF ALIENATION
Marx was a student and a critic of society. His 
dialectical materialism provides the framework within which 
he analyzes social change and its effects upon the members 
of society. To explain the development of alienation or 
alienated labour, Marx turns to the significant economic and 
technological trends of his time.
Marx identified three major or primary sources of
alienation under each of which are subsumed a number of
secondary sources, " . . .  definite and developed expres-
1
sion(s) of the first foundations." The three primary 
sources are (1) private property; (2) political economy; and 
(3) the division of labour and exchange. An examination of 
each of these sources and their components is required for 
an understanding of the development and meaning of alienation 
as Marx perceived it.
I. PRIVATE PROPERTY
Private property refers to the objects of production, 
and including the means of production, which are owned and 
controlled by those other than the producers, the workers.
It is private property as it exists in a capitalistic,
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industrial economy to which Marx refers. Private property 
in the Marxian sense refers to the means and objects of 
production, not to the possession of personal property. 
Indeed, one could say that Marx was interested in personal­
izing property, that is, in the personal control by the pro­
ducer of his product. Furthermore, it should not be mistaken 
that Marx was in favor of the abolition of all forms of 
private property. For he specifically speaks of private 
property in a different economic order:
The meaning of private property— liberated from its 
estrangement— is the existence of essential objects for 
man, both as objects of enjoyment and as objects of 
activity.3
Nevertheless, Marx is referring generally to private property 
in the capitalistic order.
Private property has made us so stupid and one-sided 
that an object is only ours when we have it— when it 
exists for us as capital, or when it is directly 
possessed, eaten, drunk, worn, inhabited, etc.,— in 
short, when it is used by us. Although private property 
itself again conceives all these direct realisations of 
possession as means of life, and the life which they 
serve as means is the life of private property— labour 
and conversion into capitalT^
Private property contains within it the relations of 
labour, of capital and the mutual relations between these 
two.5 These relations follow a dialectical movements
(First) Unmediated or mediated unity of the two. 
Capital and labour at first still united. Then, though 
separated and estranged, they reciprocally develop and 
foster each other ah positive conditions.
(Second) The two in opposition, mutually excluding 
each other. The worker knows the capitalist as his 
non-existence, and vice versa: each tries to rob the
other of his existence.
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(Third) Opposition of each to itself. Capital—  
stored-up labour. Capital as such— splitting into 
capital itself and into its interest, and this latter 
again into interest and profit. . . .6
However, the basic element in all private property, the
"subjective essence," is labour.^ In a capitalistic order
labour is given neither credit for, nor control of, that for
which it is responsible, that which it has created.
. . . But labour, the subjective essence of private 
property as exclusion of property, and capital, 
objective labour as exclusion of labour, constitute 
private property as its developed state of contra­
diction— hence a dynamic relationship moving 
inexorably to it resolution.8
The conflict between capital and labour, and indeed 
the whole structure of political economy, emanates from the 
existence of private property.
Political economy proceeds from the fact of private 
property, but it does not explain it to us. It 
expresses in general, abstract formulae the material 
process through which private property actually passes, 
and these formulae it then takes for laws. It does not 
comprehend these laws— i.e., it does not demonstrate 
how they arise from the very nature of private prop­
erty. . . .9
Changes in the nature of private property occur in the form 
of political econony and its components and especially in 
the rise of industrial production:
All wealth has become industrial wealth, the wealth 
of labour; and industry is accomplished labour, just as 
the factory-system is the essence of industry— of 
labour— brought to its maturity and just as industrial 
capital is the accomplished objective form of private 
property.10
The second major point of importance regarding private 
property concerns its relation to alienation or to estranged 
labour. Although this relationship will be more fully
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treated later in. this discussion,^ it can be said here that 
the connection is one of reciprocity. Two statements help 
to demonstrate this points
That the entire revolutionary movement neces­
sarily finds both its empirical and its theoretical 
basis in the movement of private property— in that 
of the economy, to be precise— is easy to s e e . 12
This material. immediately sensuous private 
property is the material sensuous expression of
estranged human life. . . . The positive trans­
cendence of private property as the appropriation 
°£ human life is, therefore, the positive trans­
cendence of all estrangement. . . .13
Private property is thus the foundation out of which politi­
cal economy, the capitalistic industrial order, develops and 
matures, and at the same time is an expression of the results 
of such an order. Instead of being a means for meeting human 
needs, private property encourages an economic order in 
which artificial needs are created and in which the desire 
to have, to possess things, objects is stimulated.-^ Man
becomes the victim, seduced hy an economic system which no
longer serves his needs, but is served by him.
II. POLITICAL ECONOMY
The second major source of alienation is political 
economy, which contains within it several secondary sources 
or causes of estranged labour. The term "political economy," 
as used by Marx in the Manuscripts, has two meanings. It 
refers to an economic system in some instances and to a body 
of economic theory in others. In the first case political 
economy refers to the developing industrial capitalist
society based on private interest, to the system which Marx 
believed was a product of the movement of private property 
and of modern industry. As a body of theory, Marx referred 
to political economy as "the science of wealth, the science 
of denial, want, thrift, saving, and asceticism.1,15 its 
cardinal doctrine is "self-denial, the denial of life and of 
all human needs. . . ."I® Marx notes that this extends even 
to restraint and control of procreation of people (in a 
reference to population theory of the day).17 He is criti­
cal of the ethical foundation of political economy which 
neither fulfills human needs nor facilitates man1s develop­
ment in a truly human and creative sense.1®
Marx quotes at length and criticizes such theorists 
as Adam Smith, Say, Ricardo, and Mill, and credits them with 
having advanced
. . . further than their predecessors in a positive 
sense in their estrangement from man. They do so, how­
ever, only because their science develops more con­
sistently and genuinely. Because they make private 
property in its active form the subject, thus simul­
taneously making man . . . the essence, the contradic­
tion of actuality corresponds completely to the 
contradictory essence which they accept as their prin­
ciple. Far from refuting it, the ruptured world of 
industry confirms their internally-ruptured principle.19
This theory and its subsequent empirical system, which
acknowledges labour as its basis, views man as simply another
commodity, whose existence within the system operates on a
supply and demand principle.20
The basic characteristic of political economy for Marx 
is the antithesis of labour and capital, the opposition of
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labour and property. For a system whose goals,are profit 
and wealth for those of economic power (the private owners 
of production) cannot serve, the interests of the nonowners, 
those who sell their labour in the marketplace. It cannot 
because this would impede the fulfillment of the goals of 
political economy^-1* and it will not because the needs of the 
labourer and wage-earner are not the concern of political 
economy as an economic structure.
It goes without saying that the proletarian, i.e., 
the man who, being without capital and rent, lives 
purely by labour, and by a one-sided, abstract labour, 
is considered by political economy only as a worker. 
Political economy can therefore advance the proposition 
that the proletarian, the same as any horse, must get 
as much as will enable him to work. It does not con­
sider him when he is not working, as a human being; but 
leaves such consideration to criminal law, to doctors, 
to religion, to the statistical tables, to politics 
and to the workhouse beadle.22
And later in the manuscripts he concludes
Political economy starts from labour as the real 
soul of production; yet to labour it gives nothing, 
and to private property everything. . . .  23
In a system whose major goal is profit for the capital­
ist (that is, the owner) and in which the industrial setting 
is geared for profit only,^ the work activity of man changes. 
Though the whole system is based upon labour, the worker no 
longer has control over his activity, it belongs to another 
(the capitalist or owner). "In political economy labour 
occurs only in the form of wage-earning activity."25 
becomes simply a means to meet the need of physical 
existence.
Furthermore, because it is not relevant to the
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structure or the goals of political economy, neither the 
capitalists who control the means of production nor the 
theorists, the apologists for this system, consider the 
problem of the worker's relation to production, of the 
worker's physical and mental well-being relative to his work, 
of the worker's needs as a human being.26
It is true that labour produces for the rich 
wonderful things— but for the worker it produces 
privation. It produces palaces— but for the worker, 
hovels. It produces beauty— but for the worker, 
deformity. It replaces labour by machines— but 
some of the workers it throws back to a barbarous 
type of labour, and the other workers it turns into 
machines. It produces intelligence— but for the 
worker idiocy, cretinism.27
Finally, as capitalistic economy continues to create
artificial needs, for purposes of money-making, and then
provides the means to meet them, paradoxically, the system
becomes less concerned with, and less willing to recognize,
the needs of the worker. The capitalist is willing to grant
the worker only the barest level of subsistence, to accept
the lowest level of living as the standard and to be
indignant at even the smallest luxury which a worker might 
28enjoy.
Political economy as a major source of alienated 
labour contains within it several concomitant factor's which 
develop within the system and become important secondary 
precipitators of alienation. These "categories" of political 
economy are money, competition, capital and trade in each of 
which one can find, according to Marx, a "definite and 
developed expression of the first foundations," that is, of
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private property and estranged, alienated labour.29 A brief 
examination of these categories illustrates their influence 
on the development and perpetuation of alienation. In his 
discussions of these categories, perhaps more than in any 
other sections of the Manuscripts, Marx draws implications 
of political economy for allmmembers of society, including 
the capitalists. His focus on the worker, the nonowner, as 
his major concern in the Manuscripts enlarges in these sec­
tions to a concern with the larger effects of industrial 
capitalism as he saw it.
Money
A money economy in a real sense made possible the 
rapidly developing capitalism and industrialism. Marx 
turned his attention to the meaning and power of money in 
political economy and finds some basic problems whichp 
precipitate anti-human tendencies within the economic system. 
As mentioned above, political economy creates artificial 
needs and then provides the means {products, investments, 
etc.) to meet them. Since one can only fulfill these needs 
with money, the latter takes on great importance in the 
society and is soon reified to a point that it has inherent 
value, a life of its own.29
With this development the amount or quantity of money 
becomes significant in determining one's power,21 the things 
one can do,22 and, in fact, the kinds of relationships one 
has with other men.22 Marx particularly objects to the kind
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of "inactive, extravagant wealth" which is squandered on 
purposeless pleasures and which could be used constructively 
to "give sustenance to a hundred l i v e s . i t  was the misuse 
of wealth in society rather than its existence to which Marx 
obj ected.
Finally, money's power of transformation is criti­
cized because it is unnatural? it makes possible "the 
fraternisation of impossibilities." It is a catalyst of 
contradictions.
The overturning and confounding of all human and 
natural qualities, the fraternisation of impossibili­
ties— the divine power of money— lies in its character 
as men's estranged, alienating and self-disposing 
species-nature. Money is the alienated ability of 
mankind.35
Money becomes the greatest power in society and all things 
are measured in its terms. Most important, relationships 
among men become monetary in nature. Just as one's labour 
becomes simply "wage-earning activity," men become commodi­
ties, buying and selling each other as objects. The opposi­
tion of labour and capital is manifest in accumulation of 
money in society.
Competition
A second component of political economy which enhances 
the development of alienated labour, and greatly harms the 
capitalists of society as well, is competition. "... . The 
only wheels which political economy sets in motion are 
avarice and the war amongst the avaricious— competition." 
Competition has two important effects upon the society in
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which it occurs. The first result is the accumulation of 
capital in the hands of a few, which leads eventually to the 
extreme development of monopoly in the economy.®7 From the 
pressures of the concentration of capital the small capital­
ist who is unable to compete falls into the class of non- 
owners, into the category of workers.®® Secondly, monopoly 
and competition work to sort out previous distinctions among 
capitalists and among workers and increase the separation 
between the two classes in society, the property-owners and 
the propertyless workers.®®
It can also be seen that competition has a tendency 
to perpetuate itself. As small capitalists fall into the 
propertyless category, competition for employment increases 
due to the additional supply of workers. Wages may decrease? 
the power of the capitalists, the potential employers, 
increases. The competition among the workers becomes strong, 
intensified and violent. The final outcome is that part of 
the working class suffers chronic unemployment and falls into 
pauperhood and starvation.^®
Capital
Capital, which is a third component of political 
economy, is another avenue for the expression of alienation. 
Marx's treatment of capital in the Manuscripts relies heavily 
upon the political economists themselves from whom he quotes 
extensively. Marx focuses particularly on the relationship 
between the capitalist and the worker and between the large 
and small capitalists.
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Capital is defined as stored-up or accumulated labour, 
that is, "private property in the products of others' 
l a b o u r . C a p i t a l  implies ownership apart from those who 
produce the products.
Capital is thus the governing power over labour 
and its products. The capitalist possesses this 
power, not on account of his personal or human 
qualities, but inasmuch as he is an owner of capital.
His power is the purchasing power of his capital, 
which nothing can withstand.42
It seems quite clear that, in his treatment of capital 
in the Manuscripts, Mafxi is disturbed by (1) the loss of 
power or control over the product by the worker which is 
implied in "private property in the products of others' 
labour," and (2) the closely related development that the 
capitalist profits from products which are "worked up" (raw 
materials which are developed) and made saleable by someone 
else's labour. In short, those who produce or create realize 
no power or profit; those who live on profit and power con­
tribute nothing to the product and therefore "live off" the 
work of others.^3
Further criticism of the capitalist's motives and 
activities are inserted in the form of quotations from Say 
and Smith. (3) The major interest of the capitalist is 
profit; he therefore employs his capital in whatever ways 
will yield the greatest amount of profit. The employment of 
capital is not always in ways which are most useful or even 
in the interests of society. (4) Finally, the capitalists' 
interests coincide with neither the interests nOr the general
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economic state of society, so that profit is low in rich 
countries and high in poor countries. The interest of the 
capitalist is contrary to the interest of the public as 
demonstrated by the effort to narrow c o m p e t i t i o n . ^
Marx completes the discussion of capital by consider­
ing the relationship between the large and small capitalist. 
He observes that "With the increase of capitals the profits 
on the capitals diminish, because of competition. The first 
to suffer, therefore, is the small capitalist."^
In a situation of increasing wealth, the competition 
increases for labour and for the product's market. Because 
of the ability to buy and sell in large quantities, the large
capitalist can necessarily compete more favorably than the
4 6small capitalist. The latter's ultimate destiny is ruin.
All of the above is based on the freedom to produce 
and the freedom to exchange as defined by political economy. 
The inevitable results are enumerated in several quotes from 
political economists and their critics. Competition creates 
economic chaos, human life loses its value except only as 
capital, the power of things creates poverty, for the system 
bears no responsibility for the wages or the needs of the 
worker.^
These are the conditions created by capital; these 
conditions are sources of alienation for the worker and even 
for the small capitalists. Marx summarizes the situation of 
labour and capital in political economy:
We have already seen how the political economist
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establishes the unity of labour and capital in a 
variety of wayss— (1) Capital is accumulated labour.
(2) The purpose of capital within production— partly, 
reproduction of capital with profit, partly, capital 
as raw material (material of labour), and partly, as 
itself a working- instrument (the machine is capital 
directly equated with labour)— is productive labour.
(3) The worker is a capital. (4) Wages belong to 
costs Of capital. (5) In relation to the worker, 
labour is the reproduction of his life-capital. (6)
In relation to the capitalist, labour is an aspect of 
his capital's activity.
Finally, (7) the political economist postulates 
the original unity of capital and labour in the form 
of the unity of the capitalist and the worker; this 
is the original state of paradise. The way in which 
these two aspects in the form of two persons leap at 
each other's throats is for the political economist 
a contingent event, and hence only to be explained by 
reference to external factors.48
The final tragedy for the worker is that he becomes 
capital, he lives or exists as capital, he must be maintained 
as capital and may decline or lose his use as capital which 
is obsolete or worn out.
'i'hv.
Trade
The fourth category of political economy which Marx 
mentions is trade. This category is not given explicit 
treatment, however. Instead, considerable attention is given 
to exchange, especially in relation to the division of labour, 
the third major source of alienation. The following section 
will include a discussion of both.
Marx returns continually to his conclusion that 
alienated labour is inherent in political economy, that such 
an economic system almost by definition creates alienation
v
for the worker, for the small capitalist, and eventually for
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everyone, since the system is doomed to destruction. That 
Marx is a severe critic of the goals of capitalism, and the 
implications of those goals, cannot be disputed. They are 
not geared to the needs of individuals or to the potentials 
of society and are therefore implicitly anti-humanistic.
Marx expresses the implications of political economy paren­
thetically in the Manuscript on estranged labour:
(The laws of political economy express the 
estrangement of the worker in his object thus: the
more the worker produces, the less he has to consume; 
the more values he creates, the more valueless, the 
more unworthy he becomes; the better formed his pro- 
. product, the more deformed becomes the worker; the 
more civilised his object, the more barbarous becomes 
the worker; the mightier labour becomes, the more 
powerless becomes the worker; the more ingenious 
labour becomes, the duller becomes the worker and the 
more he becomes nature's b o n d s m a n . ) 50
III. DIVISION OF LABOUR AND EXCHANGE
The division of labour is the third and perhaps most 
important source of alienated labour. Its significance lies 
in its immediacy to the worker's situation; that is, the 
division of labour contains those elements which specifically 
create alienated labour.
By the division of labour Marx in general means a 
dividing of work and the instruments of labour so that the 
fewest possible operations are apportioned to cany one 
individual, which is encouraged to develop by the propensity 
to exchange and which results in the impoverishment of indi­
vidual activity and its loss of character.51
An important distinction between the division of
labour and the separation of labour helps to clarify the
former's meaning. In the division of labour the work is
distributed ("labour is split up") among many, with each
person performing a few operations in the production of a
product. In separated labour "each carries on the same work
c oby himself, it is a multiplication of the same work." It 
becomes clear that it is the "splitting up" of tasks into 
minute operations and the results of this for the worker 
which most disturbs Marx. Of great importance is the role 
of technology which will be discussed shortly.
The division of labour and exchange are responsible 
for what happens in the work situation. These two elements 
derive from private property and political economy.^ Marx 
quotes extensively from the political economists to demon­
strate that the division of labour results from the propen­
sity to exchange. The desire to exchange stems from egoism 
and self-interest. Out of the division of labour, and 
particularly exchange, grows a diversity of skills which 
exist and are useful simply because of e x c h a n g e . 54 That is, 
the division of labour is not formed by the distribution of 
skills but vice versa. Each person then sells his skill.
Marx notes in ending that particular summary of Smith: "In
advanced conditions, every man is a merchant. and society is 
a commercial society.55
Marx summarizes another political economist. Say,
whose view of the reason for the division is rather different 
1 J'
Say regards exchange as accidental and not
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fundamental. Society could exist without it. It 
becomes indispensable in the advanced state of 
society. Yet production cannot take place without 
it. Division of labour is a convenient. useful 
means— a skilful deployment of human powers for 
social wealth? but it reduces the ability of each 
person taken individually. The last remark is a 
step forward for Say.5&
After mentioning Skarbek®^ and Mill, ^ 8 Marx points out that
The examination of division of labour and 
exchange is of extreme interest, because these are 
perceptibly alienated expressions of human activity 
and of essential human power as a species activity 
and power.^
One can now see the major objections which Marx had 
to the division of labour and exchange. (1) Their raison 
d *e£re is selfish interest— desire for profit. (2) This 
requires mass production and an unnatural splitting up of 
labour. (3) The skills and talents of men are formed by, 
and suitable only for, this particular labour and market 
situation. (4) Production is made most efficient and 
profitable by machine technology. (5) Men's labour must 
adapt to the goals and the technological means of production. 
These latter two points, which deal with the division of 
labour and technology, illustrate the crucial problems of 
men's labour situation.
The dividing up of his labour to make it suitable for 
machine production is perhaps the most immediate cause of 
alienated labour. It makes man's activity, his labour, 
inhuman. It does not fulfill man's desires and needs and 
makes him compete to engage in this activity.®®
. . . Machine labour is simplified in order to make 
a worker out of the human being still in the making.
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the completely immature human being, the child—  
whilst the worker has become a neglected child.
The machine accommodates itself to the weakness 
of the human being in order to make the weak 
human being into a machine.61
Earlier in the manuscripts Marx discusses the worker's fate
in a prospering economy:
. . . With this division of labour on the one hand 
and the accumulation of capitals on the other, the 
worker becomes ever more exclusively dependent on 
labour, and on a particular, very one-sided, machine­
like labour. Just as he is thus depressed spiritually 
and physically to the condition of a machine and from 
being a man becomes an abstract activity and a stomach, 
so he also becomes ever more dependent on every fluctua­
tion in market-price, on the application of capitals, 
and on the mood of the rich. Equally, the increase in 
the class of people wholly dependent on work inten­
sifies competition among them, thus lowering their 
price. In the factory-system this situation of the 
worker reaches its c l i m a x . 62
Where wealth is increasing in society the worker simply over­
works (for his own gains and demands of his employer), is a 
mere machine, suffers physically and competes even harder 
with those who cannot compete, falling into starvation or 
beggary.63
Where the wealth of society is declining, the worker 
suffers more than any o n e . 64 in a situation where the
wealth of society stabilizes, wages would be low, competition 
for employment would be high since only a given number of 
workers would be enployed, and the worker again would suffer 
in a state of "static misery."63
Thus, the division of labour and its subsequent effects 
create a general economic situation as well as specific work 
conditions which together produce and sustain alienated 
labour.
The division of labour is the expression in 
political economy of the social character of labour 
within the estrangement. Or, since labour is only 
an expression of human activity within alienation, 
of the living of life as the alienating of life, the 
division of labour, too, is therefore nothing else 
but the estranged, alienated positing of human 
activity as .a real activity of the species or as 
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1844, trans. Martin Milligan (Moscow: Foreign Languages
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^Most of the material in the Manuscripts deals in 
general with the sources and causes of alienation, perhaps 
because these sources comprise the major components of the 
economic and social structures of the time. While most of 
his theory of alienation is contained within the fourth part 
of the first manuscript, entitled "Estranged Labour," for 
the most part one must turn to the rest of the manuscripts 













14". . . under private property their significance is 
reversed: every person speculates on creating a new need in
another, so as to drive him to a fresh sacrifice, to place 
him in a new dependence and to seduce him into a new mode of 
gratification and therefore economic ruin. ,Each tries to 
establish over the other an alien power, so as thereby to 
find satisfaction of his own selfish need. The increase in 
the quantity of objects is accompanied by an extension of 
the realm of the alien powers to which man is subjected, and 
every new product represents a new potency of mutual 
swindling and mutual plundering. . . Ibid., p. 115.
". . . Subjectively, this is even partlymmanifested in 
that the extension of products and needs falls into 
contriving and ever-calculating subservience to inhuman,
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refined, unnatural and imaginary appetites. Private property 
does not know how to change crude need into human need. Its 
idealism is fantasy, caprice and whim; . . . "  Ibid., p. 116.
". . . He [the industrial eunuch, the producerj puts 
himself at the service of the other's most depraved fancies, 
plays the pimp between him and his need, excites in him 
morbid appetites, lies in wait for each of his weaknesses—  
all so that he can then demand the cash for this service of 




•18". . . The ethics of political economy is (sic) 
acquisition, work, thrift, sobriety— but political economy 
ppomises to satisfy my needs. The political economy of 
ethics is the opulence of a good conscience, of virtue, etc.; 
but how can I live virtuously if I do not live? And how can 
I have a good conscience if I am not conscious of anything?
It stems from the very nature of estrangement that each 
sphere applies to me a different and opposite yardstick—  
ethics one and political economy another; for each is a 
specific estrangement of man and focuses attention on a 
particular round of estranged essential activity, and each 
stands in an estranged relation to the other." Ibid., pp. 
120-21.
" . . .  And this it does [political economy comes out 
in its complete cynicism] . . . by developing the idea of 
labour much more one-sidedly, and therefore more sharply and 
more consistently, as the sole essence of wealth; by proving 
the implications of this theory to be anti-human in 
character. . . ." Ibid., p . 95.
•^ Ibid.. p. 95.
20 "When political economy claims that demand and 
supply always balance each other, it immediately forgets 
that according to its own claim [theory of population] the 
supply of people always exceeds the demand, and that, there­
fore, in the essential result of the whole production 
process— the existence of man— the disparity between demand 
and supply gets its most striking expression." Ibid., p. 125.
21"It was likewise a great and logical advance of 
modem English political economy, that, whilst elevating 
labour to the position of its sole principle, it should at 
the same time expound with complete clarity the inverse 
relation between wages and interest on capital, and the fact 
that the capitalist could normally only gain by pressing 
down wages, and vice versa. Not the doing-down of the
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consumer, but the capitalist and the worker doing-down each 




24The effects of technology and the division of labour 
as existent in the industrial setting of that time are dis­
cussed in the next section ,on the division of labour and 
exchange.
25Ibid., p. 29.
26“political economy conceals the estrangement 
inherent in the nature of labour by not considering the 
direct relationship between the worker (labour) and produc­
tion. . . . "  Ibid., p. 71.
27Ibid.
28"how the multiplication of needs and the means of 
their satisfaction breeds the absence of needs and of means 
is demonstrated by the political economist (and the capital­
ist: it should be noted that it is always empirical business
men we are talking about when we refer to political economists 
— their scientific confession and mode of being). This he 
shows:
(1) By reducing the work's need to the barest and most 
miserable level of physical subsistence, and by reducing his 
activity to the most abstract mechanical movement. Hence,
he says: Man has no other need either of activity or of
enjoyment. For he calls even this life human and existence.
(2) By counting the lowest possible level of life 
(existence) as the standard, indeed as the general standard—  
general because it is applicable to the mass of men. . . .  To
him, therefore, every luxury of the worker seems to be
reprehensible, and everything that goes beyond the most 
abstract need— b^e it in the realm of passive enjoyment, or a 
manifestation of activity— seems to him a luxury. . . ." 
Ibid., p. 118.
29Ibid., p. 82.
30"The need for money is therefore the tame need 
produced by the modem economic system and it is the only 
need which the latter produces. The quantity of money 
becomes to an ever greater degree its sole effective 
attribute: just as it reduces everything to its abstract
form, so it reduces itself in the course of its own movement 
to something merely quantitative. Excess and intemperance 
come to be its true norm. . . ." Ibid., p. 116.
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31"The extent to which money, which appears as a means, 
constitutes true power and the sole end— the extent to which 
in general that means which gives me substance, which gives 
me possession of the objective substance of others, is an 
end in itself— can be clearly seen from the facts that 
landed property wherever land is the source of life, and 
horse and sword wherever these are the true means of life, 
are also acknowledged as the true political powers in 
life. . . . "  Ibid.. p. 125.
In analyzing a passage from Faust by Goethe, " . . .  
the extent of the power of money is the extent of my power. 
Money's properties are my properties and essential powers—  
the properties and powers of its possessor. Thus, what I am 
and am capable of is by no means determined by my indi­
viduality. . . . "  Ibid., p. 138.
32". . .Everything which the political economist 
takes from you in life and in humanity, he replaces for you 
in money and in wealth? and all the things which you cannot 
do, your money can do. It can eat and drink, go to the 
dance hall and the theatre? it can travel, it can appropriate 
art, learning, the treasures of the past, political power—  
all this it can appropriate for you— it can buy all this for 
you; it is the true endowment. Yet being all this, it is 
inclined do do nothing but create itself, buy itself; for 
everything else is after all its servant. . . . "  Ibid., 
p. 119.
^"By possessing the property of buying everything, 
the possessing the property of appropriating all objects, 
money is thus the object of eminent possession. The univer­
sality of its property is the omnipotence of its being. It 
therefore functions as the almighty being. Money is the 
pimp between man's heed and the object, between his life and 
his means of life. But that which mediates my life for me, 
also mediates the existence of other people for me. For me 
it is the other person." Ibid,, p . 137.
"If money is the bond binding me to human life, 
binding society to me, binding me and nature and man, is not 
money the bond of all bonds? Can it not dissolve and bind 
all ties? . . . It is the true agent of divorce as well as 
the true binding agent— the universal galvano-chemical power 
of Society." Ibid., p. 139.
34". # b There is a form of inactive, extravagant 
wealth given over wholly to pleasure, the enjoyer of which 
on the hand behaves as a mere ephemeral individual frantic­
ally spending himself to no purpose, knows the slave labour 
of others (human sweat and blood) as the prey of his 
cupidity, and therefore knows man himself, and hence also his 
own self, as a sacrified and empty being. With such wealth 
the contempt of man makes its appearance, partly as arrogance 
and as the throwxng-away of what can give sustenance to a
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hundred lives, and partly as the infamous illusion that his 
own unbridled extravagance and ceaseless, unproductive con­
sumption is the condition of the other's labour and therefore 
of his subsistence. He knows the realisation of the essential 
powers of man only as the realisation of his own excesses, 
his whims and capricious, bizarre notions. This wealth 
which, on the other hand, againkknows wealth as a mere means, 
as something that is good for nothing but to be annihilated 
and which is therefore at once slave and master, at once 
generous and mean, capricious, presumptuous, conceited, 
refined, cultured and witty— this wealth has not yet experi­
enced wealth as an utterly alien power over itself: it sees
in it, rather, only its own power, and not wealth but grati­
fication is its final aim and end." Ibid., p. 126.
35ibid.. p. 139. "Money, then, appears as this over­
turning power both against the individual and against the 
bonds of society, etc., which claim to be essences in them­
selves . It transforms fidelity into infidelity, love into 
hate, hate into love, virtue into vice, vice into virtue, 
servant into master, master into servant, idiocy into intel­
ligence and intelligence into idiocy . . . it is the general 
confounding and compounding . . . of all natural and human 
qualities." Ibid., p. 141.
36Ibid., p . 68.
37". . . that the necessary result of competition is 
the accumulation of capital in a few hands, and thus the 
restoration of monopoly in a more terrible form; that 
finally the distinction between capitalist and land-rentier, 
like that between the tiller of the soil and the factory- 
worker, disappears and that the whole of society must fall 
apart into the two classes— the proper ty-owners. and the 
propertyless workers." Ibid., p. 67.
38Ibid. Also p. 24.
39Ibid., p. 67.
40", . .Equally, the increase in the class of 
people wholly dependent on work intensifies competition 
among them, thus lowering their price. In the factory-system 
this situation of the worker reaches its climax.
"(c) In an increasingly prosperous society it is only 
the very richest people who can go on living on money-in- 
interest. Everyone else has to carry on a business with his 
capital, or venture it in trade. As a result, the competi­
tion between capitals becomes more intense. The concentra­
tion of capitals increases, the big capitalists ruin the 
small, and a section of the erstwhile capitalists sinks into 
the working class, which as a result of this supply again 
suffers to some extent a depression of wages and passes into
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a still greater dependence on the few big capitalists. The 
number of capitalists having been diminished, their competi­
tion with respect to workers scarcely exists any longer; and 
the number of workers having been augmented, their compe­
tition among themselves has become all the more intense, 
unnatural and violent. Consequently, a section of the 
working class falls into the ranks of beggary or starvation 
just as necessarily as a section of the middle capitalists 
falls into the working class." Ibid., pp. 24-25.
41Ibid.. pp. 36-37.
42Ibid.
42Ibid., pp. 36-40. "He [the capitalist] profits 
doubly— first, by the division of labour; and secondly, in 
general, by the advance which human labour makes on the 
natural product. The greater the human share in a commodity, 
the greater the profit of dead capital." Ibid., pp. 39-40. 
For instance, a hand-made product requiring many hours and 
mature craftsmanship brings a higher price, the additional 
profit of which is gained by the capitalist. Very little 
additional increment is gained by the producer.
"It goes without saying that profits also rise if the 
means of circulation become less expensive or easier avail­
able (e.g., paper money). Ibid.. p. 40.
44See particularly pages 40-41.
45Ibid., p . 42.
46Ibid., p. 43. The large capitalist can get more 
credit, pay higher wages and thus compete better for labour, 
and have more circulating and fixed capital to work with. 
Ibid., pp. 44-45.
47gee quotes on pages 47-50.
48Ibid., pp. 132-23.
49"The worker is the subjective manifestation of the 
fact that capital is man wholly lost to himself, just as 
capital is the objective manifestation of the fact that 
labour is man lost to himself. But the worker has the mis­
fortune to be a living capital, and therefore a capital with 
needs— one which loses its interest and hence its livelihood, 
every moment it is not working. . . ." Ibid., p . 84.'
" . . .  The worker exists as a worker only when he 
exists for himself as capital; and he exists as capital only 
when some capital exists for him. The existence of capital 
is bis existence, his life; as it determines the tenor of his 
life in a manner indifferent to him." Ibid., p. 85.
". . .For it [political economy], therefore, the
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worker' s needs are but the one need— to maintain him whilst 
he is working is so far as may be necessary to prevent the 
race of labourers from dying out. The wages of labour have 
thus exactly the same significance as the maintenance and 
servicing of any other productive instrument, or as the 
consumption of ci capital, required for its reproduction with 
interest? or as the oil which is applied to wheels to keep 
them turning. . . . "  Ibid., p. 85.
50Ibid.. p. 71.
31The present writer's definition based upon Marx's 
discussion of the division of labour. See especially page 
135.
52Ibid.. p. 63.
53Ibid., pp. 134-35. " . . .  precisely in the fact
that division of labour and exchange are embodiments of 
private property lies the twofold proof, on the one hand 
that human life required private property for its realisa­
tion, and on the other hand that it now requires the super­
session of private property. Ibid., p. 134.
"Division of labour and exchange are the two 
phenomena in connection with which the political economist 
boasts of the social character of his science and in the 
same breath gives expression to the contradiction in his 
science—-the establishment of society through unsocial, 
particular interests." Ibid.. p. 135.
54Marx summarizing Adam Smith: "Division of labour
bestows on labour infinite production capacity. It stems 
from the propensity to exchange and barter, a specifically 
human propensity which . . .  is conditioned by use of reason 
and speech. The motive of those who engage in exchange is 
not humanity but egoism. The diversity of human talents is 
more the effect than the cause of the division of labour—  
i.e., of exchange. Besides, it is only the latter which 
makes such diversity useful. . . ."
Animals, being unable to exchange, are unable to take 
advantage of the differences which arise among members of 
the same species.
". . . It is otherwise with men, amongst whom the 
most dissimilar talents and forms of activity are of use to 
one another, because they can bring their different products 
together into a common stock, from which each can purchase. 
As the division of labour springs from the propensity to 
exchange it grows and is limited by the extent of exchange—  




57"Skarbek distinguishes the individual powers 
inherent in man— intelligence and the physical capacity for 
work— from the powers derived from society— exchange and 
division of labour. which mutually condition one another.
But the necessary premise of exchange is private property." 
Ibid., p. 134.
58"Mill presents trade as the consequence of the 
division of labour. With him human activity is reduced to 
mechanical motion. Division of labour and use of machinery 
promote wealth of production. Each person must be entrusted 
with as small a sphere of operations as possible. . . ."
Ibid., p. 134.
59Ibid.
6°"S . . Similarly, the division of labour renders 
him even more one-sided and dependent, bringing with it the 
competition hot only of men but of machines. Since the 
worker has sunk to the level of a machine, he can be con­
fronted by the machine as a competitor. . . ." Ibid., p . 25.
" . . .  The crudest modes (and instruments) of human 
labour are coming back: the tread-mill of the Roman slaves,
for instance, is the means of production, the means of 
existence, of many English workers. It is not only that man 
has no human needs— even his animal needs are ceasing to 
exist. . . Ibid., p. 117.
61Ibid., pp. 117-18.
62Ibid.. p. 24.
63,1'Hence even in the condition of society most 
favourable to the worker, the inevitable result for the 
worker is overwork and premature death, decline to a mere 
machine, a bond servant of capital, which piles up dangerously 
over against him, more competition, and for a section of the 
workers starvation or beggary." Ibid., p . 25.
64<|lphe worker has to struggle not only for his physi­
cal means of subsistence: he has to struggle to get work,
i.e., the possibility, the means, to perform his activity.
Take the three chief conditions in which society can find 
itself and consider the situation of the worker in them:
(1) If the wealth of society declines the worker 
suffers most of all, for: although the working class cannot
gain so much as can the class of property-owners in a 
prosperous state of society, no one suffers so cruelly from 
its decline as the working class." Ibid., p . 23. Marx 
draws on Adam Smith's discussion of three societies: Bengal,
China, and North America.
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Marx concludes this from a quote from Adam Smith, 
ibid., pp. 25-26. And then he adds: "Thus in a declining
state of society— increasing misery of the worker? in an 
advancing state— misery with complications; and in a fully 
developed state of society— static misery." Ibid.. p. 26.
66Ibid., p. 129.
CHAPTER V
THE MANIFESTATIONS OF ALIENATION
An examination of the Manuscripts reveals that con­
siderably more space is devoted to the sources and conse­
quences of alienation than to the nature and manifestations 
of alienation. Marx's ideas on the latter are concentrated 
in the brief chapter on estranged labour. The explication 
on the manifestations of alienation is logical and system­
atic. A more systematic theoretic structure exists, 
particularly in this chapter, than a cursory examination of 
the Manuscripts reveals. This theory, translated into 
contemporary sociological terms at times, will be presented 
throughout this and following chapters.
Marx's discussion of alienation, or alienated labour, 
is clarified if one distinguishes between the nature of 
alienation (see Chapter Two) and its manifestations, that is, 
the forms in which it occurs in the real life of man. 
Manifestations are the forms or expressions of alienated 
labour as Marx saw it occur in the life of the worker in the 
European industrial setting of his time. It seems useful to 
conceptualize these as separate forms, rather than to include 
them in the definition of alienation itself. The latter
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approach has been used consistently in the literature. Such 
an approach tends to confuse the matter and contributes 
little to an understanding of Marx's theory of alienation.
One may think of these manifestations as empirical 
forms or expressions of a particular social-psychological 
phenomenon. Just as one identifies different forms of social 
conflict or various expressions of neuroses, one can identify 
different forms of alienation.
In addition, it is possible to refer to these mani­
festations as empirical indicators which bear a definite 
relationship to one another. The manifestations of aliena­
tion occur in a definite sequence, each form being an 
empirical indicator of the presence of all prior forms.
These sequential relationships will be explicated and trans­
lated into propositional form, to be demonstrated in the
final chapter of this study.
Although recent analyses of the Manuscripts identify 
only three "types” of alienation, the present investigator 
found that Marx clearly specifies four manifestations of 
alienation or alienated labour:
1. Alienation from the act of production;
2. Alienation from the product of labour;
3. Alienation from man's species being; and
4. Alienation of man from man.
The discussions of each manifestation and the' development of 
the relationships among them substantiate, and further 
unveil, Marx's basic assumptions about the nature of society,
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-the individual and social relationships among men. Bach 
manifestation will be defined and discussed in terms of its 
meaning and its relationship to the other forms.
I. ALIENATION PROM THE ACT OF PRODUCTION
This is the most basic manifestation of alienation 
which exists prior to the other forms. Although this form 
is not discussed first, its priority in reality becomes 
apparent in the explication.
. . . How would the worker come to face the product 
of his activity as a stranger, were it not that in the 
very act of production he was estranging himself from 
himself? The product is after all but the summary of 
the activity, of production. If then the product of 
labour is alienation, production itself must be active 
alienation, the alienation of activity, the activity 
of alienation. In the estrangement of the object of 
labour is merely summarised the estrangement, the 
alienation, in the activity of labour itself.1
It seems clear that alienation in the act of production must
occur first, and in fact does.
Alienation from the act of production refers to 
activity which has become alien to the worker. It no longer 
belongs to him, which is to say that the worker neither con­
trols nor originates his activity. Since activity itself 
(doing or making anything) is part of the individual's being 
and living, if one is alienated from one's activity, one is 
alienated from himself.
. . . (2) The relation of labour to the act of
production within the labour process. This rela­
tion is the relation of the worker to his own 
activity as an alien activity not belonging to him; 
it is activity as suffering, strength as weakness, 
begetting as emasculating, the worker1s own physical
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and mental energy, his personal life or what is 
life other than activity— as an activity which is 
turned against him, neither depends on nor belongs 
to him. Here we have self-estrangement, as we had 
previously the estrangement of the thing.2
Production is no longer a part of, or an expression of, the
worker.
How does alienation from the act of production come 
about and why does it occur at all? It is built into the 
system in which it occurs? it is a fact of industrial 
capitalism which Marx was studying.
We took our departure from a fact of political 
economy— the estrangement of the worker and his 
production. We have formulated the concept of this 
fact— estranged, alienated labour. We have analysed 
this concept— hence analysing merely a fact of 
political economy.3
The situation is exacerbated by the division of labour,
machine technology and the increasing accumulation of
capital and economic power in the hands of a few. The
worker
. . . becomes ever more exclusively dependent on 
labour, and on a particular, very one-sided, machine­
like, labour.... .he is thus depressed spiritually 
and physically to the condition of a machine. . . . 4
Marx perceives several changes in the productive 
process, in addition to the loss of power and control by the 
worker, which contribute to alienation in production. He 
objects to the use of machine technology, to its service to 
the goal of profit rather.than to human goals. Technology 
should be man's servant, not the other way around. The 
breakdown of the craft industries and the minute division of 
labour accompanying mechanization were creating inhuman work
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situations. Marx saw no way in which a man could find ful­
fillment or confirmation of his humanity performing mundane 
tasks which dulled the mind as well as the spirit.
There is no doubt that implicit here is the assump­
tion that man's work, his life-activity, as Marx refers to 
it, is the central fact of man's life. If he becomes 
alienated in this activity, repercussions appear in other 
facets of one1s existence.
II. ALIENATION FROM THE PRODUCT OF LABOUR
Although it is the first manifestation of alienation 
mentioned in the Manuscripts, alienation from the product of 
labour results from alienation in the act of production.
According to the Marxian framework, derived in part 
from Hegel and Feuerbach, objectification is the result of 
the act of producing something, an object, idea, and so 
forth.
. . . The product of labour is labour which has 
been congealed in an object, which has become 
material: it is the objectification of labour.
Labour's realisation is its objectification. . . .5
The meaning of this rather philosophical notion becomes
clearer as Marx develops his argument.
Objectification is part of human life. The object of 
labour, the end result, under desirable circumstances, is 
therefore an egression of man's existence, and a confirma­
tion of his abilities, his species life.
It is just in the working-up of the objective 
world, therefore, that man first really proves himself
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to be a species being. This production is his active 
species life. Through and because of this production, 
nature appears as his work and his reality. The object 
of labour is, therefore, the objectification of man's 
species life: for he duplicates himself not only, as
in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, 
in reality, and therefore he contemplates himself in a 
world that he has created. . . .6
Under conditions of estranged labour, however, objectifica­
tion becomes an alienating activity and the object of labour 
is no longer controlled by the producer. It is no longer an 
expression of his species life. In the work setting which he 
was studying, Marx saw a major disturbance in production of 
objects.
. . .  In the conditions dealt with by political 
economy this realisation of labour appears as loss 
of reality for the workers; objectification as loss 
of the object and object-bondage ? appropriation as 
estrangement, as alienation./
Appropriation occurs where the activityoof producing 
objects is controlled by another and the production of the 
object means loss of the object to an alien-power. The 
worker loses control over how and what he produces and then 
has no power in the use of his products. Man's relationship 
to the product changes:
. . . the object which labour produces— labour 's 
product— confronts it as something alien, as a 
power independent of the producer. ” i 7®
. . . The alienation of the worker in his product 
means not only that his labour becomes an object, an 
external existence, but that it exists outside him, 
independently, as something alien to him, and that it 
becomes a power on its own confronting him; it means 
that the life which he has conferred on the object 
confronts him as something hostile and alien.?
Marx sees a cumulative effect operating to increase
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the catastrophe of man's situation. The tone in these state­
ments is more philosophic than empiric hut is indicative of 
Marx's prediction for the future of the worker under capital­
ism.
So much does labour's realisation appear as loss 
of reality that the worker loses reality to the point 
of starving to death. So much does objectification 
appear as loss of the object that the worker is robbed 
of the objects most necessary not only for his life 
but for his work. Indeed, labour itself becomes an 
object which he can get hold of only with the greatest 
effort and with the most irregular interruptions. So 
much does the appropriation of the object appear as 
estrangement that the more objects the worker produces 
the fewer can be possess and the more he falls under 
the dominion of his product, capital.
Earlier in the first manuscript Marx points out that a con­
dition of increasing wealth in society is dependent on 
appropriation.
. . . this is possible
(a) as the result of the accumulation of much 
labour, capital being accumulated labour; as the 
result, therefore, of the fact that his products are 
being taken in ever-increasing degree from the hands 
of the worker, that to an increasing extent his own 
labour confronts him as another's property and that 
the means of his existence and his activity are 
increasingly concentrated in the hands of the 
capitalist.H
The negative effects of alienation in the act of pro­
duction and from the products are great for the worker, but 
not exclusively for him. The capitalist himself becomes 
alienated within this economic structure, in a deterministic 
or sequential ways
The direct relationship of labour to its produce 
is the relationship of the worker to the objects of 
his production. The relationship of the man of means 
to the objects of production and to production itself
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is only a consequence of this first relationship—  
and confirms it. We shall consider this other 
aspect later.12
If man becomes alienated from the products of his 
labour, from the objects which should express his humanity, 
then, Marx says, man becomes estranged or alienated from his 
species being, from those qualities which make him human.
III. ALIENATION FROM MAN'S SPECIES BEING
The third manifestation of alienated labour, which 
follows sequentially alienation from the act of production 
and alienation from the product of labour, is the alienation
of man from his species being. Species being was defined in
Chapter III, following closely Feuerbach and Marx, to refer 
to a conscious being whose activity is free and whose life 
is an object of thought and reflection to him.-^
Man is a species being, not only because in 
practice and in theory he adopts the species as his 
object (his own as well as those of other things), 
but— and this is only another way of esqpressing it—  
but also because he treats himself as the actual,
living species; because he treats himself as a uni­
versal and therefore a free b e i n g . 14
Furthermore, man as a species being engages in free, 
conscious life-activity, that is, productive activity which 
is characteristic of man and is the essence of human life.-1-5
. . . the productive life is the life of the 
species. It is life-engendering life. The whole 
character of a species--its species character— is 
contained in the character of its life-activity; 
and free* conscious activity is man's species char­
acter. . . . Man makes his life-activity its&lf the 
object of his will and of his consciousness. He has 
conscious life-activity. . . . Conscious life-activity 
directly distinguishes man from animal life-activity. It
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is just because of this that he is a species being.
Or it is only because he is a species being that he 
is a Conscious Being, i.e., that his own life is an 
object for him. Only because of that is his activity 
free activity. . . A®
, Species being, therefore, refers to man as a creature 
with particular intellectual and spiritual qualities, 
especially an ability to symbolize, which differentiate him 
and his existence from all other living things. His activity 
is free; he controls his environment. Nevertheless, man is 
a part of nature; his life-activity occurs within the limits 
of nature.
. . . The universality of man is in practice 
manifested precisely in the universality which makes 
all nature his inorganic body— both inasmuch as 
nature is (1) his direct means of life, and (2) the 
material, the object, and the instrument of his life- 
activity. . . . That man's physical and spiritual 
life is linked to nature means simply that nature is 
linked to itself, for man is a part of nature.^
Although man is to be distinguished qualitatively 
from animals, he shares with them a dependence upon inorganic 
nature. That is, man lives on the products of nature and is 
therefore inextricably bound to it.
When man's productive activity becomes alienated, 
that is, when man becomes alienated from the act of producing 
and from the product of his labour, he will subsequently 
become alienated from nature, the physical and natural 
environment in which he exists, and from himself, from his 
own physical body and his spiritual essence. In other words, 
he becomes alienated from his species being.
. . . In tearing away from man the object of his 
production, therefore, estranged labour tears from
101
him his species life, his real species objectivity, 
and transforms his advantage over animals into the 
disadvantage that his inorganic body, nature, is 
taken from him.18
This form of alienation destroys the integrality of 
man with nature, with himself, and ultimately with other men. 
Man's relationship to nature becomes instrumental; his 
relationship to his body and his spirit becomes estranged. 
These become a means to his existence and survival; they are 
no longer ends in themselves.
In estranging from man (1) nature, and (2) him­
self, his own active functions, his life-activity, 
estranged labour estranges the species from man.
It turns for him the life of the species into a 
means of individual life. First it estranges the 
life of the species and individual life, and 
secondly it makes individual life in its abstract 
form the purpose of the life of the species, like­
wise in its abstract and estranged form.
For in the first place labour, life-activitv. 
productive life itself, appears to man merely as a 
means of satisfying a need— the need to maintain the 
physical existence. Yet productive life is the life 
of the species. It is life-engendering life. . .
The estrangement resulting from this instrumental relation­
ship goes to the very core of man's experience. Paradoxically, 
ically, while all things become means to man's physical 
existence, he becomes estranged from his own consciousness, 
his intellect and from his physical being, his body.
Estranged labour turns thus:
(3) Man's species being, both nature and his 
spiritual species property, into a being alien to 
him, into a means to his individual existence. It 
estranges man's own body from him, as it does 
external nature and his spiritual essence, his 
human b e i n g . 20
Alienation from one's species being (from nature and 
from oneself) is a manifestation of alienated labour which
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necessarily ensues after the appearance of the prior two 
manifestations. The development of alienated labour is com­
pleted with appearance of the fourth form, according to Marx, 
which is the estrangement of man from man.
IV. ALIENATION OF MAN FROM MAN
This fourth manifestation of alienated labour derives 
from the three previous forms. The appearance of alienation 
among men indicates the prior occurrence of alienation from 
the act of production, from the product of labour, and from 
man's species being, especially from himself.
44) An immediate consequence of the fact that man 
is estranged from the product of his labour, from his 
life-activity, from his species being is the estrange­
ment of man from man. If a man is confronted by him­
self, he is confronted by the other man. What applies 
to a man's relation to his work, to the product of his 
labour and to himself, also holds of a man's relation 
to the other man, and to the other man's labour and 
object of labour.21
Although closely related to all forms of alienation, 
the alienation of man from man is most intimately tied to 
alienation from man's species being. Marx elaborates on this 
relationship. "In fact, the proposition that man's species 
nature is estranged from him means that one man is estranged 
from the other, as each of them is from man's essential 
nature."22 This relationship is repeatedly emphasized in 
the discussion of the fourth manifestation of alienation.
Every self-estrangement of man from himself and 
from nature appears in the relation in which he 
places himself and nature to men other than and 
differentiated from himself.23
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The development of the relationship between estrange­
ment from self and estrangement from others reflects the 
epistemological and sociological foundations of Marx's thoug 
thought. First, it is clear that man's personal development 
and the emergence of the self occur within a social context. 
Man's realisation and understanding of himself, man's 
knowledge of what he is and his consequent reaction to this, 
develop in the context of one's relationship to others.
The estrangement of man, and in fact every rela­
tionship in which man stands to himself, is first 
realised and expressed in the relationship in which 
a man stands to other m e n . 24
Within this context one's self is eaqpressed and objectified.
"We must bear in mind the above-stated proposition that man's
relation to himself only becomes objective and real for him
through his relation to the other man."25
Zt must follow, therefore, that if one becomes
estranged from one's self, estrangement will develop in one's
relationships with others. Marx emphasizes that these
relationships exist on a level of practical reality, that is,
of observable, immediate experience.
. . .  In the real practical world self-estrangement 
can only become manifest through the real practical 
relationship to other men. The medium through which 
estrangement takes place is itself practical. . . .26
Reflected here is Marx's determination to eliminate the
philosophical connotations of alienation and estrangement
\
inherited from Hegel and Feuerbach. As demonstrated earlier, 
all four manifestations reveal the occurrence of alienation 
in definite, observable (practical) forms.
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Furthermore, Marx emphasizes the development of self­
estrangement and estrangement from others particularly within
3 * 7
the production or work situation. And so the previous 
quotation continues:
. . . Thus through estranged labour man not only 
engenders his relationship to the object and to the 
act of production as to powers that are alien and 
hostile to him; he also engenders the relationship 
in which other men stand to his production and to 
his product, and the relationship in which he stands 
to these men. . . .2®
The loss of the worker's control over labour and its 
products gives control of both to someone else. Subsequently, 
the relation which the worker and the stranger (someone out­
side of but in control of production) have to labour and its 
products must necessarily create estrangement between the two 
parties.
. . . Just as he begets his own production as the 
loss of his reality, as his punishment; just as he 
begets his own product as a loss, as a product not 
belonging to him; so he begets the dominion of the 
one who does not produce over production and over the 
product. Just as he estranges from himself his own 
activity, so he confers to the stranger activity 
which is not his own.29
Man becomes estranged from other men, therefore, 
because his life activity and its products are controlled by 
others and because he consequently cannot live and interact 
as a free and equal human being. In addition, man's rela­
tionships with others are disrupted by and reflect his 
alienation from self. ". . .Every one of your relations to 
man and to nature must be a specific expression, corresponding 
to the object of your will, of your real individual life.''30
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Man's relation to man and nature is observed most directly 
in man's relation to woman. This expression of the human 
essence and its relation to nature are of particular concern 
to Marx in his discussion of communism which is discussed 
later in this study in connection with the resolution of 
alienation. The consequences of these manifestations of 
alienation and of the system which creates them range from 
specific, immediate results to extensive, fundamental prob­
lems created within the social order. These consequences 
are the subject of the following chapter.
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FOOTNOTES
-^ Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 
1844. trans. Martin Milligan (Moscow: Foreign Languages






7 Ibid., p. 69.
8Ibid.




^Precisely because man is a symboling creature, 
because his activity reflects the qualities of intelligence 
and creativity, man's existence does and ought to have a 
qualitative meaning which is distinctively the characteristic 
and perhaps the essence of humanity. Marx sees this, that 
is man's existence as a species being, threatened by 
alienated labour. The use of symbols and importance of 
language is discussed by Feuerbach. See the footnote on 
ibid., p. 77.
14Ibid., p. 74.
15"It is just in the working-up of the objective world, 
therefore, that man first really proves himself to be a 
species beincr. This production is his active species life. 
Through and because of this production, nature appears as 
his work and his reality. The object of labour is, there­
fore, the objectification of man's species life: for he
duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness, intel­
lectually, but also actively, in reality, and therefore he 
contemplates himself in a world that he has created. . . . "  
Ibid., p. 76.
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jQaid., p. 75. Within this discussion Marx distin­
guishes man from animals. An animal is "identical with its 
life-activity. It does not distinguish itself from it. It 
is its life-activitv.1 Ibid.. p. 75. Man, on the other 
hand, makes hi; life-activity the object of his will and can 
exercise control over it.
. . . It [an animal] produces one-sidedly, whilst 
man produces universally. It produces only under the 
dominion of immediate physical need, whilst man produces 
even when he is free from physical need and only truly pro­
duces in freedom therefrom. An animal produces only itself, 
whilst man reproduces the whole of nature. An animal's 
product belongs immediately to its physical body, whilst man 
freely confronts his product. An animal forms things in 
accordance with the standard and need of the species to 
which it belongs, whilst man knows how to produce in accord­
ance with the standard of every species, and knows how to 
apply everywhere the inherent standard to the object. Man 
therefore also forms things in accordance with the laws of
" Ibid. , pp. 75-76.
17Ibid., p. 74.






24Ibid.. p. 78. The passage continues:  . _ "Hence within
the relationship of estranged labour each man views the other 
in accordance with the standard and the position in which he 
finds himself as a worker." Ibid.
25Ibid., p. 79.
26Ibid.
^7As already mentioned, work or productive activity 
is man's basic expression of his humanity. It is central to 
his existence. This explains the emphasis and implication 
of priority given to interpersonal alienation in the produc­
tion context. From here alienation spreads to all man's 
social relationships, including his sexual expression.
28Ibid., pp. 79-80.
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29Ibid., p. 80. "Let us now see, further, how in real 
life the concept of estranged, alienated labour must express 
and present itself. If the product of labour is alie^ to 
me, if it confronts me as an alien power, to whom, then, does 
it belong?"
"To a being other than me. . . ." Ibid., p . 78.
"The alien being, to whom labour and the produce of 
labour belongs, in whose service labour,is done and for 
whose benefit the produce of labour is provided, can only be 
man himself.
"If the product of labour does not belong to the 
worker, if it confronts him as an alien power, this can only 
be because it belongs to some other man than the worker. If 
the worker's activity is a torment to him, to another it 
must be delight and his life's joy. Not the gods, not 
nature, but only man himself can be this alien power over 




THE CONSEQUENCES OP ALIENATION
The consequences of alienation, as explicated by Marx 
in the last section of the chapter on "Alienated Labour" and 
in other parts of the Manuscripts, can be divided into two 
groups or categories: (1) those consequences, particularly
economic, which are the immediate, concomitant results of 
the four manifestations of alienation, and (2) those develop­
ments in society which are the long-range effects of 
alienated labour and the capitalistic system in which it 
emerges.
I . IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES
The first category includes three major concomitant 
consequences: (1) private property; (2) wages; and (3) the
property-relation of the non-worker to the worker and to 
labour.
Private Property
The discussion of private property in connection with 
the sources of alienation has already indicated the com­
plicated nature of the relationship between private property 
and alienation. In dealing with consequences of alienation.
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Marx makes it clear that the relations of private property, 
that is, labour, capital and the relations between the two, 
result from alienated labour.
Through estranged, alienated labour. then, the 
worker produces the relationship to this labour of 
a man alien to labour and standing outside it. The 
relationship of the worker to labour engenders the 
relation to it of the capitalist, or whatever one 
chooses to call the master of labour. Private 
property is thus the product, the result, the neces­
sary consequence, of alienated labour, of the 
external relation of the worker to nature and to 
himself.
Private property thus results by analysis from the 
concept of alienated labour— i.e., of alienated man, 
of estranged labour, of estranged life, of estranged 
man.1
A contradiction is immediately apparent since private prop­
erty is used in earlier discussions to explain the develop­
ment of alienated labour. The contradiction is resolved by 
an explication of the particular relationship between these 
two phenomena. This relationship can be identified, in the 
language of Hans Zetterberg, as an interdependent relation:
. . . Thus, in an interdependent relation, a 
small increment in one variable results in a small 
increment in a second variable? then, thetlncreirre- 
ment in the second variable makes possible a further 
increment in the first variable, which in turn 
affects the second one, and so this process goes on 
until no more increments are possible. Note, however, 
that an immediate large change in one variable will 
not bring about a large change in the other variable.
The only way a large change is brought about in an 
interdependent relation is through a series of inter­
acting small changes. . . .2
Although Marx did not explain the relationship in systematic
theoretical terms, the nature of this reciprocal relationship
can be analyzed in this non-tautological manner. Marx
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attempts to clarify the causal relation further:
True, it is as a result of the movement of 
private property that we have obtained the concept 
of alienated labour (of alienated life) from 
political economy. But on analysis of this concept 
it becomes clear that though private property 
appears to be the source, the cause of alienated 
labor, it is really its consequence, just as the 
gods in the beginning are not the cause but the 
effect of man's intellectual confusion. Later this 
relationship becomes reciprocal.3
Unlifce a tautological relationship, the elements of time and
space are important here. The relation becomes clear only
at the final stage or highest development of private property.
Only at the very culmination of the development 
of private property does this, its secret, reeemerge, 
namely, that on the one hand it is the product of 
alienated labour, and that secondly it is the means 
by which labour alienates itself, the realisation of 
this alienation.4
The relationship between private property and 
alienated labour is highly complex. Private property is the 
foundation for the industrial, capitalist economic order.
It is the basis for the conflict between capital and labour. 
It is also "the material, sensuous expression of estranged 
human life. . . ."5 The two phenomena are interdependent, 
each affects the development of the other. Private property 
is both a product of alienated labour and a means by which 
labour becomes alienated. Alienated labour, which emerges 
from the movement of private property is, upon development, 
its perpetuator. The continuing existence of private 
property depends upon the endurance of a large segment of 
society for whom labour and life are alienated. Alienated 
man becomes powerless to stop the movement of private
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property. In other words, the permanent entrenchment of 
private property in society is possible in the first place 
only because the worker has already become alienated in his 
work and life under the new system. If he were not, private 
property would have no viability even in industrial society. 
In the course of the development of political economy, 
reciprocity thus Emerges between alienated labour and private 
property. An understanding of this relationship is necessary 
to understand political economy and the other consequences 
of alienated labour and the capitalistic structure.
Just as we have found the concept of private 
property from the concept of estranged, alienated 
labour by analysis, in the same way every category 
of political economy can be evolved with the help 
of these two factors; and we shall find again in 
each category, e.g., trade, competition, capital, 
money, only a definite and developed expression of 
the first foundations.6
Wages
The second major consequence of estranged labour is 
wages. The implications of wages are destructive for the 
worker and further aggravate his alienation in all dimensions. 
“Wages are a direct consequence of estranged labour, and 
estranged labour is the direct cause of private property."^ 
Wages and private property appear together in political 
economy.
We also understand, therefore, that wages and 
private property are identicals where the product, 
the object of labour pays for labour itself, the 
wage is but a necessary consequence of labour's 
estrangement, for after all in the wage of labour, 
labour does not appear as an .end in itself but as 
the servant of the wage. . . .  8
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Wages are established "through the antagonistic struggle 
between capitalist and the worker."® However, the worker is 
at great disadvantage because he cannot organize in a way to 
parallel the monopolies of the capitalists. Furthermore, 
the worker cannot augment his income with revenue from 
ground-rent or interest on capital as can the capitalist.
He must depend on wages.
. . . Thus only for the workers is the separation 
of capital, landed property and labour an inevitable, 
essential and detrimental separation. Capital and 
landed property need not remain fixed in this abstrac­
tion, as must the labour of the workers.10
Wages are a necessary cost to the capitalist and must be kept
to the minimum in order not to greatly diminish his
profit.11
The determination of wages is largely a reflection of 
the capitalist's perception of the worker as part of the 
productive system. The worker is viewed as one of several 
instruments of production which must be maintained at certain 
minimal levels to carry on the productive process. This is 
generalized in the perception of the worker as a commodity 
to be "purchased" and utilized as other ingredients of pro­
duction.
The lowest and the only necessary wage-rate is 
that providing for the subsistence of the worker 
for the duration of his work and as much more as 
is necessary for him to support a family and for 
the race of labourers not to die out. The ordinary 
wage, according to Smith, is the lowest compatible 
with common humanity (that is a cattle-like existence),1^
In the second manuscript Marx repeats and esqpands on this
idea:
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. . . For it, therefore, the worker's needs are 
hut the one need— to maintain him whilst he is 
working in so far as may he necessary to prevent 
the race of labourers from dying out. The wages of 
labour have thus exactly the same significance as 
the maintenance and servicing of any other produc­
tive instrument, or as the consumption of a_ capital. 
required for its reproduction with interest; or as 
the oil which is applied to wheels to keep them 
turning. . . .13
The problem of wages and the implication for the 
worker cannot, however, be separated from the central problem 
of estranged labour. Therefore, the question is not simply 
one of the amount of wages but of the nature of labour.
A forcing-up of wages (disregarding all other 
difficulties, including the fact that it would only 
be by force, too, that the higher wages, being an 
anomaly, could be maintained) would therefore be 
nothing but better payment for the slave. and would 
not conquer either for the worker or for labourer 
their human status and dignity.1 ’^
No amount of equalization of wages will resolve these prob­
lems for the worker.
Indeed, even the equality of wages demanded by 
Proudhon only transforms the relationship of the 
present-day worker to his labour into the relation­
ship of all men to labour. Society is then con­
ceived as an abstract capitalist.!*
Wages continue to reflect the disadvantaged position 
of the worker under capitalism and the meaningless nature of 
work in such a system. Furthermore, certain inequities 
adversely affect the worker even in cases of wage increases. 
For instance, living costs and wages do not coincide: 
"Furthermore: the prices of labour are much more constant
than the prices of provisions, often they stand in inverse 
proportion."1^ There are, in addition, greater disparities
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in wages than in profits. " . . .  The labour-prices of the
various kinds of workers show much wider differences than the 
profits in the various branches in which capital is agpriDiigdL11-^ 
Because the worker is dependent solely upon wages, unlike the 
landlord and capitalist, he is most directly and severely 
affected by changes in market prices.
Thus in the gravitation of market-price to 
natural price it is the worker who loses most of 
all and necessarily. . . .
The accidental and sudden fluctuations in market- 
price hit rent less than they do that part of the 
price which is resolved into profit and wages? but 
they hit profit less than they do wages. Xn most 
cases, for every wage that rises, one remains 
stationary and one falls. 3.8
In this particular discussion of wages, Marx explains 
the position of the worker under three societal conditions: 
a decline in wealth, an increase in wealth, and a stabilized 
condition in which wealth has reached its peak. Xn the first 
case the worker suffers most of all and in a very direct 
manner. In the third case wages would be low because of 
great competition for employment which is stabilized and 
limited to only a certain number of workers. What of the 
worker's fortune in the case of increasing wealth? Behind 
the facade of rising wages, the real plight of the worker is 
evident. The worker is encouraged to work too hard and 
subsequently suffers the consequences.
The raising of wages excites in the worker the 
capitalist's mania to get rich, which he, however, 
can only satisfy by the sacrifice of his mind and 
body. The raising of wages presupposes and entails 
the accumulation of capital, and thus sets the 
product of labour against the worker as something ever
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more alien to him. Similarly, the division of 
labour renders him ever more one-sided and dependent, 
bringing with it the competition not only of men but 
of machines. since the worlcer has sunk to the level 
of a machine, he can be confronted by the machine as 
a competitor. Finally, as the amassing of capital 
increases the amount of industry and therefore the 
number of workers, it causes the same amount of indus­
try to manufacture a greater amount of product, which 
leads to over-production and thus either ends by 
throwing a large section of workers out of work or by 
reducing their wages to the most miserable minimum.
Such are the consequences of a condition of society 
most favourable to the worker— namely, of a condition 
of growing, advancing wealth.i®
Indeed, the physical well-being of the worker is jeopardized
by the increase of wages.
In the first place, the raising of wages gives 
rise to overwork among the workers. The more they 
wish to earn, the more must they sacrifice their 
time and carry out slave-labour, in the service of 
avarice completely losing all their freedom, thereby 
they shorten their lives. . . .  20
Implied throughout this discussion is the idea that capital­
ism instills in the worker those material desires and 
economic goals of the capitalist which, almost by definition, 
are impossible for the worker to attain. The attempt to 
attain them can only be detrimental for the worker.
It seems clear that the worker is at great disadvan­
tage in the system in which he exchanges his labour for wages. 
Within this structure wages are a mechanism of the capital­
ist's control and manipulation of the worker. Wages serve 
the purposes of the capitalist but not those of the worker.
As a consequence of alienated labour, wages exacerbate many 
of the destructive elements of the capitalistic system.
Perhaps it is this fact alone which is the basis of Marx's 
criticism of the wage system.
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The Relation of the Non-Worker to 
the Worker and to Labour
The third major consequence of alienated labour con­
cerns the relation of the non-worker to the worker and to 
labour. Marx culminates his discussion of estranged labour 
in the first manuscript with consideration of this matter.
We have considered the one side— alienated 
labour— in relation to -the worker himself, i.e., the 
relation of alienated labour to itself. The propertv- 
relation of the non-worker to the worker and to labour 
we have found as the product, the necessary outcome of 
this relation of alienated labour. . . .21
This third consequence is an extension of private property
which is bound so intimately to alienated labour. Marx
continues:
• ■ • Private property, as the material, summary 
expression of alienated labour, embraces both rela­
tions— the relation of the worker to work, to the 
product of his labour and to the non-worker, and 
the relation of the non-worker to the worker and to 
the product of his labour.2^
The question Marx is concerned with is that of the 
relation of the non-worker to the worker, to labour and to 
the product of labour. He begins with three points regarding
(1) the existence of alienation for the non-worker; (2) the 
perspective or view of production for the non-worker; and 
(3) the direction or implication of the non-worker's activity 
in the system.
First it has to be noticed, that everything 
which appears in the worker as an activity of 
alienation, of estrangement. appears in the non­
worker as a state of alienation. of estrangement.
Secondly, that the worker's real, practical 
attitude in production and to the product (as a
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state of mind) appears in the non-worker confronting 
him as a theoretical attitude.
Thirdly, the non-worker does everything against 
the worker which the worker does against himself; 
but he does not do against himself what he does 
against the worker.
Let us look more closely at these three relations.^ 
The first manuscript breaks off at this point apparently 
unfinished or partially lost. On the basis of the available 
portions of the manuscripts, however, it is possible to 
anticipate the explanation which would have followed at this 
point.
First, it is apparent that the non-worker can not 
escape from alienation and that those conditions which 
create an alienating work situation for the worker also 
effect a state of alienation in the non-worker. The latter 
is alienated perhaps in part by his detachment and separation 
from the product. Although he controls production and the 
product in ways which the worker does not, he does not 
participate immediately in the creation of the products he 
manipulates. He deals only in the abstractions of money, in 
the impersonal reality of capital and profit. If, as Marx 
assumes, meaningful and creative work activity is a basic 
need for man, then the non-worker is alienated for reasons 
similar to the worker, and even the advantage of economic 
power does n6t a&i&y the situation created by capitalism.
At least two interpretations occur to this writer 
regarding the second statement. The first interpretation 
emphasizes that similar psychological reactions to these
XX9
alienating conditions occur in the non-worker and the worker, 
the difference being the immediate sources of them. Marx 
speaks of the "worker’s real, practical attitude*1 in the 
sense of being an immediate result of the worker's daiiy work 
and living situation, of the daiiy reality of existence.
The non-worker's attitude or state of mind is not so cioseiy 
reXated to the immediate problems of work, bed and board, as 
it is to his generai ideoiogy and values which encourage him 
to participate in such a system, or at least not to do any­
thing to change it, Xest his (precarious, but perceived as 
rewarding) economic position be threatened. In other words, 
the source of the non-worker's aiienation is a generai 
ideoiogicai framework which has negative as weii as positive 
consequences for him but %hich he supports and perpetuates. 
The second interpretation incorporates the first but places 
more emphasis on the non-worker's view of the worker.
Because he does not experience alienation from production 
and the product in the sense that the worker does and because 
he is ideoiogicaiiy disposed toward the system which rewards 
him, the non-worker's recognition of the worker's aiienation 
is extremeiy probiematicaX. Having no immediate self-experi- 
ence and no inciination to explore that part of economic 
reality, the non-worker treats the worker's aiienation as a 
debatabie question, a matter of specuiation and probably a 
rationaiization contrived by the worker to explain away his 
own economic ineptness.
The third statement also is open for various
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interpretations, two of which shall be mentioned here. First 
of all it can be seen that Marx recognizes that the non­
worker does not suffer the same misfortunes of the system as 
the worker. And the non-worker carefully sees to it that he 
does not. Examples might be the maintaining of wages at a 
low level to increase the margin of profit or the firing of 
employees (with no responsibility to find them other employ­
ment) because machines can do their work better and faster. 
Certainly the non-worker will not expose himself to these 
hazards 1 Open interpretation of this statement revolves 
around the first part: " . . .  the non-worker does everything
against the worker which the worker does against him­
self? . . .1,24 The question here is one of volition. One 
might say that the worker, because he is a victim of this 
system and is forced to exist within it, quite involuntarily 
contributes to the worsening of his own situation, to his 
increased alienation and continued deprivation. That is, he 
does the work which keeps the system going and thereby con­
tributes to his own destruction. On the other hand, one might 
interpret this as a castigation of the worker for sustaining 
the system, as a call to revolution, as a plea to the worker 
to redirect his will to overthrow the system.
It is clear that this point in the first manuscript 
is critical in raising questions of the broader implications 
of alienation for the non-worker as well as the worker and 
for society as a whole. If additional pages from the first 
manuscript were in existence they would surely enlighten our
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understanding of Marx's ideas on alienation. Many questions 
remain unanswered and our understanding necessarily is incom­
plete .
II. LONG-RANGE CONSEQUENCES
Although a great deal of Marx's writing is concerned 
with the long-range effects of capitalism, the concern here 
is with the consequences of alienated labour as developed in 
the Manuscripts.
State of the Worker
The most immediate, and perhaps the most disastrous, 
consequences pertain directly to the worker. One very 
prominent theme in these writings is that, due to manipula­
tion of some men (workers) by others (non-workers) and due 
to the perceived place of the worker in production, the 
worker becomes a commodity and is treated as such. And as a 
commodity his value in the labour market is determined by 
supply and demand.
The demand for men necessarily governs the produc­
tion of men, as of every other commodity^.. . . . The 
worker's existence is thus brought under the same con­
dition as the existence of every other commodity. The 
worker has become a commodity and it is a bit of luck
for him if he can find a buyer. . . .25
T . . The value of the worker as capital rises 
according to demand and supply, and even physically 
his existence. his life, was and is looked upon as 
a supply of a commodity like any other. The worker 
produces capital, capital produces him--hence he pro­
duces himself, and man as worker, as a commodity, is
the product of this entire cycle. . . .26
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. . . Labour produces nob only commodities: it ,
produces itself and the worker as a commodity— and 
does so in the proportion in which it produces com­
modities generally.27
Production does not simply produce man as a com­
modity. the commoditv-man. man in the role of
commodity; it produces him in keeping with this role
as a spiritually and physically dehumanised being.—  
Immorality, deformity, and hebetation of the workers 
and the capitalists.— Its product is the self- 
conscious and self-actincr commodity. . . .  The 
commodity-man. I ! ,2b
The implications of all this are that man is perceived and 
manipulated as an object, that he is not valued as a human 
being but only as capital, as a necessary part of the economy,
and that man's needs and the desire to develop his own
faculties are completely dismissed as unimportant to the 
goals of the system. Furthermore, man's position as a com­
modity becomes increasingly worsened over time.
The worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth 
he produces, the more his production increases in 
power and range. The worker becomes an ever cheaper 
commodity the more commodities he creates. . . .2»
The general notion of the worker as a commodity can be found
throughout the Manuscripts. particularly in the first and
early part of the second.
As the worker becomes a commodity in the market-place, 
he is subject to the effects of price fluctuations, competi­
tion, and overproduction.^® This has been explained earlier.
A third significant point about the state of the 
worker relates to the increasing separation and dichotomiza- 
tion of the workers (including the small capitalists 
eventually) and the non-workers
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(c) In an increasingly prosperous society it is 
only the very richest people who can go on living 
on money-interest. Everyone else has to carry on a 
business with his capital, or venture it in trade.
As a result, the competition between capitals becomes 
more intense. The concentration of capitals increases, 
the big capitalists ruin the small, and a section of 
erstwhile capitalists sinks into the working class, 
which as a result of this supply again suffers to 
some extent a depression of wages and passes into a 
still greater dependence on the few big capitalists.
The number of capitalists having been diminished, 
their competition with respect to workers scarcely 
exists any longer; and the number of workers having 
been augmented, their competition among themselves has 
become all the more intense, unnatural and violent. 
Consequently, a section of the working class falls into 
the ranks of beggary or starvation just as necessarily 
as a section of the middle capitalists falls into the 
working class.32
Because capitalism induces increasing monopolies and greater
concentrations of money and economic power, the category of
workers broadens and comes to include eventually all but the
biggest, richest capitalists in the society.
Increased Value on Things
A second set of consequences, related to the first, 
involves the fact that with the decreasing emphasis on man 
and his needs there develops an increased disproportionate 
value placed on things, on material goods. ". . . With the 
increasinga values of the world of things proceeds in direct 
proportion the devaluation of the world of man. . . .1,33 m  
a society where great importance is placed on possessing 
material goods, two concomitant developments occur. The 
first is the misuse of technology. Because the economy is 
no longer directed toward the real needs and necessities of 
men and because the goal of those with economic power is
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profit, technology is directed toward producing those things 
which will yield the greatest profits. All of this depends 
on the creation of needs, i.e., artificial needs, for those 
who buy.3^ It is the use of technology for artificial, dis­
honest purposes to which Marx objects, not to technology 
itself.' The appearance in modern society of "hidden per­
suaders," "built-in obsolescence," and short-cuts in quality 
and safety to enlarge profits are surely the long-range 
consequences of misused technology which Marx saw as an 
inevitable development in capitalism.
The second point at which possession of material goods 
is emphasized is the extreme importance placed on money, 
since it is the means for obtaining these goods. Money 
becomes an end in itself,35 and he who has money has power.36
The need for money is therefore the true need 
produced by the modern economic system, and it is 
the only need which the latter produces. The 
cm antitv of money becomes to an ever greater degree 
its sole effective attribute: Just as it reduces
everything to its abstract form, so it reduces it­
self in the course of its own movement to something 
merely quantitative. Excess and intemperance come 
to be its true norm. . I .3Y
Because money tends to accumulate disproportionately in
society, Marx was concerned with the effects of extravagant
wealth on men, both the haves and the have-nots.
. . . There is a form of inactive, extravagant 
wealth given over wholly to pleasure, the enjoyer 
of which on the one hand behaves as a mere ephemeral 
individual frantically spending himself to no pur­
pose, knows the slave-labour of others . . .  as the 
prey of his cupidity, and therefore "knows man himself, 
and hence also his own self, as a sacrificed and empty 
being.
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. . . With such wealth the contempt of man makes 
its appearance, partly as arrogance and as the 
throwing-away of what can give sustenance to a hundred 
human lives, and partly as the infamous illusion that 
his own unbridled extravagance and ceaseless, unpro­
ductive consumption is the condition of the other's 
labour and therefore of his subsistence. He knows the 
realisation of the essential powers of man only as the 
realisation of his own excesses, his whims and capric­
ious, bizarre notions. . . .38
In addition to the extravagant use of money and the 
wastefulness which deprives others in society of a decent 
existence, Marx objected to the detrimental effects of money 
on one1s relationships with others and on one1s own life and 
character. In interpersonal relationships money becomes the 
mediator; since money is the major goal for individuals, 
human interaction occurs always within an economic framework. 
Human relationships become only means to economic ends. In 
such circumstances the spontaneity, honesty and meaning of 
human relationships, highly valued by humanists such as Marx, 
cannot prevail.
By possessing the property of buying everything, 
by possessing the property of appropriating all 
objects, money is thus the obiect of eminent posses­
sion. The universality of its property is the omni­
potence of its being. It therefore functions as the 
almighty being. Money is the pimp between man's need 
and the object, between his life and his means of 
life. But that which mediates my life for me, also 
mediates the existence of other people for me. For 
me it is the other p e r s o n . 39
The effects of money on one's life and character center
around the transformative power of money. Money allows
certain kinds of impossibilities and contradictions to occur
in terms of one's power, personal qualities and abilities,
because it enables one to purchase the things or qualities
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which one does not naturally h a v e . 40
The overturning and confounding of all human 
and natural qualities, the fraternisation of 
impossibilities— the divine power of money— lies 
in its character as men's estranged, alienating 
and self-disposing species-nature. Money is the 
alienated ability of mankind.
That which I am unable to do as a man, and of 
which therefore all my individual essential powers 
are incapable, I am able to do by means of money.
Money thus turns each of these powers into something 
which in itself it is not— turns it, that is, into
its contrary.41
The "overturning" power of money makes it, in a sense, 
a creative and a destructive force in man's life, inasmuch 
as it becomes the ultimate determinant of possibilities. It 
has the power to change those things which exist in imagina­
tion to reality, the facts of reality into mere images, 
abstractions which will never be realized.
. . . The difference between effective demand 
based on money and ineffective demand based on my 
need, my passion, my wish, etc., is the difference 
between being and thinking, between the imagined 
which exists merely within me and the imagined as 
it is for me outside me as a real object.
If I have no money for travel, I have no need—  
that is, no real and self-realising need— to travel.
If I have the vocation for study but no money for 
it, I have no vocation for study— that is, no 
effective, no true vocation. On the other hand, if 
I have really no vocation for study but have the 
will and the money for it, I have an effective 
vocation for it. . . .42
Money reverses reality, and changes, sometimes destroys, the 
reciprocity in human relationships.
Money, then, appears as this overturning power 
both against the individual and against the bonds 
of society, etc., which claim to be essences in 
themselves. It transforms fidelity into infidelity, 
love into hate, hate into love, virtue into vice,
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vice into virtue, servant into master, master 
into servant, idiocy into intelligence and 
intelligence into idiocy. . . .
. . . He who can buy bravery is brave, though 
a coward. As money is not exchanged for any one 
specific quality, for any one specific thing, or 
for any particular human essential power, but for 
the entire objective world of man and nature, from 
the standpoint of its possessor it therefore serves 
to exchange every property for every other, even 
contradictory, property and objects r it is the 
fraternisation of impossibilities. It makes 
contradictions embrace.43
It is rather clear that Marx was greatly concerned about the 
destructive effects of money on human lives, human relation­
ships and the entire fabric of society.
A number of other consequences of alienation are 
mentioned in these writings which anticipate many contempo­
rary problems of capitalistic societies. The problems of 
the unemployed, for instance, are exacerbated by the fact 
that, being nonparticipants in the economic system, they 
remain unrecognized by the capitalists.
. . .  The worker exists as a worker only when he 
exists for himself as capital? and he exists as 
capital only when some capital exists for him. The 
existence of capital is his existence, his life; as 
it determines the tenor of his life in a manner 
indifferent to him.
Political economy, therefore, does not recognise 
the unoccupied worker, the workman, in bo far as he 
appears to be outside this labour-relationship. The 
cheat-thief, swindler, beggar, and unemployed man; 
the starving, wretched and criminal working-man—  
these are figures who do not exist for political 
economy but only for other eyes, those of the doctor, 
the judge, the grave-digger and bum-bailiff, etc.? 
such figures are spectres outside the domain of 
political economy. . . .44
The lack of the capitalist's moral responsibility is
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demonstrated by his failure to concern himself with the human 
needs of the worker and by his willingness to give the 
worker only that which will keep him alive, working and able 
to reproduce a new generation of workers. Those who do not 
work do not directly serve the capitalist and are therefore 
beyond his responsibility.
In addition to the problems of recognition and help 
for the unemployed, Marx explains the problems of the poor in 
terms of living conditions, house-rent, and encouragement by 
capital of vices,.
In a discussion on the accumulation and profit of 
capital in the first manuscript, in which Marx quotes politi­
cal economists at length, the problem of rent for the poor 
which is dramatically demonstrated in contemporary urban 
ghettoes is mentioned and put into propositional form.
The enormous profit which the landlords of houses 
make out of poverty. House-rent stands in inverse 
proportion to industrial poverty. (The lower the 
standard of living, the higher the house-rent.)45
While the long-range effects of capitalism are generally
negative in terms of the living conditions of all men in
society (except perhaps for a few large capitalists), the
plight of the poor man is aggravated by a home environ which
is psychologically and physically damaging.
We have said above that man is regressing to the 
cave dwelling, etc.— but that he is regressing to it 
in an estranged, malignant form. The savage in his 
cave— a natural element which freely offers itself 
for his use and protection— feels himself no more a 
stranger, or rather feels himself to be just as much 
at home as a fish in water. But the cellar-dwelling 
of the poor man is a hostile dwelling, "an alien.
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restraining power which only gives itself up to 
him in so far as he gives up to it his blood and 
sweat"— a dwelling which he cannot look upon as his 
own home where he might at last exclaim, "Here X am 
at home," but where instead he finds himself in 
someone else's house, in the house of a stranger 
who daily lies in wait for him and throws him out 
ff he does not pay his rent. Similarly, he is 
also aware of the contrast in quality between his 
dwelling and a human dwelling— a residence in that 
other world, the heaven of wealth.46
The general living conditions under a system of private 
property with its emphasis on the need for money and the 
subsequent exploitation which follows are disastrous for man.
. . . Even the need for fresh air ceases for the 
worker. Man returns to living in a cave, which is now, 
however, contaminated with the mephitic breath of 
plague given off by civilisation, and which he con­
tinues to occupy only precariously, it being for him 
an alien habitation which can be withdrawn from him 
any day— a place from which, if he does not pay, he 
can be thrown out any day. For this mortuary he has 
to pay. A dwelling in the light. which Prometheus in 
Aeschylus designated as one of the greatest boons, 
by means of which he made the savage into a human 
being, ceases to exist for the worker. Light, air, 
etc.— the simplest animal cleanliness— ceases to be a 
need for man. Dirt— this stagnation and putrefaction 
of man— the sewage of civilisation (speaking quite 
literally)— comes to be the element of life for him.
Utter, unnatural neglect, putrefied nature, comes to 
be his life-element. None of his senses exist any 
longer, and not only in his human fashion, but in an 
inhuman fashion, and therefore not even in an animal 
fashion. . . .47
Here inaa general sense is found a solemn warning against
the consequences for man's environment of free capitalism
and free industry; Marx anticipated the dire problems faced
today of air and water pollution, undesirable cities with
uninhabitable urban slums, and the destruction of nature.
These are indicators of the measure of responsibility of
capitalism to the needs of men and to the conditions of
society.
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Finally, the capitalist enhances his own position and 
increases the deterioration of the worker not only by limited 
compensation, disregard for the worker's living conditions, 
and creation of demeaning dependence upon the capitalist for 
bread and board, but also by profits gained through the 
lecherous exploitation of the problems and the vices of the 
poor. In commenting that "house rent stands in inverse 
proportion to industrial poverty," Marx adds.
So does the interest obtained from the vices of 
the ruined proletarians. (Prostitution, drunkenness; 
the pawnbroker.) The accumulation of capitals in­
creases and the competition between them decreases, 
when capital and landed property are united in the 
same hand, also when capital is enabled by its size 
to combine different branches of production.
Indifference towards men. Smith's twenty-lottery- 
tickets.48
Asceticism and Conservation
Another long-range effect of alienation and the system 
which fosters its development is the growth and flourishment 
of a capitalist ideology containing a particular view of the 
worker and a definite conservative orientation to matters of 
everyday living. Regarding the first, the capitalist, 
through his own power over the worker, reduces the needs of 
the worker to the lowest and most basic needs of physical 
survival and then establishes this low level of living as 
the acceptable standard of living for the working class.49 
The capitalist contrives the worker's needs; any needs or 
enjoyments beyond those which barely keep him alive are 
unnecessary and immoral.
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. . .  To him (the capitalist), therefore, every 
luxury of the worker seems to be reprehensible, and 
everything that goes beyond the most abstract need—  
be it in the realm of passive enjoyment, or a mani­
festation of activity— seems to him a l u x u r y . 50
This social perspective as well as the general conservatism 
of capitalism is reinforced by the pervading asceticism of 
capitalism. The basic tenets of the Protestant Ethic not 
only help to spur the growth of capitalism but become a 
basic foundation for the ideology and activities of capital­
ists.
. . . Political economy, this science of wealth, 
is therefore simultaneously the science of denial, of 
want, of thrift, of saving— and it actually reaches 
the point where it spares man the need of either 
fresh air or physical exercise. This science of 
marvellous industry is simultaneously the science of 
asceticism, and its true ideal is the ascetic but 
extortionate miser and the ascetic but productive 
slave.bJ-
Dominance of Economic over Human Problems
Marx objects to the mandate of self-denial in the
capitalistic ethic because it serves economic rather than
human ends. The idea is to acquire wealth, and to work hard
and soberly doing it, for accumulation is its own reward.
All this is done at the expense of human needs, human develop
ment, growth of human potential.
. . . Thus political economy— despite its wordly 
and wanton appearance— is a true moral science, the 
most moral of all the sciences. Self-denial, the 
denial of life and of all human needs, is its cardinal 
doctrine. The less you eat, drink and read books? the 
less you 3° to the theatre, the dance hall, the public- 
house; the less you think, love, theorise, sing, paint, 
fence, etc., the more you save— the greater becomes 
your treasure which neither moths or dust will devour—  
your capital- The less you are, the more you have;
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the less you express your own life, the greater is 
your alienated life— the greater is the store of 
your estranged being. . . .52
As Marx points out in numerous places in the Manuscripts.
this asceticism is carried even to the advocation of sexual
abstinence for population control.^3
Under the system of capitalism and as a result of
alienation in its many forms which is created by the system,
the structure of society and the goals of society are not
humanistic. They do not reflect the potential of man and
the infinite possibilities for the good life. Under such
conditions, the goals of society and the institutions designed
to facilitate these goals are unrelated to human needs. These
needs are the last to be served, if at all.
Society, as it appears to the political economist,
is civil society, in which every individual is a. 
totality of needs and only exists for the other person, 
as the other exists for him, in so far as each becomes 
a means for the other. The political economist reduces 
everything (just as does politics in its Rights of 
Man) to man, i.e., to the individual whom he strips of 
all determinateness so as to class him as capitalist 
or worker.54
A society designed to serve economic ends rather than human 
needs is one in which interpersonal relations suffer; genuine 
human relationships become impossible. These are at least 
the major long-range consequences of alienation and the 




1Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 
1844, trans. Martin Milligan (Moscow: Foreign Languages
Publishing House, 1961), p. 80. Subsequently referred to 
as Manuscripts.
^Hans L, Zetterberg, On Theory and Verification in 
Sociology (3rd enlarged ed.; Totowa, New Jersey: The Be d-
minster Press, 1965), p. 73.
M^anuscripts. p . 80. Note,the synonymy of alienated 
labour and alienated life. Further illustrating the inter­
dependent relation is the following statement made by Marx 
concerning the relation between appropriation and alienation: 
"Alienated labour has resolved itself for us into two ele­
ments which mutually condition one another, or which are but 
different expressions of one and the same relationship." 
Ibid., pp. 82-83.
4Ibid., pp. 80-81.
5Ibid.. p. 103. See the discussion of private prop­
erty as a source of alienation earlier in this dissertation.
^Ibid., p . 82.
7Ibid., p . 81.
8Ibid.
9Ibid., p . 20.
l^Ibid. "The separation of capital, ground-rent and 
labour is thus fatal for the worker.1 Ibid., p. 21.
H -Ibid., p. 85. . . Wages, therefore, belong to
capital's and the capitalist's necessary costs, and must not 
exceed the bounds of this necessity. . . . "  Ibid.
•^ Ibid.. p. 21. Here Marx is mahing reference to Adam 
Smith, Wealth of Nations (Everyman Library Edition), Vol. I, 




l^Ibid., p. 22. Reference to Adam Smith, Wealth of 





20ibid., p . 23. ". . . This shortening of their life­
span is a favourable circumstance for the working class as a 
whole, for as a result of it an ever-fresh supply of labour 
becomes necessary. This class has always to sacrifice a 
part of itself in order not to be wholly destroyed." Ibid.
21Ibid., p. 83.
22Ibid. "Having seen that in relation to the worker 
who appropriates nature by means of his labour, this appro­
priation appears as estrangement, his own spontaneous 
activity as activity for another and as activity of another, 
vitality as a sacrifice of life, production of the object as 
loss of the object to an alien power, to an alien person— we 
shall now consider the relation to the worker, to labour and 





28Ibid., p. 84. Political economy is interested only 
that the worker survive and reproduce to replenish the neces­
sary supply of workers. ". . . For it, therefore, the 
worker1s needs are but the one need— to maintain him whilst 
he is working in so far as may be necessary to prevent the 
race of labourers from dying out. The wages of labour have 
thus exactly the same significance as the maintenance and 
servicing of any other productive instrument, or as the 
consumption of a, capital. required for its reproduction with 
interest; or as the oil which is applied to wheels to keep 




30See the earlier discussion in this section on wages.
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See particularly pages 28-25.
" . . .  But this is only possible
(a) as the result of the accumulation of much labour, 
capital being accumulated labour. . . . His products are 
being taken in ever-increasing degree from the hands of the 
worker, that to an increasing extent his own labour con­
fronts him as another's property and that the means of his 
existence and his activity are increasingly concentrated in 
the hands df the capitalist.
"(b) The accumulation of capital increases the 
division of labour, and the division of labour increases the 
number of workers. Conversely, the workers’ numbers 
increase the division of labour, just as the division of 
labour increases the accumulation of capitals. . . ." Ibid., 
pp. 23-24.
33Ibid.. pp. 24-25.
33Ibid., p .  69.
34Ibid., pp. 115-12, especially.
35Ibid., p. 119. " . . .  Everything which the politi­
cal economist takes from you in life and in humanity, he 
replaces for you in money and in wealth; and all the things 
which you cannot do, your money can,do . . . — all this it 
can appropriate for you— it can buy all this for you: it is
the true endowment. Yet being all this, it is inclined to 
do nothing but create itself, buy itself; for everything else 
is after all its servant. And when I have the master I have 
the servant and do not need his servant. . . . The worker may 
oply have enough for him to want to live, and may only want 
to live in order to have (enough)." Ibid.. p. 119.
3^Ibid., p. 125. "The extent to which money, which 
appears as a means, constitutes true power and the sole end—  
the extent to which in general that means which gives me 
substance, which gives me possessionqof the objective sub­
stance of others, is an end in itself— can be clearly seen 
from the facts that landed property wherever land is the 
source of life, and horse and sword wherever these are the 
true means of life, are also acknowledged as the true politi­
cal powers in life. . . . "  Ibid.. p. 125.
3^Ibid., p. 116.
3BIbid.. p. 126.
39Ibid.. p. 137. "If money is the bond binding me to 
human life, binding society to me, binding me and nature and 
man, is not money the bond of all bonds? Can it not dissolve 
and bind all ties? . . . It is the true agent of divorce as 
well as the true binding agent— the (universal) galvano- - 
c""; ; • 3 I powfei. •
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chemical power of Society." Ibid., p. 139.
Marx pursues his discussion of money by quoting 
passages from Goethe and Shakespeare on the subject and 
elaborating on them.
f°Ibid., pp. 138-39. "That which is for me through 
the medium of money— that for which I can pay (i.e., which 
money can buy)— that am X, the possessor of the money. The 
extent of the power of money is the extent of my power.
Money's properties are my properties and essential powers—  
the properties and powers of its possessor. Thus, what I am 
and am capable of is by no means determined by my individual­
ity. I am ugly, but I can buy for myself the most beautiful 
of women. Therefore I am not ugly, for the effect of 
ucrliness— its deterrent power— is nullified by money. I, in 
my character as an individual, am lame, but money furnishes 
me with twenty-four feet. Therefore I am not lame. I am 
bad, dishonest, unscrupulous, stupid; but money is honoured, 
and therefore so is its possessor. Money is the supreme 
good, therefore its possessor is good. Money, besides, saves 
me the trouble of being dishonest: I am therefore presumed
honest. I am stupid, but money is the real mind of all 
things and how then should its possessor be stupid? Besides, 
he can buy talented people for himself, and is he who has 
power over the talented not more talented than the talented?
Do not I, who thanks to money am capable of all that the 
human heart longs for, possess all human capacities? Does 
not my money therefore transform all my incapacities into 
their contrary?" Ibid.. pp. 138-39.
41ibid., p. 139.
Ibid., p. 140. "If I long for a particular dish or 
want to take the mail-coach because I am not strong enough to 
go by foot, money fetches me the dish and the mail-coach: 
that is, it converts my wishes from something in the realm of 
imagination, translates them from their meditated, imagined 
or willed existence into their sensuous. actual existence—  
from imagination to life, from imagined being into real being. 
In effecting this mediation, money is the truly creative 
power.
"No doubt demand also exists for him who has no money, 
but his demand is a mere thing of the imagination without 
effect or existence for me, for a third party, for the others, 
and which therefore remains for me unreal and objectless. . . .
" . . .  Being the external, common medium and faculty 
for turning an image into reality and reality into a mere 
image (a faculty not springing from man as man or from human 
society as society), money transforms the real essential 
powers of man and nature into what are merely abstract con­
ceits and therefore imperfections— into tormenting chimeras—  
just as it transforms real imperfections and chimeras—  
essential powers which are really impotent, which exist only
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in the imagination of the individual— into real powers and 
faculties.1 Ibid., p. 140.
43Ibid.. p. 141.
44Ibid.. p. 85. ". . . The wages of labour have thus
exactly the same significance as the maintenance and servic­
ing of any other productive instrument, or as the consumption 
of .a capital. required for its reproduction with interest? 
or as the oil which is applied to wheels to keep them 
turning. Wages, therefore, belong to capital's and the 
capitalist's necessary costs, and must not exceed the bounds 
of this necessity. It was therefore quite logical for the 
English factory-owners to deduct from the wages of the worker 
the public charity which he was receiving out of the Poor 
Rate before the Amendment Bill of 1834, and to consider this 





49Ibid., p. 118. "How the multiplication of needs 
and of the means of their satisfaction breeds the absence of 
needs and of means is demonstrated by the political economist 
(and the capitalist: it should be noted that it is always
empirical business men we are talking about when we refer to 
political economists— their scientific confession and mode 
of being) . This he shows:
(1) By reducing the worker's need to the barest and 
most miserable level of physical subsistence, and by reducing 
his activity to the most abstract mechanical movement.
Hence, he says: Man has no other need either of activity or
of enjoyment. For he calls even this life human life and 
existence.
(2) By counting the lowest possible level of life 
(existence) as the standard, indeed as the general standard—  
general because it is applicable to the mass of men. He 
changes the worker into an insensible being lacking all 
needs, just as he changes his activity into a pure abstrac­
tion from all activity. . . . "  Ibid.
50Ibid.
51Ibid.
52Ibid., p. 119. ''. . . The ethics of political
economy is acquisition. work. thrift, sobriety— but political 
economy promises to satisfy my needs. The political economy
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of ethics is the opulence of a good conscience, of virtue, 
etc.; but how can I live virtuously if X do not live? And 
how can I have a good conscience if X am not conscious of 
anything? It stems from the very nature of estrangement 
that each sphere applies to me a different and opposite 
yardstick— ethics one and political economy another? for is 
a specific estrangement of man and focuses attention on a 
particular round of estranged essential activity, and each 
stands in an estranged relation to the other. . . . "  Ibid.,
pp. 120-21.
33Ibid., p. 121. "Needlessness as the principle of 
political economy is most brilliantly showniin its theory of 
population. There are too many people. Even the existence 
of men is a pure luxury; and if the worker is 'ethical,' he 
will be sparincr in procreating. (Mill suggests public 
acclaim for those who prove themselves continent in their 
sexual relations, and public rebuke for those who sin against 
such barrenness of marriage. . . .  Is not this the ethics, 
the teaching of asceticism?) The production of people 
appears in the form of public misery." Ibid.
54Ibid.. p. 129.
CHAPTER VII
THE RESOLUTION OF ALIENATION
The emphasis in the discussions of alienation in the 
Manuscripts is largely on diagnosis rather than prognosis.
This is particularly true in the first manuscript. In the 
third, however, Marx deals with the transcendance of estrange­
ment in terms of the termination of the relations of private 
property. In addition, contrasts are, drawn, between capital­
ism and communism in terms of how each system meets human 
needs, human relationships therein, and so on.
The resolution of alienation is bound up with the 
relation of alienation and private property. It will be 
recalled that private property is a processual phenomenon
"I
which follows a particular development, reaches its culmina­
tion, ^ and moves towards its resolution.-* The notion of 
historical necessity is coupled with the need for complete 
emancipation of society from private property. Alienated 
labour and private property are inextricably related; their 
development and decline are interdependent.4 It is for this 
reason that the simple manipulation of wages, which are 
identical with private property, will not alleviate or 
resolve alienation. Neither the escalation nor the equaliza­
tion of wages will do so,^ for alienation will flourish as
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long as does private property.
The transcendance of alienation is dependent upon the 
transcendance of private property,® which requires the 
emancipation of society from the relations of private property. 
This means the emancipation of the workers and the establish­
ment of a new economic order, communism.
(2) Prom the relationship of estranged labour to 
private property it further follows that the 
emancipation of society from private property, etc., 
from servitude is expressed in the political form 
of the emancipation of the workers; not that their 
emancipation alone was at stake but because the 
emancipation of the workers contains universal human 
emancipation— and it contains this, because the 
whole of human servitude is involved in the relation 
of the worker to production, and every relation of 
servitude is but a modification and consequence of 
this relation.?
Later in the third manuscript Marx discusses the inevitable
replacement of private property with communism as the sole
means of transcending real estrangement.
In order to abolish the idea of private property, 
the idea of communism is completely sufficient. It 
takes actual communist action to abolish actual 
private property. History will come to it; and this 
movement, which in theory we already know to be a 
self-transcending movement, will constitute in actual 
fact a very severe and protracted process. . . .8
The general resolution of alienation for Marx involves 
a complete change in the economic goals and conditions of 
society in order that man would have a.society which serves 
him and his needs primarily. Marx recognizes communism as 
the only system which would lead to a free, humanistic 
existence with such goals. In the second and third sections 
of the third manuscript Marx discusses the contrasts of
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capitalism and communism, the latter's stages of development 
and the adequacy of each to meet the needs of man.
. . . The transcendence of self-estrangement follows 
the same course as self-estrangement. Private property 
is first considered only in its objective aspect— but 
nevertheless with labour as its essence. Its form of 
existence is therefore capital, which is to be annulled 
"as such" (Proudhon). Or a particular form of labour—  
labour levelled down, parcelled, and therefore unfree—  
is conceived as the source of private property's 
pemiciousness and of its existence in estrangement 
from men; . . . Finally, communism is the positive 
expression of annulled private property— at first as 
universal private property. . . .9
There are three forms of communism each of which is 
considered an annulment of private property: crude communism,
incomplete communism, and mature communism. Only the last is 
deemed the true, positive annulment in the sendeoof being an 
actual improvement for men.
In the case of crude communism the idea of universal 
private property promotes an unreasonable community ownership 
of all things, including talent, women and so on. Its 
tendency is to lower the physical and moral life of all.10
. . . In negating the personality of man in every 
sphere, this type of communism is really nothing but 
the logical expression of private property, which is 
this negation. . . .
The communityiis only a community of labour, and 
an equality of wages paid out by the communal capital—  
the community as the universal capitalist. Both sides 
of the relationship are raised to an imagined univer­
sality— labour as a state in which every person is 
put, and capital as the acknowledged universality and 
power of the community.11
The humanistic interests of Marx cause him to condemn the
communal sharing or prostitution of women as the final
degradation of man. This is so because he considers the
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relationship between a man and a woman to be the most sig­
nificant expression of man's relation to other persons and 
to nature.
. . . It therefore reveals the extent to which 
man's natural behaviour has become human. . . . the 
extent to which his human nature has come to be 
nature to him. In this relationship is revealed, 
too the extent to which man's need has become a 
human need; the extent to which, therefore, the 
other person as a person has becomes for him a 
need— the extent to which he in his individual 
existence is at the same time a social being.12
Marx dismisses the first form of communism as anti-humanist
and similar to conditions under private property.
. . . The first positive annulment of private 
property— crude communism— is thus merely one form 
in which the vileness of private property, which 
wants to set itself up as the positive communism. 
comes to the surface.12
The second form which , is referred to here as incom­
plete communism is exactly that. Although self-estrangement 
has been overcome to an extent in this form, the society 
remains shackled by private property and unable to serve 
human needs in the fullest way. Discussion of this second 
form is very brief.
(2) Communism (a) of a political nature still—  
democratic or despotic; (b) with the annulment of the 
state, yet still incomplete, and being still effected 
by private property (i.e., by the estrangement of man). 
In both forms communism already knows itself to be 
re-integration or return of man to himself, the tran­
scendence of human self-estrangement; but since it has 
not yet grasped the positive essence of private 
property, and just as little the human nature of need, 
it remains captive to it and infected by it. It has, 
indeed, grasped its concept, but not its essence.14
Greatest attention is given to the third form which 
is mature communism. In this case private property has been
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eliminated completely and true humanism prevails.
(3) Communism as the positive transcendence of 
private property, as human self-estrangement. and 
therefore as the real appropriation of the human 
essence by and for man; communism therefore as the 
complete return of man to himself as a social (i.e., 
human) being— a return become conscious, and accom­
plished within the entire wealth of previous 
development. This communism, as fully-developed 
naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully-developed 
humanism equals naturalism; it is the genuine resolu­
tion of the conflict between man and nature and 
between man and man— the true resolution of the 
strife between existence and essence, between 
objectification and self-confirmation, between free­
dom and necessity, between the individual and the 
species. . . . 1 5
The development of communism is inevitable and is 
supported by the movement of history.
. . . Communism is the riddle of history solved, 
and it knows itself to be this solution.
The entire movement of history is, therefore, both 
its actual act of genesis (the birth act of its 
empirical existence) and also for its thinking con­
sciousness the comprehended and known process of its 
coming-to-be. . I .
Immature communism, on the other hand, does not enjoy the
strong support of history and desperately uses "disconnected
historical phenomena opposed to private property" to validate
its existence.
The emergence of mature communism is dependent funda­
mentally upon the movement of private property which is 
historically necessary for the former to develop.
Th That the entire revolutionary movement neces­
sarily finds both its empirical and its theoretical 
basis in the movement of private property— in that 
of the economy, to be precise— is easy to see.18
. . . Likewise, however, both the material of 
labour and man as the subject, are the point of
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departure as well as the result of the movement 
(and precisely in this fact, that they must con­
stitute the point of departure. lies the histori­
cal necessity of private property). . . .19
Marx does not explain, however, the process by which the 
change is made from the system of private property to com­
munism. He writes earlier of the emancipation of the worker 
as necessary for the transcendence of estrangement, without 
specifying any strategy of emancipation. The emphasis lies 
instead on the movement of private property.
This material, immediately sensuous private 
property is the material sensuous expression of 
estranged human life. Its movement— production 
and consumption--!s the sensuous revelation of 
the movement of all production hitherto— i.e., 
the realisation or the reality of man. . . .20
"All production" here includes "particular modes of produc­
tion" such as religion, family, state, law, morality, science 
and art, in which estrangement is transcended and man returns
pi
to his social mode of existence. A few pages later Marx 
explains that the positive transcendence of private property 
is the process through which man regains "his total essence" 
including control and use of his senses; he regains his 
sense of self.
The transcendence of private property is there­
fore the complete emancipation of all human senses 
and attributes; but it is this emancipation precisely 
because these senses and attributes have become, 
subjectively and objectively, human. . . .  Need or 
enjoyment have consequently lost their egotistical 
nature, and nature has lost its mere utility by use
becoming human use.22
This has implications for social relations and society as a 
whole.
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In the same way, the senses and enjoyments of 
other men have become my own appropriation. Besides 
these direct organs, therefore, social organs develop 
in the form of society; thus, for instance, activity 
in direct association with others, etc., has become 
an organ for expressing my own life, and a mode of 
appropriating human l i f e . 23
One of the major results of the transcendence of private
property for Marx is getting away from the sense of having.
of possessing, of using objects.2^
(5) The meaning of private property— liberated 
from its estrangement— is the existence of essential 
obiects for man both as objects of enjoyment and as 
objects of activity.25
Although Marx does not systematically illustrate his 
ideas on the specific details of a communist society Certain 
contrasts with political economy are mentioned. Instead of 
an emphasis on wealth and acquisition, the society is mainly 
concerned with creating "rich human beings."2® The society 
is geared to serve human needs and to facilitate the develop­
ment of the human potential of all.2  ^ In addition, this will 
be a socifety of independent men. who do not have to live "by
O Q
the grace of another." The appearance of atheism in a 
communistic order, although not synonymous with communism, 
occurs because it is an affirmation of man and a negation of 
God, doing away with religion which is a form of alienation. 
The transcendence of economic alienation brings about the 
transcendence of religious alienation.2  ^ The general goals 
of this new society are to meet and promote human needs and 
to encourage and develop human association.20 The strong 
emphasis on fulfilling human relations and free human
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interaction relates to Marx's basic assumptions about the 
individual and society discussed earlier in this dissertation.
toward a humanistic social order. The dialectic appears to 
look like this:
Marx seems to indicate that communism is the negation of 
private property while socialism is the final humanistic 
society free of struggles to overcome political economy.
communism in the third manuscript, Marx mentions first 
socialism and then communism.
. . . Atheism, as the denial of the inessentiality, 
has no longer any meaning, for atheism is a negation 
of God, and postulates the existence of man through 
this negation; but socialism as socialism no longer 
stands in any need of such a mediation. It proceeds 
from the practically and theoretically sensuous con­
sciousness of man and of nature as the essence.
Socialism is man's positive self-consciousness. no 
longer mediated through the annulment of religion, 
just as real life is man's positive reality, no longer 
mediated through the annulment of private property, 
through communism. . . .31
From this it is clear that socialism as a final stage is more
than the annulment of political economy; it is a state of
positive, stable humanism in which man is the center of
things. It is a new, higher stage in the dialectic distinct
A final point concerns the pattern of this change
socialism
^-^communi sm
At the end of this discussion of private property and
from the stage of negation played by communism.
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Further support to the Idea of communism as an inter­
mediate, transitory stage is given in the last two sentences 
of this section.
. . . Communism is the position as the negation 
of the negation, and is hence the actual phase 
necessary for the next stage of historical develop­
ment in the process of human emancipation and 
recovery. Communism is the necessary pattern and 
the dynamic principle of the immediate future, but 
communism as such is not the goal of human develop­
ment— the structure of human society.32
This early conception of historical change is especially
interesting because of its variance with later dialectic
patterns used by Marx and Engels. Perhaps in the Manuscripts
is found the unadulterated notion of the dialectic which was
later altered by the influence of Engels.
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FOOTNOTES
See the relations of private property discussed in 
Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, 
trans. Martin Milligan (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publish­
ing House, 1961), pp. 91-92. Subsequently referred to as 
Manuscripts.
2Ibid., pp. 80-81.
8ibid., p . 98.
4Ibid., pp. 80-81.
5Ibid.. p. 81. "A forcing-up of wages (disregarding 
all other difficulties, including the fact that it would 
only be by force, too, that the higher wages, being an 
anomaly, could be maintained) would therefore be nothing but 
better payment for the slave, and would not conquer either 
for the worker or for labour their human status and dignity.
"Indeed, even the equality of wages demanded by 
Proudhon only transforms the relationship of the present-day 
worker to his labour into the relationship of all men to 
labour. Society is then conceived as an abstract capitalist." 
Ibid.. p. 81. In this connection, Marx disapproved of the 
union-type movement of bargaining for wages.
6Ibid., p . 103. See quotation 18 later in this text
7Ibid., pp. 81-82.
8Ibid , p. 124.
9Ibid.. pp. 98-99.
i0Ibid., p . 99. " . . .  It wants to abstract by force
from talent, etc. For it the sole purpose of life and 
existence is direct, physical possession. The category of 
labourer is not done away with, but extended to all men.
The relationship of private property persists as the rela­
tionship of the community to the world of things. Finally, 
this movement of counterposing universal private property to 
private property finds expression in the bestial form of 
counterposing to marriage (certainly a form of exclusive 
private property) the community of women, in which a woman 
becomes a piece of communal and common property. It may be 
said that this idea of the community of women gives away the 
secret of this as yet completely crude and thoughtless com­
munism. Just as the woman passes from marriage to general 
prostitution, so the entire world of wealth . . .  passes from 
the relationship of exclusive marriage with the owner of
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private property to a state of universal prostitution with, 
the community. . . ."xblbid., pp. 99-100. -
lllbid., p. 100. "How little this annulment of 
private property is really an appropriation is in fact proved 
by the abstract negation of the entire world of culture and 
civilisation, the regression to the unnatural simplicity of 
the poor and undemanding man who has not only failed to go 
beyond private property, but has not yet even attained to 
it." Ibid.. p. 100.
12Ibid.. p. 101. " . . .  The direct, natural, and
necessary relation of person to person is the relation of 
man to woman. In this natural relationship of the sexes 
man's relation to nature is immediately his relation to man, 
just as his relation to man is immediately his relation to 
nature— his own natural, function. . . . Prom this relation­
ship one can therefore judge man's whole level of development. 
It follows from the character of this relationship how much 
man as a species being, as man, has come to be himself and to 
comprehend himself; the relation of man to woman is the most 
natural relation of human being to human being. . . ."I 
Ibid.,
l^Ibid. ». . . The crude communism is only the con­
summation of this envy (of all wealthier private property) 
and of this levelling-down proceeding from the preconceived 
minimum. It has a definite, limited standard. . . Ibid., 




I?Ibid. " . . .  That other, still immature communism, 
meanwhile, seeks an historical proof for itself— a proof in 
the realm of the existent— amongst disconnected historical 
phenomena opposed to private property, tearing single phases 
from the historical process and focusing attention on them 
as proofs of its historical pedigree (a horse ridden hard 
especially by Cabet, Villegardelle, etc.). By so doing it 
simply makes clear that by far the greater part of this pro­
cess contradicts its claims, and that, if it has once been, 
precisely its being in the past refutes its pretension to 
being essential." Ibid. This may afford some insight into 







22Ibid., p . 107. " . . .  Thus man is affirmed in the
objective world not only in the act of thinking, but with 
all his senses." Ibid., p. 108.
23Ibid., p . 107 -
2^Ibid., pp. 105-106. "(4) Just as private property
is only the sensuous expression of the fact that man becomes 
obiective for himself and at the same time becomes to him­
self a strange and inhuman object; just as it expresses the 
fact that the assertion of his life is the alienation of his 
life, that his realisation is his. loss of rea.lity, is an 
alien reality: conversely, the positive transcendence of
private property— i.e., the sensuous appropriation for and 
by man of the human essence and of ..human life, of objective 
man, of human achievements— is not to be conceived merely in 
the sense of direct one-sided gratification— merely in the 




3®Ibid., p. 112. The idea of economic dependence is 
meant here.
^^Ibid., p. 103; also p. 114.
See, for example, pages 124-25. "When communist 
workmen associate with one another, theory, propaganda, etc., 
is their first end. But at the same time, as a result of 
this association, they acquire a new need— the need for 
society— and what appears as a means becomes an end. you can 
observe this practical process in its most splendid results' 
whenever you see French socialist workers together. Such 
things as smoking, drinking, eating, etc., are no longer 
means of contact or means that bring together. Company, 
association, and conversation, which again has society as 
its end, are enough for them; the brotherhood ,of man is no 
mere phrase with them, but a fact of life, and the nobility 




^ Ibid. There is some debate as to what is meant by 
"communism as such" in the last sentence. Milligan, trans­
lator of the Russian edition, states that "Marx here means 
crude, equalitariart communism, such as propounded by Babeuf 
and his followers." Ibid. Robert Tucker has interpreted 
this as an unwillingness by contemporary Russians to accept 
the implication that communism was not the highest stage for 
Marx. The question of ownership, even if by the state, is 
also involved here. Robert Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in 




The purpose of this study has been to determine 
whether a theory of alienation exists in the 1844 Manuscripts 
of Karl Marx. The preceding chapters have demonstrated that 
a theory of alienation can be found in these early writings 
and that these ideas on alienation by Marx can be arranged 
in systematic order without violating the Marxian intention.
One purpose of this chapter is to present the summary 
and conclusions of Marx's theory of alienation in preposi­
tional form with a brief explanation of each set of proposi­
tions. The summary is presented according to the theoretical 
framework developed in this analysis. In the text which 
immediately follows# the numbers on the left of the 
propositions indicate the relation of the propositions to 
one another. The numbers following the propositions indicate 
the numbers of the pages in the Manuscripts from which the 
propositions were formulated. The direct quotations for 
these propositions are found in the footnotes of preceding 
chapters. If no number is indicated for the page# the 




The second purpose of this chapter is to discuss the 
implications of this theory of alienation for contemporary 
sociology. This discussion, which constitutes the latter 
part of this chapter, is framed in terms of a series of 




The sources of alienationiinclude private property, 
political economy, and the division of labour and exchange. 
In addition, Marx gives attention to the general economic 
donditions in which alienation develops. These general con­
ditions are discussed in the first manuscript and are pre­
sented here as the general setting in which alienation 
ultimately develops.
Three economic possibilities for society.— Marx dis­
cusses the worker's situation in the general framework of 
the three logical economic possibilities for society. The 
following propositions are derived from his discussion.
1. The more the wealth of a society declines, the more
the worker suffers most of all. (23)
2. The more the wealth of a society stabilizes, the
greater the "static misery'* of the worker. (25-26)
3. The more the wealth of a society grows and increases,
the greater the unemployment and reduction of wages. 
(25)
3.1 The more prosperous the economy, the greater the
intensity <5f competition among capitalists.
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3.2. The greater the intensity of competition, the greater 
the concentration of capital.
3.3. The greater the concentration of capital, the more 
the small capitalists drop into the working class.
3.4. The smaller the number of capitalists, the less their 
competition for workers.
3.5. The larger the number of workers, the greater their 
competition -for work.
3.6. The greater the competition among workers for work, 
the more workers fall into the situation of beggary 
or starvation. (24-25)
The general conclusion is that the worker suffers under 
all three sets of conditions. Marx elaborates his argument 
regarding the situation in which wealth increases, perhaps 
because this is the economic setting which is most likely to 
be beneficial to the worker. He demonstrates that, according 
to his theory, the worker suffers even in an increasingly 
wealthy society. This conclusion is related to the general 
premise that alienated labour is inevitable in a society of 
prosperous capitalism.
An important factor in all these propositions is 
competition for work which produces unemployment and a 
reduction of wages even in a wealthy society Because the 
ability to compete in a capitalistic system is dependent 
upon one's capital, the big capitalists out-compete the 
small ones, forcing the latter into the working class and 
thereby depressing the wages of that class. The intensity 
of competition is directly related to the size of a par­
ticular group or class. Therefore, Marx observes, the 
increasingly smaller capitalist class becomes less
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competitive and more monopolistic. Meanwhile, competition 
increases in the ever larger working class and becomes 
increasingly violent. The suggestion is that competition is 
related to, and in fact encourages, violence, certain asso­
ciations between competition and various forms of violence 
have been made in contemporary society and should be further 
explored. Because capitalism is not designed to provide 
opportunities in terms of need but only for profit, there 
are never enough opportunities available for those who need 
them, but only enough available to assure growth and profit 
simultaneously. Finally, because man cannot compete success­
fully for a limited number of opportunities, some men are 
bound to fall into the unemployed, dormant, dependent 
classes.
The general conclusion remains, that the worker 
suffers in all situations of capitalism, even in a growing, 
prospering economy. The system simply is neither theoreti­
cally defined nor empiricaXly operative to provide for the 
needs of its citizens.
Private property.— The relationship between private 
property and alienation is perhaps the most basic relation­
ship in Marx's theory of alienation. It is important in 
explaining both the sources and the consequences of alienated 
labour; the latter will be demonstrated later in this 
chapter. The following basic and minor propositions explain 
the role of private property in the development of alienation.
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Basic Proposition;
1. The greater the persistence and growth of the system
of private property, the greater the development of 
alienated labour in society. (80)
1.1.1 The greater the development of private property, the 
greater the conflict between capital and labour.
(91-92)
1.1.2 The greater the conflict between capital and labour, 
the greater the alienation of labour in society.
(91-92) (93)
1.2.1 The greater the development of private property, the 
greater the development of political economy. (67)
1.2.2 The greater the development of political economy 
(capitalism), the greater the development of alienated 
labour in society. (67)
Particularly noteworthy are (1) the increasing conflict of
capital and labour, which are basic to private property and
(2) the development of political economy (capitalists)
which is built upon the foundation of private property. The
relationship between private property and alienation becomes
interdependent and reciprocal. That is to say, while
alienated labour is originally dependent upon private property
for its growth and development, the relationship becomes one
of interdependence and reciprocity. Alienated labour becomes
important in the maintenance and further development of
private property. An increment in one creates an increment
in the other and so on. Therefore, one cannot be destroyed
without the other.
Political economy.— The relation between political 
economy, the second major source,cshdi^lienhtiop is indicated 
by the basic proposition below. The derived propositions
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indicate the link between alienated labour and profit which 
results in a developing disregard for the needs of the 
labourer.
Basic Proposition;
2. The greater the development of political economy, the
greater the development of alienated labour in 
society. (81, 95, 120-21)
2.1.1 The greater the development of political economy, the 
greater the emphasis on profit. (39-40)
2.1.2 The more the economic system is geared for profit, 
the less it becomes economically feasible or relevant 
to consider the needs of the labourer. (71, 118)
2.1.3 The greater the emphasis on profit, the greater the 
development of alienated labour.
Additional propositions summarize the connections 
between alienated labour and the four major expressions or 
segments of political economy— money, competition, capital 




2.2.1 The greater the development of political economy, the 
greater the power of money. (82)
2.2.2 The greater the power of money, the more men and their 




2.3.1 The greater the development of political economy, the 
greater the development of competition. (68, 82)
2.3.2 The greater the development of competition, the greater 
the accumulation of capital in the hands of a few and 
the development of monopoly. (67)
2.4 The greater the development of competition, the
greater the separation between property-owners and 
propertyless workers in society. (67)
Capital
2.5.1 The greater the development of political economy, the 
greater the development and power of capital in 
society. (82, 36-37)
2.5.2 The greater the development and power of capital, the 
less power and control over the product exists for 
the worker. (36-40)
2.6 The greater the development and power of capital, the 
greater the power and profit of those who do not 
produce the products. (39-40)
2.7 The greater the development of capital, the greater 
the tendency to employ capital in whatever ways will 
yield the greatest profits.
2.8 The greater the development of capital, the more the
worker himself becomes a form of capital whose only 
need is to be maintained as capital. (122-23) (84-85)
Trade
2.9 The greater the development of political economy, the 
greater the development of trade and exchange. (82)
It seems clear that the development and perpetuation
of alienated labour in political economy is sustained by the-
over-evaluation of money, the devisive effects of competition
the powerlessness of the worker and his treatment as capital,
and the effects of trade and exchange on the worker.
Division of labour and exchange.— The third major 
source of alienated labour is the division of labour and 
exchange. The propositions, with the exception of three 
derived propositions, are drawn directly from Marx.
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Basic Proposition;
3. The greater the development of the division of labour 
and exchange, the greater the development of alienated 
labour in society. (135; 134-135)
3.1 The greater the propensity to exchange (for profit),
the greater the development of the division of labour.
3.2.1 The greater the development of the division of labour,
the more a distribution of diverse skills is formed 
in society on the basis of exchange. (134)
3.2.2 The greater the development of the division of labour,
the greater the unnatural "splitting up" of labor.
(134)
3.2.3 The greater the development of the division of labour, 
the more the skills and talents of men are determined 
by the labour and the market situation. (133-34)
3.3.1 The greater the accumulation of capital, the greater
the division of labour. (reversible) (24)
3.3.2 The greater the division of labour, the greater the
number of workers. (reversible) (24)
3.3.3 .’. The greater the accumulation of capital, the 
greater the number of workers. (reversible)
3.3.4 .*. The greater the division of labour, the greater 
the number of workers. (reversible)
3.4.1 The greater the division of labour, the greater the 
production of products. (25)
3.4.2 The greater the production, the greater the (likeli­
hood of) oovesrproduction. (25)
3.4.3 The greater the overproduction, the greater the
unemployment among workers. (25)
3.4.4 The greater the overproduction, the greater the 
reduction of wages of the workers. (25-26)
3.4.5 .'.The greater the division of labour, the greater 
the unemployment among workers and the reduction of 
wages.
Marx perceives the negative results of the division
of labour which contribute to alienated labour to be: (1)
a determination of men's skills and activities by the 
market? (2) the breakdown of the skills hierarchy into 
minute, boring tasks; (3) the increase in the number of 
workers; (4) increased production leading to overproduction; 
(5) the alternate unemployment and decline of wages for the 
workers.
Manifestations of Alienation
The four forms of alienation are related in sequential 
order to one another. The following propositions demon­
strate the relationships among these forms. The propositions 
in the first set are basic propositions from the text of 
Marx; the propositions in the second set are their logical 
derivatives.
Basic Propositions;
1.1 The greater the alienation of the worker from the act 
of production, the greater will be his alienation 
from the product. (72)
1.1.1 The greater the alienation of the worker from the . 
product, the greater will be his alienation from 
nature. (74-75)
1.1.2 The greater the alienation of the worker from nature,
the greater will be his alienation from other men.
(79, 76-77)
1.2.1 The greater the alienation of the worker from the 
product, the greater will be his alienation from him­
self. (73, 74-75, 76)
1.2.2 The greater the alienation of the worker from himself,




1.3 The greater the alienation of the worker from the act 
of production, the greater will be his alienation from 
nature.
1.4 The greater the alienation of the worker from the act 
of production, the greater will be his alienation 
from himself.
1.5 The greater the alienation of the worker from the act 
of production, the greater will be his alienation 
from other men.
1.6 The greater the alienation of the worker from the 
product, the greater will be his alienation from other 
men.
The central importance of work (production) is seen 
immediately. Alienation from one's work results in aliena­
tion from the product, from oneself and nature and from 
other men. It can be concluded that a society in which a
I
large number of men (people) are alienated in their work is 
likely to have great problems which may not be resolved as 
long as the economic system sustains such a work situation.
Immediate Consequences of Alienation
Private property.— The relation between private 
property and alienation has been demonstrated already with 
regard to the sources of alienation.
Basid Proposition:
1. The greater the extent of alienation of labour in 
.Society, the greater the probability of the main­
tenance (persistence) and growth of private property 
as a system. (Interdependent) (80)
' V ) r
The greater the persistence and growth of the system 
of private property, the greater the development of 
alienated labour in society.
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The interdependence and reciprocity of these two 
phenomena are clear. Private property basically creates the 
conditions in which alienation develops. Alienation, on the 
other hand, sustains and reinforces that which has created 
it. The growth of one contributes to the growth of the 
other. This is, in a sense, the key to Marx's theory of 
alienation, for the occurrence of alienation is inevitable 
in an economic system based on private property. Likewise, 
the ultimate elimination of alienation, in the Marxian sense, 
is possible only with the abolition of private property, 
that is, of the ownership and control of the means of produc­
tion for the private interests of a few.
Wages.— A second immediate consequence of alienated 
labour is the wage system. The following propositions 
illustrate the limitations and disastrous effects of the wage 
system on the worker.
Basic Proposition;
2. The greater the development of alienation (and private
property) in society, the greater the development of 
the wage system. (81)
2.1.1 The greater the development of the wage system, the 
more dependent the worker becomes on wages, exclusive 
of other sources of income. (21)
2.1.2 The more dependent the worker becomes on wages, the 
more he strives to maximize his income in order to 
emulate the material well-being of the capitalist.
(25)
2.1.3 The more the worker tries to emulate the material 
well-being of the capitalist, the more the worker 
suffers from overwork. (23)
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2.1.4 .‘. The greater the development of the wage system,
the greater the suffering and alienation of the worker.
2.2 The more dependent the worker becomes on wages, the
more affected he is by fluctuations in market prices. 
(21-22)
Again, an interdependent relationship between wages 
and alienation becomes apparent. The sources of income are 
limited for the worker and his real income is greatly 
affected by market conditions. Because of many effects of 
capitalism on the worker he strives to imitate the material 
existence of the capitalist. His desire for “his share of 
the goods" has been created by the system. The end results 
for the worker are negative.
Marx maintained that as long as the worker is viewed 
as an instrument of production by the capitalist, the 
worker's wages will be stabilized at a subsistence level.
In this situation of alienated labor the capitalist is inter­
ested only in maintaining his workers at a minimum subsis­
tence level for productive purposes. Furthermore, he clearly 
states that an increase in wages (which generally comes only
by force), does not change the work situation nor gain
"status and dignity" for the worker. The latter will never 
be achieved as long as the worker is treated as capital and
is bought, sold and bargained for as a commodity.
Relation of the non-worker to the worker.— The extent 
to which alienation affects other people involved in a 
capitalist economy is indicated by the third consequence of 
alienation. A general proposition is drawn from the
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discussion of the non-worker's relation to the worker1s 
situation.
Basic Proposition;
3. The greater the.(experienced) alienation of the
worker, the greater the (theoretical) alienation of 
the non-worker. (83)
As discussed in Chapter VI, the non-worker cannot 
escape the state of alienation. His alienation is different 
from the worker's, in its form and sources. That is, to the 
extent that the worker experiences the activity of aliena­
tion, the non-worker experiences the attitude of alienation. 
For example, the worker experiences alienation in one real, 
practical sense from lack of control in production and over 
the product while the non-worker experiences alienation from 
lack of participation in production and creation of the 
product he controls. The implication is that alienation for 
the non-worker is a function of separation and detachment 
from an activity while for the worker it is a result of 
meaninglessness and powerlessness within the activity. The 
final result of this difference in the experience of aliena­
tion is that the non-worker may not be able or willing to 
recognize the worker's alienation and, holding the economic 
power, is able to protect himself from such experiences. The 
final solution is action or revolution by the workers, which 
will be elaborated below.
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Long-Range consequences of Alienation
The long-range consequences of alienation are those 
which are less closely related to Alienation as Marx analyzes 
it in the section oh estranged labour but which are referred 
to, at length, in other parts of the manuscripts. They are 
the continually emerging results of alienation and the 
capitalistic system which breeds it.
State of the worker.— The most important long-range
consequence of alienation concerns the state of the worker.
He is treated as a commodity, his needs and desires are
ignored, and he becomes increasingly separated as a class
from the non-workers.
1.1 The greater the development of alienated labour, the 
more the worker becomes a commodity and is treated 
accordingly. (21, 85, 69)
1.1.1 The more that labour produces commodities, the more 
it produces itself and the worker as a commodity. (69)
1.1.2 The more the worker becomes a commodity, the more his 
value in the labour market is determined by supply 
and demand.
1.1.3 The more the worker becomes a commodity in the market 
place, the more subject he is to the effects of price 
fluctuations, competition, and overproduction.
1.1.4 To the extent that production produces man as a com­
modity, it also produces man as a "spiritually and 
physically dehumanised being." (85)
1.2 The more the system produces and treats man as a com­
modity, the less the system directs itself toward 
man's needs and desires for self-fulfillment.
1.2.1 The more wealth the worker produces, the poorer he 
becomes. (21)
1.2.2 The more wealth the worker produces, the more his 
production increases in power and range. (69)
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1.1.3 The more the worker becomes a commodity in the market 
place, the more subject he is to the effects of price 
fluctuations, competition, and overproduction.
1.3 The greater the development of alienation, the greater 
the separation and dichotomization of the workers and 
non-workers.
As discussed earlier, alienation increases and the 
state of the worker becomes progressively worse, even under 
prosperous conditions so long as a capitalistic economy 
exists. Marx devotes considerable space in his manuscripts 
to describing the ways in which the worker suffers.
Increased value on things.— Another consequence of 
alienation related to the worsening state of the worker is 
the valuation of things, of material goods. Alienation is 
created by an economic system which is founded upon the pro­
duction and consumption of goods for profit. The more the 
system is directed toward material goods, the more it is 
directed away from men. Hence, a reciprocal reversible rela­
tionship is found between the value of men and of things:
2.1 The greater the devaluation of man (alienation) the 
greater the value assigned to things. (69)
(reversible)
The increased value of things determines the kind and 
use of technology cfoaa production.
2.2 The greater the value assigned to things, the more 
technology is directed toward producing things.
2.2.1 Because the goal of capitalism is profit, technology 
is used to produce things which yield the greatest 
profit.
2.2.2 The more technology is directed toward producing things 
for profit, the greater is the misuse of technology.
(not used to serve man's needs and desires) (115-18, etc.)
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Technology becomes misused, according to Marx; that 
is, it is used to produce goods for profit rather than to 
serve men's needs and desires. Therefore, in order to 
assure this profit, needs and desires for these goods must 
be created.
2.3" The greater the value assigned to things, the greater 
the creation of artificial needs and desires. (115)
The increase of the value of material goods leads to
the dominance and disproportionate power of money. Money
becomes the only true need whose most important attribute is
its quantity. (116)
t
2.4 The greater the value assigned to things, the greater 
the importance and value placed on money. (119, 125)
2.4.1 The greater the importance placed on money, the more 
money becomes valued in itself and becomes an end in 
itself. (116, 125)
2.4.2 To the extent that money reduces everything to its 
abstract form, it reduces itself to something merely 
quantitative. (116)
Marx is fearful particularly about the concentration 
of money in society, which he sees as inevitable, given other 
trends withdnt capitalism.
2.4.3 The greater the concentration of extravagant wealth,
the greater the likelihood of wasteful spending and
continual pursuit of pleasure. (126, 137, 138-39)
2.4.4. The greater the concentration of money, the greater
the extravagant use of money. (116, 119, 140)
2.4.5 The greater the extravagant use of money, the more
other men in society are deprived of a decent 
existence. (126)
The great importance of money creates immediate, dis­
astrous results for human relationships. And it contributes 
further to the alienation of man.
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2.4.6 The greater the importance of money, the more it
becomes the mediator of human relationships. (125,
139, 141)
2.4.7 The greater the importance of money, the more human 
relationships become only means to economic ends.
(126, 125, 85)
2.4.8 The greater the importance of money, the greater the
effects of the transformative power of money. (141)
2.4.9 The greater the transformative power of money, the 
more money, the more money allows one to purchase 
power or qualities and abilities which one does not 
naturally have. (138-39; 140)
2.4.10 The greater the importance of money, the more it 
changes or destroys the reciprocity in human relation 
ships. (85, 118, 139)
Asceticism and conservatism.— Two related consequences 
of alienation and capitalism are asceticism and conservatism. 
While both phenomena are present initially in the development 
of capitalism, alienation contributes to the increased 
pervasiveness of both. The relationship is not unlike the 
interdependent relationship of alienation and private 
property.
3.1 The greater the development of alienation and capital­
ism, the greater the development of asceticism and a 
conservative view of man. (118)
3.1.1 The greater the power of the capitalist over the 
worker, the more the capitalist reduces the needs of 
the worker to the lowest and barest levels of sur­
vival. (118)
3.1.2 The more the capitalist reduces the needs of the 
worker, the greater is his tendency to establish this 
low level of living as the acceptable standard of 
living for the worker. (118)
3.1.3 To the extent that the capitalist expects the worker 
to live at a low level, he (capitalist) perceives any 
luxury— any enjoyment or activity— as reprehensible—  
as unnecessary and immoral. (118)
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3.1.4 The more one denies oneself (or saves), the less one 
develops his human potential. (119, 120-21)
3.1.5 To the extent that asceticism or self-denial in 
capitalism develops, asceticism tends to serve 
economic rather than human ends. (118)
These propositions are specific illustrations of the
mat manner in which alienation affects the non-worker. Because
of his power and concern with profit, the non-worker either
deliberately or inadvertently ignores the.needs of the worker.
The worker (employed or unemployed) is forced consequently to
live a low level of existence. This is defined then as
appropriate and any attempt to enjoy life on the part of the
worker is perceived as frivolous and immoral. The ideology
of asceticism and conservatism, which is reenforced by
alienation, is as circular as the life pattern of the poor.
There is a general application of asceticism, so that even
those who are able financially and in other ways to improve
themselves as human beings are discouraged from doing so.
"The less you are, the more you have. . . . "  (119)
Dominance of economic over human problems. — The final 
general consequence of alienation which has been drawn from 
the Manuscripts concerns the general orientation and goals of 
society. Marx seems to be indicating that with the develop­
ment of alienation and capitalism, the major concerns of 
society become economic rather than social or human problems. 
The following general proposition is derived.
4.1 The greater the development of alienation and
capitalism, the more the structure and goals of 
society are diverted from human goals to economic ones.
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Because people's interests are focused upon economic 
gains, social relationships suffer and the worker and his 
problems are ignored.
4.1.1 The more society is oriented toward economic ends, 
the more human relationships suffer.
4.1.2 To the extent that one does not directly serve the 
interests Of the capitalist, one is not recognized 
nor considered to be the responsibility of the 
capitalist. (85, 125-26)
Those with economic power ignore particularly the problems
of the unemployed.
And perhaps worst of all, the worker is forced to pay
high rent for bad housing, to be subjected to the precarious-
ness of renting and to live in an environment which is
unhealthy and ugly.
4.1.3 "The lower the standard of living, the higher the 
houserent." (50)
4.1.4 To the extent that a man is poor, capitalist society 
dismisses his need for fresh air, cleanliness, light 
and good living conditions. (117)
A general interpretation of Marx on the latter point 
is that pollution of water and air, the growth of undesirable 
cities and the destruction of nature are indicators of 
capitalism*s responsibility to society and the needs of men.
The Resolution of Alienation
Because of the intimate link between private property 
and alienation, the resolution or transcendance of alienation 
is dependent upon the abolition of private property. In 
addition to the negation of private property, there should 
be a positive attempt to establish a humanistic society.
Marx refers to socialism as the ultimate form of a society 
directed toward human goals and needs, a society which is 
more than simply the negation of capitalism.
Basic Proposition;
1. The greater the movement of the economy from private
property toward socialism, the greater the livelihood 
of the resolution of alienation. (103, 81-82, 98-99)
1.1 The more complete the annulment of private property, 
the greater the likelihood that man will regain his 
sense of self. (107-108)
1'. 2 The more complete the annulment of private property,
the greater the likelihood that meaningful social
relations will develop and will become a means of 
personal expression for those involved. (107, 112, 
124-25)
1.3 The more complete the annulment of private property,
the greater the likelihood that private property will 
exist only as objects of enjoyment and activity for 
man. (137)
These minor propositions specify some of the ways in which 
the abolition of private property works to destroy aliena­
tion.
These propositions and the accompanying discussion 
have been formulated as an attempt to summarize Marx1s theory 
of alienation in his 1844 Manuscripts. The major questions 
of the relevance of such a theory for the study and analysis 
of alienation in the modern world will be discussed in the 
following section.
II. MARX AND THE SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF ALIENATION
The place and significance of Marxian theory in the 
field of sociology has been debated extensively. Certainly 
a theory should be able to generate ideas and, directly or 
indirectly, problems of research. It should be relevant to
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the general questions to which the discipline addresses it­
self. The sociological relevance of the 1844 Manuscripts 
has been questioned rather severely. However, if they have 
been dismissed often as philosophy, they have not been 
thoroughly examined in terms of their sociological import.
The previous chapters and the first section of this chapter 
have demonstrated that a theory of alienation, concerned with 
relationships among social phenomena and containing ideas 
that are related systematically, exists in the Manuscripts.
The significance of Marx's theory for the sociological 
study of alienation will be evaluated by a consideration of 
the major criticisms or questions which have been raised 
about the Manuscripts and Marx's ideas of alienation.
The Question of Abstractness
The question of abstractness is the one to which Marx 
was probably the most sensitive in writing the Manuscripts.
He had become aware of the problem as a result of his study 
of Hegel and his intellectual associations with the Young 
Hegelians.
Marx devotes considerable attention in the last sec­
tion of the third manuscript, which is a "Critique of the 
Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole," to a criticism 
of Hegelian abstraction. In criticizing Hegel and congratu­
lating Feuerbach, Marx raises the matter of abstractness 
continually.1 Particularly in his critique of Hegel's 
Phenomenology of Mind Marx talks of the philosophic mind as 
abstract, alienated thinking. Hegel understands societal 
entities only as abstract thoughh-forms and his analysis of 
history is abstract and speculative, not concerned with real 
men. This kind of intellectual activity is an example of
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alienation for Marx. Even when Marx discusses "the positive
1 *5aspects of the Hegelian dialectic,"'’ especially Hegel's 
recognition of labour as man's basic act, he condemns Hegel's 
analysis as formal, abstract, unrelated to "real man." The 
great appeal of Feuerbach, so obvious in these writings, is 
his materialism, his concern with the concrete. Marx 
broadened materialism to mean a concern with basic social 
and economic conditions as determinants of all other dimen­
sions of man's life. He turned his attention to the concrete 
and the empirical. This concern becomes more obvious in the 
consideration of the following question.
The Question of the Sociological Basis of the Theory
Probably the most openly debated question is the one 
regarding the sociological basis of the theory. The Manu­
scripts. more than any of his other writings, have been 
described as philosophical, as representing the young, ideal­
istic Marx who was in a period of rejecting philosophy while 
still undeveloped in his sociology. Associated with this 
view has been the position that there are two Marxes, the 
young and the old, and the accompanying conclusion that only 
the young philosophical Marx was interested in the philosoph­
ical problem of alienation. A thorough systematic study of 
all the writings of Marx, which is neither the purpose nor 
scope of this dissertation, is needed to settle these debates.
The present analysis of the early Manuscripts of Marx 
has resulted in the conclusion that Marx is indeed soci­
ological in these writings. First, he is concerned with man 
and his societal conditions. As demonstrated in Chapter Two, 
a distinctly sociological concept of society and man's 
relation to it can be found therein. Marx spends
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considerable time discussing man as an essentially social 
being and man els society. Man's ability to symbolize, man's 
consciousness, makes him unique. Finally, Marx warns against 
the establishment of society as an abstraction.
The question of whether the Manuscripts are philosophy 
or sociology has been confused partly by the terminology of 
these writings. Marx borrowed several concepts from the 
philosophical tradition of his time as well as from the 
political economists. However, careful examination reveals 
that new meanings were assigned and that his use of some 
terms was meant to be polemical or satirical. A taxonomy of 
concepts has been identified in this analysis and, as shown 
in Chapter II, the major categories of analysis into which 
these concepts fall, are economic and social (also social- 
psychological) . -The Manuscripts should be called more 
appropriately The Economic and Social Manuscripts of 1844.
The only major philosophical concern is Marx's critique of 
Hegel in the fifth section of the third manuscript. The 
materialistic, empirical approach is clearly demonstrated by 
the focus on the economic conditions and their social conse­
quences in the development of alienated labour. Even such 
terms as objectification, appropriation, labour, alienation, 
and species being are transformed to specific social, 
empirical meanings whose referents can be observed in the 
real world of human ejqperience.
In addition to a concern with man and society and the 
use of social concepts, Marx is sociological because of his 
intellectual perspective. He is a problem-oriented soci­
ologist who takes an analytical and critical view of present
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societal phenomena and their tendencies. He focuses on the 
dynamic contemporary processes using the dialectic method.
He concludes that society and social change can be understood 
best in terms of conflict. In contemporary terms, he is a 
sociologist of work who focuses on the nature and meaning of 
work in industrial capitalism. He is also a student of 
ideology and social change whose concern is the long-range 
implications of capitalism for modern western society. The 
problems, the objects of study, the concepts and categories 
of analysis utilized, the approach of his work— all indicate 
a sociological foundation. The conclusion is obvious— these 
are not philosophical writings, except in the sense of an 
ethical preference for a humanistic society in which meaning­
ful work and healthy human relations could flourish. These 
values are no different from the quest of a better society 
which is implicit in the tradition of social science.
The Question of Circularity
The quest for the identification of cause and effect 
relationship in Marx has led to the conclusion by some that 
Marx is circular in his thinking and neglects the empirical 
relationships of his phenomena. An examination of Marx's 
theory of alienation has demonstrated that the criticism of 
circularity is unjustified. Marx saw social change and the 
whole of human history from the perspective of immanence, 
that is, as a result of the unfolding of material conditions 
and the consequences of men's actions. In recognizing that
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man is. society and that men make history, Marx also recog­
nized that the relationship between man and his social con­
ditions, indeed the relationships among all societal 
phenomena, are very complex. Kis awareness of these complexi­
ties can be seen in the Manuscripts as he strives to identify 
specific relationships and their significance.
The most basic relationship, the relation of alienation 
to private property, is concluded to be an interdependent, 
reciprocal relationship. The four manifestations of aliena­
tion are related causally and sequentially. In the identi-
j
fication of the sources and the consequences of alienation,' 
reversible or interdependent relationships appear often, as 
explicated in the first section of this chapter as well as 
earlier. The interdependence of these phenomena means that, 
while, for example, the major sources— private property, 
political economy (and its four elements) and the division 
of labour and exchange-produce alienation in its several 
forms, these manifestations and accompanying consequences in 
turn reinforce and work to perpetuate the very sources from 
which they emanate. This occurs in such a way that an 
increment in one factor (alienation) creates an increment in 
the other (private property) and vice versa.
The intricate interdependence of these phenomena lead 
to the general conclusion that alienation and capitalism are 
inextricably bound in a mutually reinforcing relation that 
must, therefore, work itself to its final conclusions. The 
predominance of the interdependent relationship among social
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phenomena cannot be identified as a circular conclusion.
The interdependent and reciprocal nature of the relations 
among the elements of alienation and capitalism (in fact, 
the elements of society in general) has great import for the 
solutions offered for the problem of alienation, and for the 
whole theory of social change.
The Question of Revolution
An appreciation of Marx as a perceptive student of 
social change has not been sufficient to convince many 
readers of Marx of the acceptability or even of the necessity 
of revolution. This is the ultimate point at which modern 
intellectuals and social scientists find it imperative to 
reject Marx. Why, it is ashed, does this insightful, tho 
thorough analyst of society and historical process find the 
final key to social change in revolution? Why does he not 
accept reform as a more reasonable and more evident form of 
change? The common resolution of the matter is to point out 
that this is one of Marx's shortsighted and mistaken con­
clusions, formulated because he was unable to anticipate the 
developments in modern capitalism in the twentieth century 
and because he probably became frustrated in seeking a solu­
tion to the problems he identified.
An examination of the Manuscripts affords some insight 
into the necessity for revolution which is mentioned, though 
briefly, in these early writings. Marx's study of history 
and of the trends of his day lead him to an immanent concep-
conception of society. The elements of industrial capitalism, 
founded upon private property and private interest, unfold to 
produce alienated labour and its consequences. The manifesta­
tions and consequences in turn work to perpetuate their 
sources within the economic system. Everything that grows 
out of capitalism reinforces it and helps it to grow. It is 
^precisely the interdependent, reciprocal nature of these 
relationships, as explained above, which creates the neces­
sity of revolution. Reform cannot alter these developed 
interdependencies. Therefore, the final solutioniis apparents 
in order to eliminate alienation, there must be a major break 
in the relationships between alienation and capitalism which 
are responsible for its perpetuation. The ever-increasing 
interdependence of these segments of society requires that 
any effective attempt to change society, to break the con­
tinual reinforcement and perpetuation of conditions, must be 
radical. In short, to disrupt or sever the complex inter­
dependence of alienation and capitalism necessitates revolu­
tion. Marx makes it very clear that the elimination of one 
requires the elimination of the others. The basis of this 
conclusion Is his identification of the interdependent and 
reciprocal relationships among the social variables with 
which he was dealing.
The Question of utopianism
A question, often related to the question of revolu­
tion and by the same students of Marx, that is, those
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intellectuals and social scientists who have only passing 
interest in Marx, is the matter of utopianism in Marx's 
writings. His visions of a classless society or a humanistic 
society make his readers suspicious. Because Marx is a 
critic of society and because he is problem-oriented, he 
also conceives of the ideal model of society. Specifically, 
in the Manuscripts he is concerned with the resolution of 
alienation. This demands a consideration of a society with­
out alienation in terms of its orientation, economic struc­
ture and so on. In the second part of the third manuscript 
Marx discusses the dialectic of change toward a humanistic, 
nonalienated society, toward socialism. This has been 
elaborated in Chapter VII.
Although Marx considers socialism to be a more 
advanced state of society than communism (a position state 
which is more than simply the negation of capitalism), he 
makes reference to mature communism as humanism which equals 
naturalism. That is, the resolution of alienation is the 
resolution of conflict between man and nature, between man 
and man. Socialism is considered to be the final complete 
humanism.
The question is raised immediately that a final 
state— humanistic {and according to his later writings, 
classless)— is reached with the implication that the movement 
of history is halted. An apparent contradiction with the 
dialectic exists. Why does Marx even imply the possibility 
of a final state of humanism?
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Two observations seem important with regard to this 
question. First is the fact that Marx does not specify in 
detail his utopia. He simply seems to accept the notion 
that man is capable of establishing a more humanistic order, 
that he is capable of resolving many of the problems which 
modern civilization has produced. He envisions a society in 
which a man's work is inherently meaningful and rewarding, 
in which man has a number of skills which he performs, and 
in which all of life is an integral whole. He seems con­
vinced that modern man is capable of producing such a 
society if he has the will and ff he is not interested 
mainly in self-interest and profit, but in human needs. How 
any generation or society works this out is not Marx's basic 
problem; he is only posing the possibility4 He is not so 
idealistic that he carries the conception of the perfect 
society and calls upon the men of history to make it a -real.it 
reality. He knows, quite to the contrary, that material con­
ditions, the events of history and the actions of men form 
the key to a better society.
But does the contradiction not exist still? It is 
the conclusion of the present study of Marx&srearlyarly 
manuscripts that Marx's view of the humanistic society in 
the stream of history is not in agreement with the view 
usually assigned to him. That is to say, it is unlikely 
that Marx conceived of a final, static humanistic society 
which would imply the finality of change and man's final 
dream. Although he speaks of the end of capitalism as the
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end of prehistory or the beginning of human history, this is 
hardly to be taken in its literal sense.
Therefore, the second observation on the question of 
utopianism which has resulted from this analysis is that 
Marx did not in fact hold to a view of history which culmi­
nated in a classless, humanistic society. This writer's 
conclusion is that Marx sees all of human history as man's 
attempt to strive toward a humanistic society in which 
artificial, particularly economic, distinctions among men 
are minimized. It is likely that Marx's conception of a 
humanistic, classless society has been interpreted too 
literally, by his critics who exclaim that such a society is 
impossible and by his so-called disciples who utilize the 
notion for ideological purposes which are anti-Marx and anti­
humanist. If one views the entire idea as process, as the 
movement of history, the usual difficulties are resolved.
The Question of Contemporary Relevance
Since Marx was concerned with the effects of a par­
ticular economic system of one hundred years ago on man's 
work and general life situation, the question is often raised 
about the relevance of his analyses for twentieth-century 
capitalism. It is claimed that economic conditions have 
changed to such extent that Marx's ideas have little appli­
cability to the modern society. However, the present study 
has resulted in the conclusion that, in spite of certain 
changes in economic conditions since Marx's day, the
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structure and goals of capitalism and their effects on 
society remain nearly the same.
In considering the situation of the worker# for 
example# it is frequently observed that legal reform and 
unionism have prevented the worker from becoming the victim­
ized proletarian which Marx predicted. It will be recalled 
that Marx was against unionism because he felt that unions 
could do little to improve work conditions since the basic 
system is the problem. He sees their only result as "better 
payment for the slave." However the history of unionism has 
demonstrated that unions arise only after much conflict# 
hardship and violence. Capitalism has not indicated volun­
tary concern for the worker and has succumbed to his demands 
only when facing extreme pressures. Unions themselves have 
grown into large quasi-capitalist bureaucracies which have 
lost contact with and interest in the worker. A noteworthy 
example of Marxian theory is the case of unionized coal mine 
workers in Kentucky and West Virginia who suffer at the hands 
of the companies and the unions. These workers have had to 
join together informally against both the owners and union 
leaders to pressure for badly needed health and safety mea­
sures in the mines. Neither the company nor the union will 
assume responsibility and aid for the large number of miners 
who contract occupational diseases. The laws appertaining 
are weak and unenforced.
The relevance of the Manuscripts lies with Marx's 
identification of the problems which capitalism creates and
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the long-range implications of such an economic system- His 
treatment of the sources, manifestations and consequences of 
alienation contains many examples: intense competition,
emphasis on money, concern only with profit, the misuse of 
technology, a minute division of labour, concentrated monopo­
lies and the primacy of private interest over the general 
welfare of men. Many passages of the Manuscripts which have 
been quoted earlier describe social and environmental prob­
lems which contemporary America now faces on a large scale. 
Marx foresaw many of these long-range consequences a century 
ago.
The relevance of the Manuscripts for contemporary 
sociological research will be the final question for con­
sideration.
The Question of Researchabilitv
Ultimately a theory must face the test of its empirical 
usefulness. This question is raised about Marx's theory of 
alienation, that is, about how it can be used to research 
and understand alienation in contemporary society.
The present study has attempted to show that Marx's 
writings on alienation provide a theoretical perspective 
which has been lacking generally in recent empirical research. 
The relationships among the sources and consequences of 
alienation have been shown to be interdependent. Therefore, 
the argument that the theory is circular can no longer be 
used to support the position that Marx is unresearchable.
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It has been concluded by Birnbaum and others that 
alienation is not a viable sociological concept. This study 
has demonstrated that Marxian alienation is a concept con­
taining several dimensions or meanings which can be identi­
fied empirically in four major forms or manifestations.
Marx's theory is highly heuristic in suggesting the 
hinds of problems and the segments of the social structure 
which need to be studied to find out more about alienation.
■s
For example,_£obert Blauner^ has conducted research on 
alienation in several different types of industries and has 
utilized a Marxian perspective in studying the relationship 
between type of work, the technological and social environ­
ment in which it is performed, and dimensions of alienation.
It is the conclusion of this writer that Marx's theory 
is researchable. Certainly good research must be based upon 
theory. The first section of this chapter has shown that 
systematic statements of relationships among social phenomena 
can be found in this theory of alienation. The sources, 
manifestations, and consequences of alienation are identified 
in general terms. Each of these general dimensions could be 
specified in terms of empirical referents and could be studied 
thereby in the immediate situation of the alienated indi­
vidual. The propositions can be developed as hypotheses for 
study of the many relationships which they already suggest.
The theory as a Whole serves an important theoretical base 
for the study of alienated labour in capitalism. The theory 
will become useful particularly if the perspective from which
1 8 5
alienation is studied is changed. That is, sociologists 
might study the problem of alienation in terms of (1) one's 
work activities, work environment and relation of work to 
personal life; (2) continuing change in individual lives and 
the course of society which suggests that alienation is a 
process rather than a state; (3) explore the implications of 
the social and economic structure of society for the aliena­
tion of its members; (4) adopt a critical and more skeptical 
view of the social order. The study of alienation implies a 
certain kind of sociology, which is prepared to deal with 
conflict, process and change and which is not satisfied with 
examining only the structure of appearances of social reality.
It was this approach which was typical of Marx as he 
searched for explanations in social reality to two basic 
questions: (1) what kind of society (economic and political
system) is most conducive to the development and fulfillment 
of free individuals and (2) what are the effects of the 
modern capitalistic industrial society on human beings?
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